Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2024

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, issued on 8 March 2024 (S/2024/222), including on the provisions of resolution 2695 (2023). Exchanges of fire across the Blue Line continued throughout the reporting period, in repeated breach of the cessation of hostilities and in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While most exchanges of fire were confined to within a few kilometres on either side of the Blue Line, several strikes impacted much deeper into Lebanese and Israeli territory. On both sides of the Blue Line, fatalities were reported, with residential areas impacted and tens of thousands of civilians displaced. The continued escalation across the Blue Line underlined the imperative for urgent steps towards a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. From 21 February to 20 June, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 4,572 trajectories of projectiles fired in both directions across the Blue Line. Of these trajectories, 1,540 were fired from north of the Blue Line and 3,032 from south of the Blue Line. The highest number of trajectories was on 12 June, with 92 from north to south and 54 from south to north. Each trajectory may represent multiple projectiles. Almost all trajectories recorded were of rockets, mortar bombs and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or projectiles fired from light weapons.

3. UNIFIL detected rockets fired from north of the Litani River – and therefore outside the Force’s area of operations – on 14 occasions, with 131 trajectories in total detected, originating mostly from north-east of Burghuz (Sector East), as well as from the vicinity of Yuhmur and Wadiyeh. On seven occasions, UNIFIL detected 65 trajectories in total from south of the Blue Line that landed just north of the Litani
River. In addition, according to statements by the actors concerned or media reports, there were other strikes impacting north of the Litani River that UNIFIL could not independently verify.

Figure I
Weekly trajectories detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (8 October 2023 to 15 June 2024)

Source: UNIFIL.

4. In public statements, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for daily strikes from Lebanese territory against military installations of the Israel Defense Forces, as well as Israeli population centres and residential buildings reportedly used by Israel Defense Forces personnel. Hizbullah often stated that its strikes were in response to attacks by the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon. Hizbullah conducted several attacks simultaneously using artillery, anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, rockets and drones. Both the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah demonstrated increasing use of air platforms, with Hizbullah also utilizing advanced surface-to-air systems (see para. 18).

5. On multiple occasions, Hizbullah targeted Israel Defense Forces positions in the Israeli-occupied Golan, in particular at Kela and Yoav, with rockets or drones, as well as the Israel Defense Forces air traffic control base at Mount Meron with rockets and the Iron Dome batteries near Kfar Blum, Tel Na’ama, Bet Hillel, Ramot Naftali, Yardena and Za’urah with drones. Hizbullah also stated that it had targeted drone jamming systems at an Israeli naval site near Rosh Haniqra and the headquarters of the Ninety-First Division of the Israel Defense Forces in Biranit, as well as various brigades on multiple occasions. On 14 May, Hizbullah downed an Israel Defense Forces reconnaissance balloon between Rumaysh and Ayn Ibil (Sector West).

6. On 17 April, a total of 4 civilians and 14 Israeli soldiers were reportedly injured as a result of a combined anti-tank guided missile and drone attack that Hizbullah
carried out against Israeli troops in Arab al-Aramshe. A contractor of the Israel Defense Forces reportedly died on 26 April following a Hizbullah attack on an Israel Defense Forces convoy near Ruwaysat al-Alam on 25 April. On 6 May, two Israel Defense Forces reservists were reportedly killed following a drone attack by Hizbullah near Metulla. Two Israel Defense Forces personnel were reportedly killed near Malikiya on 8 May and Hurfeish on 5 June, respectively.

7. On 27 February, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas stated that it had attacked an Israel Defense Forces brigade in Bet Hillel with rockets. On 21 April, it claimed responsibility for an attack on the Israel Defense Forces barracks at Shomera and, on 29 April, for an attack on the Israel Defense Forces 769th Brigade at Camp Gibor, near Qiryat Shmona.

8. The Israel Defense Forces issued daily public statements about their operations, against Hizbullah “terrorists”, “military buildings” or “military positions”, as well as residential buildings allegedly occupied by Hizbullah members. UNIFIL observed artillery strikes in which white phosphorus ammunition was used on at least three occasions: on 3 March near Dayr Amis (Sector West), on 3 April near Ayta al-Sha’b (Sector West) and on 6 June near Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces conducted almost daily air strikes in Lebanon, including to strike Hizbullah commanders in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Israel Defense Forces struck a house in Juwayya (Sector West) overnight between 11 and 12 June, killing Hizbullah commander Taleb Sami Abdallah and three other Hizbullah members. Abdallah was reportedly the most senior Hizbullah figure killed since 8 October 2023. The following day, Hizbullah carried out the highest number of attacks since 8 October, claiming 19 operations. The Israel Defense Forces also increasingly struck Hizbullah members travelling in cars or on motorcycles. On 13 March, a senior Hamas operative, Hadi Mustafa, was killed in a drone strike by the Israel Defense Forces in Tyre (Sector West). On 29 March, the Minister of Defence of Israel, Yoav Gallant, stated, “I arrived at the Northern Command today to closely monitor another successful assassination of a commander in Hezbollah [...]”. On 24 April, Gallant claimed, “Half of Hezbollah commanders in South Lebanon have been eliminated”. As at 20 June, Hizbullah had declared the deaths of 337 of its members since 8 October 2023, while other non-State armed groups in Lebanon acknowledged around 75 fatalities.

9. On 4 March, Hizbullah claimed that it had thwarted two alleged Israeli infiltration attempts near Ramiyah and Rumays (both Sector West). On 15 April, the Israel Defense Forces soldiers reported that four soldiers had been injured, one seriously, following an explosion “during operational activities” near the “border fence” in Tall Isma’il.

10. As at 20 June, the Israeli authorities had reported 17 Israel Defense Forces fatalities in northern Israel since 8 October.

11. Residential areas and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the Blue Line were impacted. In May and June, bushfires occurred on both sides of the Blue Line following exchanges of fire. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that, as at 13 June, there had been at least 95 civilian fatalities in Lebanon, including 12 children and 30 women, 3 journalists and 21 health workers, since 8 October 2023, and that 95,228 civilians were displaced. According to Lebanese media, a family of three was killed in an air strike in Hula on 5 March; a pregnant woman and three Hizbullah reserve members were killed in a strike on a building in Khirbat Silm (Sector West) on 9 March; a woman and child were killed in a strike on a house in Hanin on 23 April; a family of four was killed in a strike in Mays al-Jabal on 5 May; and two children were killed in Nahariyyah, Sidon district, outside the area of operations, on 17 May. On 23 May, one individual was killed and three children
were injured following a strike on a school bus in Kafr Dajjal, Nabatiyeh district, outside the area of operations. In identical letters dated 29 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (A/78/898-S/2024/416), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “This is the first time since the war began that a school bus has been targeted.” Two paramedics were killed in a strike in Blida on 22 February; three in a strike on a civil defence centre in Udayasah on 3 March; seven in an air strike on Habbariyah (Sector East) on 27 March; and one in a strike on an ambulance near Naqurah (Sector West) on 31 May. On 27 May, three people were killed following a strike on a motorcycle near the entrance of a hospital in Bint Jubayl (Sector West). On 1 June, a hospital in Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) and a public school in Hannawiyah (Sector West) were reportedly impacted by Israeli strikes. In identical letters dated 28 March addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/835-S/2024/272), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “The deliberate killing of paramedics, destruction of relief facilities and denial of vital services to the civilian population by Israel are war crimes and a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law.” On 10 May, a contractor of a telecommunications company and a paramedic of the Amal-affiliated Risala Scout Association were killed in a drone strike on a mobile telecommunications station near Tayr Harfa (Sector West).

12. The most impacted population centres north of the Blue Line in the UNIFIL area of operations included Alma al-Sha’ab, Habis, Ayn al-Arabi, Ayt al-Sha’ab, Mallul, Aytarun, Dayr Amis, Hanin, Jubbayn, Marun al-Ra’s, Marwahin, Naqurah, Ramiyah, Sarda, Yarin, Yarun (all Sector West) and Abbasivah, Basrah, Blida, Hula, Kafir Kila, Kafir Shuba, Majidieh, Markaba, Mays al-Jabal, Muhaybib, Rab al-Thalathin, Wadi Khansha and Udayasah (all Sector East). In identical letters dated 13 March addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/810-S/2024/235), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “Lebanon condemns in the strongest terms the continuous attacks by Israel against its sovereignty, territorial integrity and citizens, in flagrant violation of international law and international humanitarian law.”

13. Civilian fatalities were also reported in Israel. One civilian was killed and several more were injured on 4 March as the result of an anti-tank guided missile attack by Hizbullah on Margaliyyot. On 27 March, Hizbullah fired rockets at an Israel Defense Forces command facility and urban areas in Qiryat Shmona, reportedly killing an Israeli civilian. On 14 May, Hizbullah fired at Adamit and Arab al-Aramshe, reportedly killing a civilian and injuring five soldiers. In identical letters dated 10 June addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2024/450), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that, “since the beginning of the war, 17 soldiers and 10 civilians have been killed along the northern border and 242 soldiers and 78 civilians injured. In addition, 61,184 civilians were forced to flee from their homes.”

14. The most affected population centres in northern Israel included Malikiya, Avivim, Gesher Haziv, Goren, Hanita, Manara, Margaliyyot, Metulla, Missig Am, Qiryat Shmona, Shlomi, Shomera, Shulta, Yuval and Zar’it. In identical letters dated 19 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2024/324), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that Hizbullah has fired “thousands of rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars and drones... towards Israel since 8 October 2023.”

15. The Israel Defense Forces continued to strike targets outside the UNIFIL area of operations, including Baalbek, Hirmel and Jazzin in the Bekaa Valley, and also in Nabatiyeh and Sidon districts. The Israel Defense Forces stated that they had killed a Hizbullah commander near Adlun (Sidon district) on 23 April and senior figures of
Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya in air strikes near Maydun (West Bekaa district) on 26 April and near Majdal Anjar (Bekaa district) on 17 May. On 25 March, a Syrian national was reportedly killed in an air strike on a vehicle in Suwayri (West Bekaa district). The northernmost Israeli strike into Lebanese territory was on 10 June, in the northeastern region of Hirmil.

16. The Lebanese Armed Forces did not engage in the breaches of the cessation of hostilities, despite coming under fire. On 4 June, two Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were reportedly injured as the result of white phosphorus shell explosions in Markaba (Sector East). On 16 March, Lebanese media reported that a Lebanese Armed Forces position near Rumaysh was hit by Israel Defense Forces fire. Lebanese Armed Forces positions were reportedly hit near Aya’ al-Sha’b on 30 March and 29 May and near Bastrah (Sector East) on 4 June. On 9 March, near Aya’ al-Sha’b, a joint Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL patrol was twice subjected to direct small arms fire. The Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle was impacted several times, but the UNIFIL patrol vehicle was not impacted. Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces temporarily discontinued their participation in joint mobile patrols. Joint patrols resumed on 12 March. In identical letters dated 17 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/854-S/2024/317), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “Israel has attacked Lebanese army posts, checkpoints, patrols and surrounding areas more than 216 times”.

17. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty on a daily basis. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL recorded 1,551 air violations by the Israel Defense Forces, totalling 5,682 hours in overflight time – a 110 per cent increase over the same period in 2023. Drones accounted for approximately 79 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft for 18 per cent and unidentified aircraft for 3 per cent. The highest number of daily air violations, 31, was detected on both 22 and 25 February. UNIFIL protested the air violations to the Israel Defense Forces.

18. Hizbullah drones reportedly entered Israeli airspace in violation of Israeli sovereignty and resolution 1701 (2006), but UNIFIL is unable to confirm such violations. Hizbullah stated that it had downed Israeli drones over Lebanese territory with surface-to-air missiles on at least five occasions. On 16 May, Hizbullah claimed that it had carried out its first air attack by launching two missiles from a drone against the Israel Defense Forces in Metulla. In June, Hizbullah claimed, for the first time, to have launched surface-to-air missiles at Israel Defense Forces fighter aircraft in the airspace of Lebanon, and that it had done so on at least three occasions. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL did not observe any ground violations.

19. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL maintained a visible presence and a high operational tempo despite the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, conducting a monthly average of 13,750 operational activities, including 5,999 vehicular patrols, a slight decrease compared with the previous reporting period. At least one woman peacekeeper was involved in 12 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities. UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, conducted an average of 389 Blue Line vehicle patrols and 542 counter-rocket-launching patrols each month. In addition, the Force maintained eight permanent checkpoints, including on the main northern entry routes into the area of operations. Foot patrols, temporary checkpoints, market walks and air operations remained suspended, except for a limited number of foot patrols in areas sufficiently distant from the Blue Line.
20. UNIFIL continued to encounter freedom of movement incidents (see annex I).* In several such incidents, the Lebanese Armed Forces helped to resolve the situation through dialogue with the individuals concerned.

21. Owing to the continued exchanges of fire and contamination of the terrain with unexploded ordnance and remnants of war, UNIFIL was not able to monitor locations of interests on a systematic basis. However, UNIFIL assessed that at least 38 locations of interest, including Green without Borders infrastructure, remained destroyed or damaged since 8 October (see S/2024/222, para. 21).

22. UNIFIL initiated six technical investigations related to incidents of cross-Blue Line fire in the reporting period, concluding one. The Force initiated and concluded eight internal investigations related to projectiles landing in or near UNIFIL positions, attacks on UNIFIL personnel and restrictions of freedom of movement.

23. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

24. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL, independently or in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, discovered unauthorized weapons on 17 occasions, mostly mobile rocket launching platforms and rockets. The Lebanese Armed Forces

* Circulated in the language of submission only.
were informed of all such weapons located and they disposed of them. In addition, UNIFIL observed hunting weapons on 65 occasions.

25. From 21 February to 20 June, the average percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, among the activities that could be conducted in close coordination, was 18.6 per cent, compared with 18.2 per cent for the previous reporting period (see S/2024/222, para. 25).

26. The strategic dialogue process, focused on support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, including the model regiment, and the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy, did not progress significantly during the reporting period. As at 20 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed the deployment of 106 personnel, including 5 officers and 13 women, to the model regiment, down from 110 (see S/2024/222, para. 26). The ground forces of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL conducted 63 joint training exercises. UNIFIL engaged with several Member States with respect to provision of material support for a significant and accelerated deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel to South Lebanon, as part of efforts to promote a return to a cessation of hostilities.

27. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,157 vessels. All 403 vessels referred for inspection by UNIFIL were cleared by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force also conducted maritime observation operations, with 13 hours of helicopter flight time. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy continued to gradually assume command functions for maritime interdiction operations, with support from the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. UNIFIL conducted 78 training activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

28. UNIFIL continued to use its liaison and coordination mechanisms to mitigate the risk of miscalculation and prevent further escalation. UNIFIL coordinated 818 events in support of civilian and humanitarian activities in areas close to the Blue Line, including to facilitate farmers’ access to agricultural harvests, funerals, repair of civilian electricity and communications infrastructure, and movement of civilians, including journalists. UNIFIL supported 199 rescue and recovery operations by the Lebanese Red Cross, as well as 113 Lebanese civil defence operations, including to extinguish bushfires. On 903 occasions, UNIFIL liaised with the parties in connection with UNIFIL force protection and the safety and security of UNIFIL positions and operational activities. Despite such liaison efforts, two civilians were killed in a drone strike in Tayr Harfa on 10 May (see para. 11). UNIFIL had conveyed information to the Israel Defense Forces prior to the commencement of the telecommunications works, but no reply was received.

29. UNIFIL continued to work with the humanitarian country team in Lebanon on the issue of protection of civilians, providing three training sessions to Force personnel on the role of UNIFIL in relation to protection of civilians. In the reporting period, no civilians sought shelter at UNIFIL positions.

30. No tripartite meetings were held, but UNIFIL stands ready to convene a meeting upon request of the parties. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv remains pending, notwithstanding the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for such office.

31. Since 21 February, UNIFIL approved 15 quick-impact projects, 7 of which were in support of post-8 October 2023 crisis response efforts, including to assist Lebanese civil defence centres.
32. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming for 4,247 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, of whom 415 were women, and by supporting the National Commission for Lebanese Women in the implementation of the Lebanese national action plan on resolution 1325 (2000) (see para. 61), as well as the gender unit of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

C. Disarming armed groups

33. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Since 8 October 2023, Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups have repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities in strikes from southern Lebanon into Israel (see paras. 4–7 and 9). The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) continues to restrict the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

34. In addition to Hizbullah, other non-State armed groups, including Al-Quds Brigades of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas and the Al-Fajr Forces of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on northern Israel during the reporting period, while the Amal Movement acknowledged fatalities among its members. On 26 March, the Secretary-General of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya, Sheikh Mohammed Takkoush, stated that his group was coordinating with Hizbullah and Hamas as a “vital necessity to fight Israel.”

35. On 13 June, Hizbullah published statistics claiming 2,125 military operations against Israel, including some carried out up to 35 km inside Israeli territory, since 8 October 2023. On 19 June, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated, “The only way to stop the fire on the Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq fronts is to stop the aggressive war on Gaza and its people within the conditions agreed with the resistance in Palestine.” Nasrallah added, “We obtained new weapons […] We produce our own drones […] We also produce here in Lebanon some kinds of rockets … In past years we spoke of 100,000 resistance members. Now we have surpassed that by far.” On 27 April, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, stated that “Hizbullah decided to respond to the Israeli aggression proportionally, ensuring that any expansion of the Israeli attacks will be met with an increased response, resistance and confrontation from Hizbullah and the resistance in Lebanon.”

36. On 12 March and 15 May, Hizbullah issued statements that its Secretary-General Nasrallah had met with Hamas delegations in Beirut. On 15 May, Hizbullah stated that discussions had covered the “various support fronts, namely Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.”

37. The security situation in the Palestine refugee camps remained largely calm, notwithstanding sporadic instances of violence arising from personal or criminal disputes.

38. Owing to the continued presence of armed actors, four United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools in Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp in Sidon remained inaccessible to UNRWA staff and students.

39. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

40. During three counter-terrorism operations, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested 14 individuals on terrorism-related charges, 8 of whom were allegedly affiliated with Da’esh.
41. Numerous personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 22 fatalities, including 1 woman, and at least 106 injuries, mostly in northern Lebanon.

D. Arms embargo and border control

42. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex II).** While the United Nations takes allegations of arms transfers seriously, it is unable to substantiate them independently.

43. In identical letters dated 22 March addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/823-S/2024/256), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that the “irresponsible and flagrant Israeli violation of Lebanese sovereignty through Global Navigation Satellite System spoofing could have disastrous consequences that will endanger civil aviation and threatens the safety of civilian passengers in Lebanese airspace.”

44. Reports of military engagement by Hizbullah in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

45. During the reporting period, the Lebanese security forces arrested 59 individuals in at least 15 counter-narcotics operations.

46. On 12 May, the General Security Directorate apprehended 460 Syrian nationals, of whom approximately 450 were deported to the Syrian Arab Republic, for violating residency and entry regulations. The Lebanese Armed Forces announced on 11 June that they had prevented the attempted irregular entry of 1,100 Syrian nationals into Lebanon in May. Lebanese security forces also arrested at least five individuals for human smuggling.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

47. The exchanges of fire generated further unexploded ordnance contamination, posing a threat to civilians on both sides of the Blue Line and to United Nations and humanitarian personnel.

48. While demining activities by both Lebanese authorities and UNIFIL have been suspended in southern Lebanon since October, the Force supported six investigations into instances of explosive ordnance contamination or remnants in UNIFIL positions or along patrol routes. The Mine Action Service of the United Nations provided one in-country familiarization training and accreditation package for the new rotation of the military demining contingent, including three training support events and two accreditation events. It also provided four explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions for 13 military and civilian personnel. Technical support was provided to humanitarian partners to integrate mine action activities into emergency response plans, as well as ammunition management support for UNIFIL planning.

F. Delineation of borders

49. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was also no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab’a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab’a Farms area proposed

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G. Political and institutional stability

50. The escalating exchanges of fire across the Blue Line between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces continued to dominate national attention throughout the reporting period. On 15 April, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated: “Although we have repeatedly stressed that we are not advocates of war, Israeli aggressions cannot be tolerated, and we do not accept our airspace to be violated […] Israel is dragging the region into war, and the international community must be aware of this and put an end to this war.”

51. On 20 February, the former President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, stated that “one segment of the Lebanese people has taken this choice, while the government is incapable of taking a position.” In a letter dated 8 April addressed to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and sent separately to the Beirut-based ambassadors of the 15 members of the Security Council, among others, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Gibran Bassil, proposed that “a substantive international response [to the situation in South Lebanon] anchored in the principles of [Security Council resolution] 1701 and aiming to restore commitments towards its implementation could take the form of a new [Security Council] resolution.” On 27 April, the Lebanese Forces, together with opposition parties and parliamentarians, called on the Government of Lebanon to ensure the “full implementation of [Security Council] resolution 1701, issuing orders to deploy the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River and along the entire border with Israel.”

52. As a complement to the government-led response, the United Nations and non-governmental partners assisted over 110,000 vulnerable conflict-affected civilians in South Lebanon from January to March 2024. As at 11 June, 95,228 people were internally displaced and an estimated 60,000 civilians remained in hard-to-reach areas along the Blue Line. There has been extensive damage, including to civilian infrastructure, residential houses and agricultural lands. Humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas within 10 km of the Blue Line remains challenging because of the security situation.

53. With respect to the continued lack of a president of the republic, the Quintet, which comprises the Ambassadors to Lebanon of Egypt, France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, issued a joint statement on 16 May underlining that, “after more than 18 months of presidential void,” Lebanon “needs and deserves a president who unites the nation, prioritizes the wellbeing of its citizens, and forms a broad and inclusive coalition to restore political stability and implement necessary economic reforms.” In that statement, the Quintet highlighted that the election of a president is “needed to ensure that Lebanon has a seat at the table in regional discussions and to conclude a future diplomatic deal on Lebanon’s southern border.”

54. On 23 February, the National Moderation bloc, which is made up primarily of former Future Movement parliamentarians, announced an initiative to hold parliamentary consultations followed by open-ended sessions to elect a new Head of State. On 5 March, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hizbullah stated that “any dialogue with preconditions is unacceptable” and reiterated that “we do not have a name for the presidency other than [Marada Movement leader] Sleiman Franjieh.” In a statement on 10 June, the coordination committee of opposition parliamentarians reiterated “their openness to ongoing consultations within a limited timeframe, free from the imposition of new precedents contrary to constitutional principles and
without any precondition, particularly the imposition of a specific candidate’s name.”

On 11 June, the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, stated: “Only the dialogue I am calling for can lead to the election of a president. Without dialogue […] a quorum of two thirds will not be secured in Parliament, irrespective of how many voting rounds take place.”

55. Parliament convened twice in its legislative capacity during the reporting period and, on 25 April, extended the mandates of locally elected bodies for another year until May 2025, owing to “the complex security, military and political circumstances in light of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon”, effectively postponing municipal elections for the third consecutive year. Three separate appeals against the postponement filed before the Constitutional Council by opposition parties, including the Lebanese Forces, the Kata’ib Party and aligned independent and emerging group parliamentarians, all of whom boycotted the session, were rejected on 28 May. Of 1,064 municipal councils, 126 have been dissolved.

56. On 15 May, Parliament convened to discuss the €1 billion aid package for Lebanon that the European Union had announced on 2 May. The caretaker Prime Minister informed Parliament that “[w]e insisted that this aid be aimed at encouraging the Syrian displaced to return to their country and not to stay in Lebanon”. Parliament recommended the formation of a ministerial committee, led by the caretaker Prime Minister, to liaise with international and regional partners, including the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to develop a detailed time frame for repatriating Syrian refugees. Parliament also requested the caretaker Cabinet to hand over Syrian prisoners to the Syrian authorities in accordance with applicable laws and to compel the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to share data and to provide humanitarian aid to incentivize refugee returns. The caretaker Cabinet was further requested to submit a quarterly progress report to Parliament on the implementation of these measures.

57. The caretaker Prime Minister convened the caretaker Cabinet six times during the reporting period. The eight Free Patriotic Movement-affiliated ministers did not attend those meetings.

58. More than two years after the signing of the staff-level agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Lebanon (S/2022/556, para. 50), most prerequisite actions for a board-level agreement remain outstanding. After its visit to Beirut on 23 May, an IMF team stated that “the negative spillovers from the conflict in Gaza and increased fighting at Lebanon’s southern border [sic] are further exacerbating an already weak economic situation.” While the team noted that “[s]ome progress has been made on monetary and fiscal reforms since the last Article IV consultation,” it added that “… these policy measures fall short of what is needed to enable a recovery from the crisis.” In March, the Central Administration for Statistics of Lebanon reported that inflation, measured year over year, had declined from 190 per cent in February 2003 to 70 per cent in February 2004.

59. The judicial investigation into the Beirut port explosion of 4 August 2020 remains stalled, as is the prosecution of 68 individuals in the case of the deadly 14 October 2021 Tayyunah clashes (S/2021/953, para. 57) and the investigation into the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim (S/2021/240, para. 46).

60. The National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared in Lebanon, the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the Public Procurement Authority all have yet to become fully operational pending the appointment of outstanding members and allocation of adequate resources.

61. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) supported over 400 women peacebuilders across 18
peacebuilding networks in Lebanon engaged in conflict prevention, inclusive community dialogue and mediation efforts, as well as an informal two-track dialogue process between senior women from traditional political parties and emerging political groups. UNIFIL provided psychosocial support workshops for network members, including displaced women, in its area of operations. Following the conclusion of the first national action plan of Lebanon for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the caretaker Prime Minister requested the National Commission for Lebanese Women to develop a second national action plan. Meanwhile, UN-Women, in partnership with local authorities in Tyre Governorate, established a committee to coordinate the provision of livelihood services to women affected by the security situation in South Lebanon and strengthen their leadership in humanitarian action.

62. As at 31 May, 788,387 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with UNHCR in Lebanon, including 777,036 Syrian refugees and 11,351 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. On 9 May, the General Security Directorate announced that the residence visas of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic would not be renewed.

63. Since 1 January 2024, there have been 61 verified actual or attempted movements by sea from Lebanon to Cyprus, involving at least 3,242 passengers, the majority of whom were Syrian. Of these movements, 50 boats reached Cyprus, carrying 2,541 passengers, while 6 were returned to Lebanon and 5 were intercepted by the Lebanese authorities. From 1 January 2024 to the time of writing, UNHCR had identified 249 deportation incidents from Lebanon involving at least 1,763 Syrian nationals. As at 20 June, 143 raids had been carried out by the Lebanese security forces targeting residences of Syrian refugees across Lebanon. Those raids led to the apprehension of 470 individuals, of whom 301 were deported.

64. Urgent calls, including by Government officials, to address the Syrian refugee crisis were echoed across the political spectrum, with intercommunal tensions escalating after a Lebanese Armed Forces investigation found Syrian nationals responsible for the 7 April murder of a Lebanese Forces local official in Jubayl. Several violent incidents, physical assaults, threats and protests directed against Syrian refugees were reported in April and May, as was the distribution of leaflets by unknown groups demanding that Syrians leave specific areas and that Lebanese citizens not rent properties to or employ Syrians, nor shop at Syrian-owned stores.

65. On 27 May, at the eighth Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region organized by the European Union, the caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Abdallah Bou Habib, stated that “Lebanon has reached the point of no return in terms of accepting that things remain as they are… it is time to work among ourselves to solve the issue of displacement by revisiting the policies of donor countries.”

66. The United Nations estimates that, in 2024, approximately 3.7 million people in Lebanon, including 2.05 million Lebanese, 1.36 million Syrian refugees, 168,026 Palestine refugees and 86,275 migrants, need humanitarian assistance. Data in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification report on Lebanon dated 30 May indicate that, as of April, an estimated 23 per cent of the population (approximately 1.26 million people) were assessed to be experiencing acute food insecurity. The World Food Programme and UNHCR have reduced cash assistance to Syrian refugees by 37 per cent in 2024 compared with 2023. Cash disbursements to vulnerable Lebanese under the National Poverty Targeting Programme have also decreased since
1 January 2024. The World Bank, in a report published on 23 May, found that “poverty in Lebanon has more than tripled over the past decade reaching 44 per cent of the total population."

67. As at 31 March, overall international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors for 2024 stood at $651.1 million. That figure includes $274.7 million disbursed in 2024 and $376.4 million carried over from 2023. Donors reported $306.7 million in outstanding commitments for 2024 and $172.2 million in commitments for 2025 and beyond. The 2024 appeal for the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, which was endorsed on 21 May by the Government of Lebanon as the common framework for collectively responding to the ongoing impact of crises and prioritizing the provision of assistance and support to vulnerable populations in Lebanon, is 19 per cent funded at $525.6 million of the $2.72 billion requested, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting $268.4 million in funds received in 2024 and $257.2 million carried over from 2023.

68. The funding situation of UNRWA remains precarious, with 30 per cent of the Agency’s expected global funding envelope for 2024 outstanding.

III. Security and safety measures

69. The designated officials north and south of the Litani River continued to coordinate to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel in Lebanon. On 12 April, Tyre was designated a non-family duty station by the International Civil Service Commission. Consequently, the entire south Litani sector became a non-family duty station area. Relocation of non-programme critical international staff and non-programme critical national staff and their dependants was approved from April through 1 October 2024. Flexible working arrangements for civilian personnel continued to apply.

70. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL registered 25 instances of impacts on United Nations positions. UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah and Force positions near Markaba and Burj Qallawiyah (all Sector West) were the most affected. On 30 March, four patrol members of Observer Group Lebanon were injured, one seriously, in an explosion while they were patrolling on foot near Rumaysh. On 28 March, near Sarda, a UNIFIL peacekeeper suffered ruptured eardrums following two impacts close to a UNIFIL patrol vehicle.

71. UNIFIL continued to adapt its security and safety measures, including military contingency plans and force protection measures. In positions closest to the Blue Line, force protection measures, including new bunkers and fortifications, continued to be implemented. The footprint of 15 UNIFIL positions close to the Blue Line remained reduced (see S/2024/222, para. 73).

72. The trial hearing in the case of the fatal attack against a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Mazra’at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 was again postponed, from 7 June to 12 February 2025, owing to the absence of the indictee for medical reasons.

73. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Military Prosecutor instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces to expand the investigations into the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022.
IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

74. As at 20 June, UNIFIL had 10,147 military personnel, including 890 women (8.8 per cent), from 49 troop-contributing countries, and 792 civilian staff (245 international and 547 national), including 253 women (31.9 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised five vessels, with 680 of the Force’s military personnel, including 61 women (9 per cent). In addition, 49 military observers, including 10 women (20.4 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization served with Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women had the rank of lieutenant colonel, while the most senior civilian woman served at the D-2 level.

75. As part of Action for Peacekeeping efforts to support effective performance and accountability, UNIFIL adapted its Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System evaluation assessment cycle to cover the period 1 July 2023 to 31 March 2024. Doing so allowed UNIFIL to assess how it has adjusted its activities to the new operational context. In addition, UNIFIL continued to underscore the value of Action for Peacekeeping in all engagements and reported progress and results in the Action for Peacekeeping Plus monitoring framework reports.

76. UNIFIL conducted 12 evaluations of units, for logistics, training and operational preparedness, in implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and Security Council resolution 2436 (2018). No shortfalls were identified in the reporting period.

77. UNIFIL continued the implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see S/2020/473), pursuant to Security Council resolution 2539 (2020).

78. UNIFIL coordinated several media visits to enhance visibility and understanding of the Force’s activities and to counter potential misinformation and disinformation regarding its mandate. Inaccurate or misleading reports, including reports in which it was suggested that peacekeepers were not assisting communities, planning to leave the area of operation or held perceived bias in favour of Israel were immediately addressed by UNIFIL through interviews and background interactions with media and Lebanese authorities.

V. Conduct and discipline

79. From 1 February through 31 May, UNIFIL recorded three allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct. No allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse was reported in either Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon or UNIFIL. Both the Office and UNIFIL remain committed to strict adherence to the United Nations zero tolerance policies on sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. Induction and targeted awareness training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 14 civilian and 4,440 military personnel of UNIFIL. In addition, 276 civilian staff members received training on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and prevention of sexual harassment. UNIFIL provided training for 28 National Investigations Officers from 14 contingents on procedures related to investigating allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and other serious misconduct.
VI. Observations

80. I remain profoundly concerned by the repeated breaches of the cessation of hostilities across the Blue Line since 8 October. The cycle of escalation between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces severely affects the civilian populations on both sides of the Blue Line and poses a grave threat to the stability of Lebanon, Israel and the region. The intensification and geographical expansion of the exchanges of fire, coupled with increasingly bellicose rhetoric and threats of an all-out war, are deeply alarming. I appeal to the parties to urgently recommit to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), return immediately to a cessation of hostilities and avail themselves of all diplomatic channels, including United Nations good offices, to avoid further suffering and the risk of a wider, devastating conflagration.

81. The current situation has highlighted that a political process anchored in the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) to address the root causes of the conflict and ensure long-term stability is long overdue. Such a political process can provide a pathway out of the current crisis and enable the parties to implement the confidence-building measures that can ensure their enduring mutual security. I call upon the parties to take concrete steps towards addressing outstanding provisions in close cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL.

82. The intensifying exchanges of fire along, and increasingly well beyond, the Blue Line have been deadly and destructive. They have exacted a heavy toll, with civilian casualties, the internal displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, widespread damage to civilian infrastructure, residential buildings, agricultural lands and forests, and contamination from explosive remnants, all of which will have long-term negative implications. I renew my call for all parties to comply fully with their obligations under international humanitarian law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack, and to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in need, as well as the movement of humanitarian workers. The protection of civilians, including women, children, journalists and medical workers, must be ensured. Displaced communities must be able to return to their homes.

83. I am seriously concerned by injuries to peacekeepers and the impacts on UNIFIL positions and condemn all acts that endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers. All parties are urged to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and to respect the inviolability of United Nations premises at all times.

84. The exchanges of fire demonstrate the possession of weapons outside the authority of the State in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I again call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. I repeat my call to address the outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of the national defence strategy. It remains important that earlier decisions of the National Dialogue are implemented, especially those pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.
85. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty from Israel and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I also condemn any violation of the sovereignty of Israel from Lebanon.

86. The continued occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line represents a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease. Once again, I urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

87. It is urgent for Lebanon to have an executive authority that is empowered to shepherd the country through the multiple crises currently facing it. I therefore urge the political leaders of Lebanon to take resolute steps towards the election of a president to address pressing political, economic and security exigencies facing the country and to advance urgent progress on reforms that will stabilize the economy and catalyse its recovery.

88. The postponement of the municipal elections is a missed opportunity to strengthen the capacity of the State to govern and deliver, as well as to increase women’s representation and political participation at the local level.

89. I regret that there has been no progress made on the issue of the Shab’a Farms in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my call upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab’a Farms area as provided in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641). Meanwhile, and without prejudice to the status of the Shab’a Farms, all parties should fully respect the Blue Line there, as elsewhere, and act with maximum restraint.

90. The ability of UNIFIL to implement its operational activities as mandated is more critical than ever. Restrictions of the freedom of movement of UNIFIL continue to be of great concern. I reiterate the need for the Government of Lebanon to address any such incidents, and the obligation of the Lebanese authorities to facilitate access by UNIFIL to all locations of interest requested by UNIFIL.

91. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL, including those responsible for the killing of a peacekeeper and injuries to three others near Mazra’at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, must be held to account. The role of the host Government remains crucial in helping to prevent such incidents in the future, including by helping to dispel misinformation and disinformation regarding the Force’s mandate.

92. A strong and well-resourced Lebanese Armed Forces remains integral to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). I extend my appreciation to the Member States whose support has helped sustain the Lebanese Armed Forces. The strengthened presence and capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River, as well as at sea, is and will continue to be an important confidence-building measure in line with resolution 1701 (2006). I also welcome efforts to strengthen coordination between the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL. I note with concern that the Lebanese Armed Forces, which have not engaged in the exchange of fire across the Blue Line, have been impacted by the crossfire.

93. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration (2012), and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).
94. I welcome the resumption of funding by most donors to UNRWA. However, I remain seriously concerned that chronic and acute funding shortfalls will jeopardize the critical role of UNRWA in providing stability in the Palestine refugee camps, with consequences for stability in Lebanon and the region at large. I appeal to the international community to provide the Agency with the necessary resources to ensure continuity of essential services and support to all Palestine refugees in Lebanon, as elsewhere.

95. I acknowledge the enormous challenges for Lebanon that come from hosting large numbers of refugees on its territory. While the hospitality that the Lebanese people have extended to large numbers of refugees for decades is laudable, I call on all in the wider international community to work towards sustainable solutions that meet the needs of refugees and alleviate the burden on Lebanon. A robust, united and well-funded response to the rising needs of the refugees and their host communities remains vital, as does the consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement, to ensure that the protection space does not contract further. In this regard, I call on the leaders of Lebanon to encourage restraint in discourse, in order to avoid amplifying social tensions.

96. I commend the international community’s continued solidarity with Lebanon and its people. I call on donors to keep Lebanon high on their agenda. Noting the funding challenges facing humanitarian and development partners, there is an urgent need for support to continue reaching those affected by the multiple crises in the country and most at risk of being left behind.

97. I reiterate my call on the Lebanese authorities to follow through on the conduct of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation into the port of Beirut explosion on 4 August 2020.

98. I express my condolences to all those affected by the continued exchanges of fire in breach of the cessation of hostilities. I express my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I also encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL, who, together with their male peers, continue to demonstrate professionalism, dedication and courage while serving in these challenging conditions. I thank the former United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, who completed her assignment on 31 May, and welcome and extend my appreciation to the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, and the staff of her office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.
Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2024

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, were fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigations, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in S/2019/237) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. In the reporting period, UNIFIL continued its operations, despite the daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, which affected patrols and UNIFIL positions close to the Blue Line as personnel sought shelter. Operations in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces continued, where possible.

3. In close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL increased counter-rocket launching patrols, including in the surroundings of UNIFIL positions, and Blue Line armoured vehicle patrols. Some foot patrols and market walks resumed where security conditions allowed, while temporary checkpoints and air operations remained suspended.

4. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL conducted an average of 5,999 monthly vehicle patrols during the day and at night. Of these, an average of 389 vehicle patrols were conducted each month along the Blue Line. In addition, the Force conducted an average of 1,017 inspection activities, which included the operation of permanent checkpoints and the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols each month.

5. UNIFIL continuously coordinated with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure freedom of movement and unrestricted access to its entire area of operations. However, the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes proposed by UNIFIL to expand the Force’s presence outside main routes and municipal centres, on the grounds that they were either private roads or areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents of restrictions of movement with the Lebanese authorities. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the Force continued to experience restrictions, as detailed below.

Access to all locations of interest

6. Owing to the security situation during the reporting period, UNIFIL was not able to systematically monitor locations of interest, including Green Without Borders sites, many of which have been destroyed or damaged by the Israel Defense Forces.

Freedom of movement incidents

7. On 24 February, 10 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces patrol for approximately 20 minutes in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East) and took photos and videos of the patrol. The Lebanese Armed Forces intervened with the individuals and the patrol resumed its planned itinerary.

8. On 25 February, a visibly agitated individual with a truck stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Dayr Qanun (Sector West) and refused to let it pass. The patrol was forced...
to use an alternative route. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. The local mayor told UNIFIL he had neither knowledge of the incident nor of the identity of the truck driver.

9. On 29 February, after an Observer Group Lebanon peacekeeper in a United Nations patrol vehicle waved at a group of four individuals sitting in a side street off the main road near Haddatha (Sector West), one of those individuals took out his pistol and pointed it towards the patrol vehicle until it was out of sight. No shots were fired. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL spoke to municipal authorities, who were unaware of the incident but condemned the behaviour as unacceptable.

10. On 29 February, a UNIFIL patrol reported that a red laser beam was pointed at the turret of one of its vehicles from the vicinity of an Israel Defense Forces position south-east of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). While the patrol was moving northward to a safe position, peacekeepers heard two bursts of fire coming from the direction of their previous location.

11. On 29 February, peacekeepers returning from a logistical mission were stopped by approximately 20 individuals in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the UNIFIL area of operations). After approximately 90 minutes, the peacekeepers and their vehicles were moved to another location, where the peacekeepers were questioned and the vehicles searched. One hour later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the site and brought the patrol to a nearby Lebanese Armed Forces office and later accompanied the patrol to the UNIFIL office at the Rafic Hariri International Airport, Beirut.

12. On 1 March, a UNIFIL patrol near Kafr Kila (Sector East) encountered three armed individuals in civilian clothes who were pointing weapons at the patrol. The patrol continued with its planned itinerary and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. The mayor of Kafr Kila subsequently told UNIFIL he that while he was not aware of the incident, he regretted it and strongly condemned the pointing of weapons at UNIFIL peacekeepers.

13. On 2 March, 15 individuals with five vehicles and three scooters blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Ayta al-Jabal (Sector West) and requested it not to use the planned route, but to drive through the village instead. After 30 minutes, the Lebanese Armed Forces reached the location and travelled with the patrol out of the area. The UNIFIL patrol then continued with its planned itinerary. UNIFIL met with the mayor of Haddatha after the incident. The mayor said that he had been informed that the patrol had apparently deviated from the main road owing to a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) inaccuracy and that he had intervened immediately. The mayor attributed the locals’ actions to heightened security concerns.

14. On 2 March, a thick green laser beam was pointed from south of the Blue Line at the turret gunner of a UNIFIL vehicle near Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). The precise point of origin could not be ascertained. The patrol moved to a safe area and subsequently continued its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

15. On 7 March, two individuals with a motorbike approached a UNIFIL convoy that was stationary on the road in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) and asked them where they were going, given that a community activity was going to happen at the location. Another 10 individuals, in military-style attire, made gestures for the patrol not to continue. A few minutes later, the convoy continued its movement as planned. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL followed up with the local authorities, who did not have knowledge of the incident. They stated that there
must have been a misunderstanding, adding that the mandate of UNIFIL should be respected.

16. On 14 March, while a UNIFIL logistical convoy was refuelling at a petrol station in the southern suburbs of Beirut, about 20 people prevented the convoy from exiting the petrol station. One individual drew a pistol and asked the peacekeepers to switch off the engines of the vehicles. The crowd increased to about 100 people. Approximately 50 minutes later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and the convoy was able to continue its movement as planned.

17. On 19 March, a red laser beam was pointed from south of the Blue Line at UNIFIL peacekeepers located approximately 100 m from a UNIFIL position, north-east of Ghajar (Sector East). The exact point of origin could not be ascertained.

18. On 25 March, an individual approached a UNIFIL convoy that was stationary in heavy traffic in the vicinity of Tyre (Sector West). The individual tore the United Nations flags from one of the vehicles. UNIFIL communicated with police present at the scene and continued their planned activity. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

19. On 26 March, three small arms rounds were fired towards UNIFIL patrol vehicles west of Yarin (Sector West). The rounds were fired from north of the Blue Line, but the exact point of origin could not be ascertained. There were no injuries to peacekeepers, nor were any UNIFIL assets damaged. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

20. On 27 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol on the road near Hanin (Sector West) was blocked by two people, who placed rocks and a car in the way. The individuals asked the Observer Group Lebanon patrol to take another route, which the patrol did. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL contacted the local authorities, who informed UNIFIL that they were not aware of the incident, having left the town after 8 October 2023.

21. On 28 March, approximately 30 individuals, of whom at least 7 were armed with pistols and automatic rifles, halted a UNIFIL convoy’s movement in Beirut. After 30 minutes, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and facilitated the convoy’s departure from the scene. No damage to UNIFIL equipment or injuries to Force personnel were reported.

22. On 28 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol near a UNIFIL position south-east of Kafr Shuba (Sector East) reported electronic interference affecting the patrol’s GNSS system.

23. On 29 March, two individuals approached two civilian UNIFIL staff who were in a UNIFIL vehicle in Tyre; one of the individuals pointed a firearm at the vehicle’s window and pulled the trigger, “dry firing” the weapon (because there was no ammunition in the chamber).

24. On 30 March, three Observer Group Lebanon peacekeepers and a national UNIFIL language assistant were injured following an explosion south of Rumaysh (Sector West). The blast occurred after the four personnel had alighted from their patrol vehicle to continue on foot to the Blue Line. The patrol was able to move to a nearby UNIFIL position, where the injured personnel received medical assistance. Three of the peacekeepers were hospitalized. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. A preliminary investigation by UNIFIL ruled out direct or indirect fire as a cause of the explosion.

25. On 1 April, approximately 40 individuals stopped a UNIFIL vehicle patrol north-east of Brashit (Sector West) and deflated the vehicle’s tyres. After 30 minutes, a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier arrived at the site, spoke with the individuals and
travelled with the patrol away from the area. A Lebanese Armed Forces patrol then arrived and the UNIFIL patrol resumed its itinerary.

26. On 5 April, four individuals in civilian clothes with a vehicle blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Rashaf (Sector West). The individuals informed the peacekeepers that a local police patrol was on its way. The local police informed the Lebanese Armed Forces, which arrived at the location and accompanied the patrol to a nearby UNIFIL position.

27. On 8 April, a group of approximately 30 individuals and a person with a vehicle blocked and surrounded a UNIFIL logistical convoy in the vicinity of Tiri (Sector West), slashed the tyres and damaged the windows of the vehicles with iron bars, while speaking aggressively to UNIFIL personnel. Shortly thereafter, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the site and the UNIFIL convoy resumed its itinerary to its intended destination. UNIFIL followed up with local authorities, who stated that the incident was the result of UNIFIL attempting to enter the village’s narrow streets.

28. On 12 April, five young persons threw stones and fired an air gun towards a UNIFIL patrol vehicle near Kafra (Sector West). No Force personnel were injured, but the window of a UNIFIL patrol vehicle was damaged. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

29. On 13 April, a person in a vehicle blocked a UNIFIL patrol near Balat (Sector West) and asked the peacekeepers to leave the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces reached the area and, after speaking with the individual, the UNIFIL patrol left but could not conclude its planned itinerary because of time constraints. The local police informed UNIFIL that they were not aware of the incident, but stated that the village population is friendly towards UNIFIL “despite the lack of assistance and projects offered to the community lately.”

30. On 17 April, six individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Tibnin (Sector West). After the Lebanese Armed Forces reached the location, the UNIFIL patrol moved to a nearby UNIFIL position, though not one that was on the planned itinerary. UNIFIL liaised with the local municipal authorities, who stated that the patrol had crossed into a remote area far from the main street, prompting local politicians to react by blocking their path. The municipal authorities confirmed that they helped resolve the incident by contacting the Lebanese Armed Forces.

31. On 21 April, 20 individuals in cars and motorbikes blocked a UNIFIL patrol accompanying journalists near Tiri (Sector West) and aggressively asked peacekeepers to use a different road. To avoid further tensions, the patrol followed an alternative route. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

32. On 24 April, two individuals in a vehicle, including one wearing a police uniform, stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Aynata (Sector West). Shortly afterwards, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and the patrol was able to resume its planned itinerary.

33. On 27 April, 14 civilians and two vehicles stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Bra’shit (Sector East). Local police subsequently arrived and accompanied the patrol out of the area, and the peacekeepers continued with their planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. The mayor of Bra’shit reiterated that using internal roads in the village is not accepted by the local population. The mayor added that no one had harmed the patrol members because the population wants the best relations with UNIFIL.

34. On 29 April, a UNIFIL vehicle malfunctioned near Mukhayyam al-Qasimi (outside the Force’s area of operations) as peacekeepers on a long-range patrol were returning from a Lebanese Armed Forces observation post near the Litani River. As
the peacekeepers pulled over to determine the source of the problem, two vehicles blocked the patrol’s way and individuals forcefully entered the vehicles and seized items, including tactical radios, binoculars and personal items. Another 50 individuals in civilian clothes gathered at the location, with some wielding weapons. The situation lasted for a few hours until two Lebanese Armed Forces personnel arrived at the location and facilitated the UNIFIL patrol’s movement from the area. The patrol then continued its planned itinerary. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned.

35. On 2 May, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked for several minutes by 10 civilians with two vehicles and two scooters in the vicinity of Tibnin (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the site and the UNIFIL patrol continued with the planned itinerary. UNIFIL contacted the local authorities, who stated that they had intervened and asked the Lebanese Armed Forces to come to the site. They explained that the incident was caused by UNIFIL trying to enter a narrow residential area not deemed suitable for UNIFIL vehicles.

36. On 20 May, 10 individuals with two vehicles blocked the front and rear of a UNIFIL patrol near Aynata (Sector West). The individuals did not act aggressively, but they refused to engage with peacekeepers. Some 30 minutes later, a Lebanese Armed Forces patrol reached the location and facilitated the UNIFIL patrol’s movement away from the area according to the planned itinerary.

37. On 20 May, eight peacekeepers were travelling from Sector East to UNIFIL headquarters, Naqurah, when they were blocked by two vehicles in Nabatiyah (outside the area of operations). About 10 to 15 individuals, some armed, aggressively demanded that the peacekeepers get out of their vehicles. The individuals searched the vehicles and seized the cell phones of three of the peacekeepers and a notebook. One hour later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and moved with the UNIFIL patrol to Tyre. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned.

38. On 22 May, approximately 10 individuals with two cars and four motorcycles blocked a UNIFIL patrol conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces south-west of Rashaf (Sector West). The individuals did not act aggressively. The Lebanese Armed Forces patrol engaged with the individuals and the UNIFIL patrol then resumed its planned itinerary.

39. On 22 May, about 30 to 40 persons blocked a UNIFIL vehicle’s movement north of Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle managed to continue its movement. No damage to property or injury to personnel were reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

40. On 23 May, six individuals blocked a UNIFIL patrol south-west of Yatar (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the location. However, after attempting to mediate, the Lebanese Armed Forces advised the peacekeepers to make a U-turn and take an alternate route.

41. On 28 May, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a van carrying two individuals and by a scooter north-west of Kafra (Sector West). The patrol turned around and continued patrolling on a different road. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

42. On 6 June, peacekeepers were blocked by a motorcycle in the middle of the road north-west of Burj Qalawiyah (Sector West). The patrol made a U-turn and started moving in the opposite direction when another car appeared and prevented the peacekeepers from moving. The UNIFIL patrol leader and one additional peacekeeper dismounted their vehicle to communicate with one of the individuals, who acted aggressively and requested the peacekeepers to hand over their cell phones and cameras. The patrol leader refused and was pushed by the individual, who then tried
to open the patrol vehicle’s door. When the patrol leader asked the individual to refrain from touching the vehicle, the individual hit him in the neck. Two additional peacekeepers dismounted the UNIFIL patrol vehicle and the individual started screaming at the patrol leader while a crowd of approximately 20 people gathered. Members of the crowd started hitting the peacekeepers and attempted to seize their helmets, notebooks and weapons. The patrol leader engaged with one of the individuals who spoke English and managed to lower tensions, and the peacekeepers returned to their UNIFIL position. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

43. On 9 June, two individuals on a scooter blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Kafra (Sector West). The individuals were observed using a radio and told the peacekeepers not to come to the location ever again. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and said that a funeral was being held near the location. The UNIFIL patrol continued with its planned itinerary.

44. On 11 June, approximately 15 individuals blocked the movement of a UNIFIL patrol that was heading to an agreed meeting point with the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Majdal Silm (Sector East). UNIFIL contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces. When the Lebanese Armed Forces reached the location, the peacekeepers were able to continue their planned itinerary.

45. On 15 June, approximately 30 individuals stopped a UNIFIL firefighting crew north-west of Shab’a (Sector East) while they were on their way to a nearby UNIFIL position to supply water to fight a bushfire. The individuals took a handheld radio set and two water hoses, and they threw stones at the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and the firefighting crew was able to leave and continue its movement. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to have the seized items returned.

Number of denial of freedom of movement incidents (1 March 2023 to 20 June 2024)

Source: UNIFIL.
Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

2. It is stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related material of all types.

3. During the reporting period, in a letter dated 22 February addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Israel Katz, stated that “Iran is accelerating the pace of its weapons transfers to Hezbollah. Iran is doing so by ground, using the porous Syrian-Lebanese border, as well as by air and sea, in violation of [Security Council resolution] 1701 [(2006)]. These transfers include, among others, components for air defense systems, drones (such as Shahed-101 and Shahed-136) and various types of missiles (such as Mini-Ababil and surface-to-air missiles ‘358’).” The Minister further stated that “several units inside the Iranian Quds Force are in charge of these transfers” and cooperate with “militias in Iraq in order to facilitate the passage of the trucks loaded with weapons through border crossings between Iran and Iraq and afterwards into Syria. Inside Syria, there are several officials in charge of receiving the arms transfers and transporting them to their end users in Hezbollah […].” In addition, six “instances of transfers by air and by ground [in Syria]” are enumerated in the letter.

4. In response to the above-mentioned letter, the caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon, Abdallah Bou Habib, in identical letters dated 26 February addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/801-S/2024/211), wrote that “the accusations made by Israel are based on dates, numbers and names, without any real support or physical proof.” In a letter dated 7 March addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/221), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that “the Foreign Minister of the Israeli regime resorted to lies, spread misinformation, and leveled unfounded allegations against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” adding that “the accusations in the letter are entirely baseless and are categorically rejected.”

5. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution 2591 (2021), in which it urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and all State security institutions, which are the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.

2. Further to paragraph 10 of resolution 2591 (2021), a ministerial-level international conference hosted by France and co-chaired with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon on 17 June 2021 focused attention on the impact of the economic crisis in Lebanon on the Lebanese Armed Forces. Participants unanimously agreed that support for the Lebanese Armed Forces reflected the international community’s interest in the unity, sovereignty and stability of Lebanon. A follow-up mechanism was subsequently put in place by the Office with the Lebanese Armed Forces to track, for transparency and accountability, the receipt of in-kind bilateral support.

3. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/712-S/2024/36), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “[t]he Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1701 (2006).” Subsequently, on 29 February, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated that, to order to implement resolution 1701 (2006), the Lebanese Army would need allied countries to help with everything from “fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the Army needs.”

4. During the reporting period, several Member States bolstered efforts aimed at strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River. The Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, participated in several international technical meetings, including a meeting in Rome on 1 March that was attended by the commanders of the armies of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Another technical meeting with the commanders of the armies of France and Italy was held on 19 April in Paris. Following that meeting, in a joint statement, France and Italy reiterated their support of the Lebanese Armed Forces as a guarantor of the national stability of Lebanon. That same day, following a meeting between the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, and the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, who was accompanied by General Aoun, the French authorities reaffirmed their continued support for the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to allow it to carry out its mission over the entire territory of Lebanon, notably in the South. On 13 May, at the invitation of Qatar, the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces met with the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of Qatar. Discussions centred on the needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the continued support of Qatar for the Lebanese Army and State institutions in order to maintain the security and stability of Lebanon.

5. In February, Japan and the United Nations Office for Project Services, under the auspices of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, signed an agreement regarding a project in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces dedicated to enhancing health services and critical operations by strengthening the operational capacity of the Lebanese Army. In March, the last shipment of fuel destined for the Lebanese Army arrived as part of the $30 million donation from Qatar to cover fuel costs for the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 12 March, France and Lebanon signed a cooperation protocol under which France is to provide medical support, including equipment and training. On 27 March, as part of its long-standing logistical support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United Kingdom donated 60 tons of equipment valued at $2.5 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces for the maintenance of previously donated armoured vehicles. On 7 May, the European Union announced continued support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and other security forces with equipment and training for border management and to combat smuggling. On 21 May, the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon participated in the final meeting of the steering committee overseeing the livelihood support programme. Disbursements to the security forces had been completed during the previous reporting period, pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2650 (2022) and in line with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, and formally closed.

6. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.