Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 18 February to 24 June 2019

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, dated 14 March 2019 (S/2019/237), including on the specific provisions of resolutions 2373 (2017) and 2433 (2018). The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained generally calm. UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) maintained continuous liaison with both parties to de-escalate tensions and continued to urge them to utilize established channels to address concerns and to refrain from any action threatening the cessation of hostilities. Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. On 20 February and 17 April, UNIFIL conducted assessment visits to one of the tunnels near the Israeli town of Zar’it, south of the Blue Line, across from Ramiyah (Sector West). As previously reported (S/2019/237, para. 2), the Israel Defense Forces announced the discovery of the tunnel on 13 January. Technical experts confirmed on 17 April that it crossed the Blue Line, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander informed the Lebanese authorities of the UNIFIL findings, urging immediate follow-up action in connection with all tunnels confirmed to cross the Blue Line, in accordance with the country’s responsibilities under resolution 1701 (2006). The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that it was investigating the issue and would report its findings. On 29 May, the Israel Defense Forces started neutralizing the tunnel by filling it with concrete. UNIFIL has verified the existence of five tunnels, and confirmed that three of them crossed the Blue Line. UNIFIL has provided the coordinates of those three tunnels to the Lebanese authorities.
3. On 15 March, in a meeting with my Special Coordinator, Michel Aoun, President of Lebanon, committed to launching an investigation of the tunnels crossing the Blue Line. The Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun, subsequently confirmed to my Special Coordinator, on 23 May, and to the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, on 3 June, that the Lebanese Armed Forces was taking action to gain access to the sites. On 27 May, President Aoun confirmed to my Special Coordinator that an investigation was under way. UNIFIL continues to follow up with the Lebanese authorities on the matter.

4. Although UNIFIL called upon the Israel Defense Forces to suspend its construction works in the Lebanese “reservation” area until an agreement had been reached between the parties, the works continued. UNIFIL continued its liaison and monitoring activities in connection with the construction works. The Israel Defense Forces continued the installation of T-wall blocks it had started on 10 January in the area of Misgav Am, south of the Blue Line, across from Udaysah (Sector East), inside a Lebanese “reservation” area. Israel has now installed two separate wall segments almost 10 km in length. The Israel Defense Forces on 10 March started to remove the technical fence located south of the Blue Line but north of the T-wall blocks in the vicinity of Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL maintained its increased presence adjacent to the works to mitigate tensions. On 12 March, at the request of the Israel Defense Forces and with the agreement of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL engineers removed the last sections of the Israel Defense Forces’ technical fence at that location, whereupon the Israel Defense Forces concluded its works in the area. In connection with its activity on 12 March, UNIFIL observed eight Israel Defense Forces soldiers who were monitoring the work of the UNIFIL engineers, assuming a prone position and pointing their weapons towards an area north of the Blue Line. Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were present but did not react to the gun-pointing. UNIFIL positioned itself between the parties until the soldiers had redirected their weapons.

5. On 6 May, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL of planned works in an area adjacent to a Lebanese reservation area south of the Blue Line, close to Ra’s al-Naqurah (Sector West). UNIFIL urged the Israel Defense Forces to refrain from initiating works until an agreement could be reached between the parties. On 22 May, the Israel Defense Forces commenced the construction of a concrete platform and an observation tower. On 12 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces began preparatory works for an observation tower north of the Blue Line in the area adjacent to the Israel Defense Forces works. UNIFIL continues to liaise with both parties regarding the works.

6. On 27 May, the Israel Defense Forces fired smoke grenades to disperse a gathering of people north of the Blue Line who were protesting damage done to a poster of Imam Mousa Sadr of the Amal Movement as a result of the Israel Defense Forces’ maintenance work on the wall in Kfar Kila. The protest continued the following day.

7. On seven occasions, Lebanese civilians demonstrated in villages close to the Blue Line, declaring that Shab’a Farms and Kfar Shuba Hills were part of Lebanon and calling for a unified Lebanese position to counter the recognition by the United States of America of the occupied Syrian Golan as part of Israel.

8. From 18 February to 24 June, UNIFIL recorded 333 ground violations of the Blue Line, 329 of which had been committed by unarmed civilians crossing south of the Blue Line, including 167 violations by shepherds and farmers, mainly in the Shab’a Farms area, and by farmers cultivating their fields near Rumaysh, as well as 116 violations by civilians going to the Shu’ayb well near Blida (all Sector East). Armed hunters crossed south of the Blue Line on four occasions.
9. Israel continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty. From February to June, UNIFIL recorded an average of 100 airspace violations each month, with 250.4 overflight hours on average. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 72 per cent of the violations, while the remaining violations involved fighter aircraft or unidentified aircraft. UNIFIL continued to protest all air violations to the Israel Defense Forces and to urge their immediate cessation.

10. The occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces continued. While the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal, shared with the parties in 2011, for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

11. Pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006), UNIFIL continued to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those belonging to the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL. UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent and an average of 150 temporary checkpoints and conducted 310 counter-rocket-launching operations each month, on average.

12. From 18 February to 24 June, UNIFIL observed 97 instances of unauthorized weapons in the UNIFIL area of operations. All but the following four incidents involved hunting weapons. On 14 April, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol observed three individuals in a vehicle with one AK-47 near Mhaibeb (Sector East). The same day, UNIFIL observed two individuals firing a pistol from a vehicle near Marjayoun (Sector East). On 28 May, UNIFIL observed an individual carrying a handgun during the aforementioned protest in Kfar Kila (see para. 6 above). On 4 June, UNIFIL observed an individual with an automatic rifle near Hinniyah (Sector West). UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces, which is investigating each of those incidents.

13. UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo, in line with resolution 2373 (2017), as reiterated in resolution 2433 (2018). During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted 13,884 monthly military operational activities on average, including an average of 7,458 patrols. Some 7.8 per cent of all UNIFIL operational activities included at least one woman.

14. UNIFIL vehicle, foot and air patrols maintained an operational footprint in all municipalities and villages in its area of operations. Air reconnaissance patrols continued to be concentrated over areas to which ground patrols had limited access, including private property, rugged terrain or land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines. Owing to late or uncoordinated flights of unmanned aerial vehicles operated by the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL had to reschedule several flights. Following developments in Gaza in early May, UNIFIL increased the number of counter-rocket-launching operations, including along the Blue Line.

15. UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon continued patrols to areas surrounding the sites of the Lebanese nongovernmental organization Green without Borders close to the Blue Line. UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, also visited the Green without Borders sites in Ramiyah, Ayta al-Sha’b and Aytarun (Sector West) and Udaysah in April, May and June. No violations of resolution 1701 (2006) were observed. UNIFIL continues to monitor all Green without Borders sites.

16. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was generally respected, some restrictions were encountered, as detailed in annex I. Several incidents involved members of the local community claiming that UNIFIL was entering private property and that it had to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces at those locations.
Two cases involved Observer Group Lebanon, for which the Lebanese Armed Forces requests advance patrolling information. UNIFIL is engaging with the Lebanese Armed Forces on this issue.

17. On 25 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces, despite having provided prior approval, refused access to a media delegation accompanied by UNIFIL to film a UNIFIL patrol close to a UNIFIL position.

18. On 24 April, a UNIFIL team that had accidentally exited the area of operations some 4 km north of Dayr Siryan (Sector East) was stopped by individuals dressed in civilian clothes. One of the individuals was armed with an AK-47 rifle and took a Global Positioning System device, a map and a signal document from inside the UNIFIL vehicles. Subsequently, a Lebanese Armed Forces unit arrived and escorted the UNIFIL team back to its area of operations. On 28 April, UNIFIL sent a letter to the Lebanese Armed Forces expressing concern over the incident. The Lebanese Armed Forces has returned the missing items to UNIFIL.

19. The United Nations has continued to follow up with Lebanese authorities at Headquarters and in Lebanon, including through the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations during his visit to Lebanon in March, on the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West), described in my report of 15 November 2018 (S/2018/1029, para. 16), in which some 20 individuals dressed in civilian clothes attacked a UNIFIL patrol. Lebanese authorities have not provided an explanation as to why the conclusions of the Lebanese Armed Forces diverged significantly from those of UNIFIL. The United Nations has not been informed of criminal proceedings to date to bring the perpetrators to justice. UNIFIL has provided the Lebanese authorities with information to assist in the identification of the perpetrators. The United Nations continues to engage with the Lebanese authorities to request updates on this incident and its follow-up.

20. In support of the operational capacity-building of the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL increased the percentage of operational activities that can be conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces from an average of 19 per cent in September 2018 to 23 per cent in June 2019.

21. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force carried out interdiction operations throughout the maritime area of operations, hailing 2,765 vessels, of which 801 were inspected and cleared by the Lebanese authorities. In support of continued capacity-building of the Lebanese Navy, the Task Force conducted 323 training activities, including maritime interdiction operation drills with two Lebanese patrol boats, to improve the common operational standards for monitoring and hailing activities.

22. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2433 (2018), the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL, within the framework of the strategic dialogue mechanism, advanced discussions in the joint working group established to develop a strategy for a phased transition of the responsibilities of the Maritime Task Force to the Lebanese Armed Forces. They jointly identified key capabilities for the Lebanese Navy necessary for a transfer of Task Force responsibilities. They also examined the possibility of a partial assumption by the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy of some Task Force responsibilities once the planned upgrade and repair of the existing radar system and ships have been completed. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy presented the main elements of a long-term development plan to UNIFIL, pending approval by the leadership of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

23. In a letter dated 12 March to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the Permanent Mission of Lebanon outlined the commitment of the Government of Lebanon and its ongoing efforts to develop the naval capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The letter specifies that the key elements of the country’s maritime
strategy are upgrading the coastal radar network, establishing logistics bases and a Maritime Forces Academy and acquiring offshore patrol vessels.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

24. UNIFIL convened tripartite meetings on 2 April and 11 June during which liaison and coordination mechanisms and violations of resolution 1701 (2006) were discussed. In addition, UNIFIL held frequent bilateral exchanges with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, including on arrangements aimed at reducing tensions along the Blue Line.

25. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, Israel, continues to be raised with Israeli authorities. Despite the agreement of Israel to the UNIFIL proposal in 2008, the establishment of the office remains pending.

26. UNIFIL continued to liaise with the Government of Lebanon, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies on building the national civil protection capacity, including through firefighting and rescue operation drills. UNIFIL continued to train its personnel to ensure its preparedness to protect civilians who were under imminent threat of physical violence.

27. Over 890 military and civilian personnel, including 76 women, participated in UNIFIL training on gender mainstreaming. On 28 February, UNIFIL, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), launched a training exercise in conflict resolution and mediation benefiting 40 women from Tyre (Sector West). UNIFIL organized workshops in Tyre, Bint Jubayl (Sector West) and Marjayoun in March and April on the effective political participation of women through economic empowerment, with 128 women’s civil society organizations taking part.

C. Disarming armed groups

28. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintained a military capacity. On 2 May, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, proclaimed, “There is an important development that the Israelis talk about: the ability of the resistance even in land operations, in offence and defence. The resistance that owns the ability to enter Galilee, this is recognized by the enemy”. On 31 May, Mr. Nasrallah said, “I reiterate and in front of the whole world, yes, we have in Lebanon precision missiles and with enough numbers that can change the face of the region and the equation … We don’t have factories for manufacturing precision missiles in Lebanon … We have the scientific and human power to manufacture, and to bring equipment that would enable us to manufacture. If the U.S. keeps this file open, we will establish factories for manufacturing precision missiles in Lebanon”.

29. On 18 April, Major-General Yoel Strick, head of the Israel Defense Forces Ground Forces, publicly remarked that, “in the next war, it would be a mistake for us to distinguish between the State of Lebanon and Hizbullah, since Hizbullah is a political actor and part of the Government … In such a conflict, if it were up to me, I would recommend declaring war on Lebanon and Hizbullah”.

30. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups continues to restrict the ability of the Government of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.
31. Following his first official visit to the South Litani Sector and the UNIFIL area of operations on 24 April, the Minister of Defence, Elias Bou Saab, called upon “the concerned sides, inside Lebanon and abroad, to have trust in the Army”. In response to a question on Hizbullah’s weapons, he said that “nobody wishes to assume a mission on behalf of the Army, and this is what the party’s Secretary-General Sayyed [Hassan] Nasrallah has confirmed … this requires a defence strategy to be discussed when we’re over and done with Israeli dangers”. On 29 April, Mr. Bou Saab noted that President Aoun would soon launch an initiative to gather Lebanese actors for a dialogue on the national defence strategy. On 14 May, Raya al-Hassan, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, stated that “the Prime Minister was clear when he asked to put aside the strategic disagreement about weapons until it is time to discuss this issue within the defence strategy”, while noting that the matter’s resolution should take place within a regional framework.

32. The Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces continued to conduct counter-terrorism operations. From 1 March to 10 June, 38 terrorism-related arrests were reported, including of suspected affiliates of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). On 3 June, two members of the Internal Security Forces and two members of the Lebanese Armed Forces were killed in a suicide attack perpetrated by a Lebanese national affiliated with ISIL in Tripoli. Four servicemen were wounded, and eight suspects were arrested in connection with the attack. On 17 June, in Nabatiyah, the Internal Security Forces arrested two Syrian nationals over their affiliation with ISIL and for planning bomb attacks at Christian and Muslim religious sites.

33. On 5 March, State security forces arrested three Syrian nationals in Sin al-Fil, east of Beirut, and Bsus (Mount Lebanon) for allegedly having fought with ISIL. On 15 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested one Lebanese and one Palestinian national in Sidon for their involvement in the 2013 Abra clashes against the Lebanese Army. On 15 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces raided an arms depot in the Bab al-Tabbanah neighbourhood of Tripoli, which allegedly belonged to a terrorist who was killed during a February 2018 raid, and confiscated 47.5 kg of explosive materials.

34. On 26 March, a Lebanese Armed Forces officer was killed by unknown assailants in a drive-by shooting in Wadi Khalid (North Lebanon). The Lebanese Armed Forces confiscated weapons and ammunition on 18 April in Sidon (South Lebanon), and on 5 June in Aaba, Kurah (North Lebanon). On 27 May, a bystander was fatally shot in a shoot-out outside a prayer hall in Sa’diyat (Mount Lebanon). Several personal disputes escalated into shooting in Beirut and in northern and eastern Lebanon, involving, among others, off-duty servicemen.

35. The security situation in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon was stable, notwithstanding localized incidents in Ein El Hilweh camp near Sidon. On 14 March, my Special Coordinator visited the camp, where he met with representatives of the popular committees and youth. Because of increased tensions, he was prevented from visiting the rehabilitated Tirah neighbourhood, which was damaged in intense clashes in 2017. As he departed the camp, a shootout wounded four individuals. On 26 April, a Fatah member was killed, allegedly by a member of the extremist Fatah al-Islam group. The situation has since stabilized, but the risk of renewed violence persists.

36. On 10 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced an understanding with Palestinian factions to improve safety and security in the Palestine refugee camp of Mieh Mieh, near Sidon. Initial steps included dismantling a security checkpoint and eliminating the carrying of weapons and the wearing of military fatigues.

37. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada,
which continue to compromise Lebanon’s sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and effectively control parts of the border.

38. On 20 May, a Hamas delegation led by a member of the politburo, Izzat al-Rishq, accompanied by senior Hamas officials in Lebanon, met with the Lebanese authorities, including the Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, and the Director of the General Directorate of General Security, Abbas Ibrahim. The delegation reportedly discussed the situation in Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon, including in Mieh Mieh, and the reconstruction of the Palestine refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared.

D. Arms embargo and border control

39. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and are of serious concern. While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently. Were the allegations proved to be correct, they would constitute a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex II).

40. Lebanon continued to strengthen security along its eastern border, with international assistance. Four Lebanese Armed Forces land border regiments are deployed and operational.

41. For the second consecutive reporting period, no cross-border fire from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon was reported. A total of 587 Syrian nationals were apprehended by Lebanese authorities for illegally entering Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic, up from 141 during the previous period (S/2019/237, para. 46).

42. At its April meeting, the Higher Defence Council requested the Ministry of Defence to establish a mechanism to, inter alia, address smuggling through illegal crossings. The Council also requested the State authorities to take appropriate measures against people crossing borders illegally, including Syrians registered as refugees.

43. From 1 March to 24 June, Lebanese authorities arrested 25 individuals in connection with human smuggling activities, including in Lebanese waters towards Cyprus. On 13 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces intercepted eight Syrian nationals at sea, with three arrested and five reported missing during the course of the operation. On 12 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested 10 Syrian nationals at sea.

44. Following assaults on security forces in December 2018 (ibid., para. 47), security operations continued in the Baalbek-Hirmil area in north-eastern Lebanon. On 10 March, a soldier succumbed to wounds sustained during a raid in Baalbek on 30 November. On 12 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces removed a grenade outside the residence of a sheikh in Qasr, Hirmil, in north-eastern Lebanon. On 24 March, the Internal Security Forces arrested a Lebanese fugitive in Brital, in eastern Lebanon, for assaults on security forces, including his alleged role in the fatal shooting of a police officer on 22 May 2015. On 11 April, an Internal Security Forces officer was injured in a shooting in Baalbek. On 16 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces removed several crates of ammunition in Akkar (North Lebanon). On 18 April, in Baalbek, the Internal Security Forces arrested a Lebanese national for arms dealing. On 21 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested a fugitive who had allegedly wounded two Army officers in Brital on 31 December (ibid.). On 24 April in Hirmil, unknown assailants shot at a government building; separately, three members of the Internal Security Forces were injured during a raid to arrest a fugitive, who reportedly died when one of his grenades exploded. On 10 June, two Lebanese nationals and one Syrian national
were killed during a Lebanese Armed Forces raid in Kneisseh, Baalbek. Five suspects were arrested.

45. On 9 May, Lebanon deposited with the United Nations its instrument of ratification to the Arms Trade Treaty, the international agreement on conventional arms adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/234 B. Lebanon, whose Parliament ratified the Treaty on 25 September 2018, will become an official State party to the Treaty on 7 August 2019.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

46. UNIFIL continued to mitigate the threat of explosive hazards throughout its area of operations, clearing 14,428 m² of land and destroying 685 anti-personnel mines and 1 piece of unexploded ordnance along its main patrol roads and in the vicinity of Yarun (Sector West). The Mine Action Service conducted 72 quality-assurance monitoring visits to the Force’s demining teams, 12 refresher training courses and 3 on-site assessment validation events for incoming rotations to ensure the safety and effectiveness of UNIFIL demining operations. It also delivered 10 safety and awareness briefings on landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices, benefiting 139 United Nations military and civilian personnel.

F. Delineation of borders

47. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab‘a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab‘a Farms area proposed in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641, annex).

48. Following the presentation of the Lebanese proposal on 8 May by President Aoun to the Ambassador of the United States to Lebanon, the United States renewed its shuttle diplomacy to establish a framework for negotiations towards the resolution of the maritime dispute between Lebanon and Israel.

G. Political and institutional stability

49. Lebanon’s economic growth remained slow, the budget deficit and level of debt remained high and deficits in trade and the balance of payments widened. The Council of Ministers endorsed an electricity policy on 8 April which, inter alia, seeks to lower government subsidies to the state-run entity Electricité du Liban. The policy combines a short-term solution for the provision of temporary energy with a longer-term plan for a constant electricity supply by 2020. On 17 April, Parliament passed the policy into law. The formation of an electricity regulatory authority and an agreement on the tendering process remain outstanding. In response to an appeal filed on 23 May by 10 members of Parliament, the Constitutional Council, on 3 June, repealed the provision of the plan that relates to the tendering process, thus binding the Ministry of Energy to abide by the existing legal frameworks for tendering.

50. On 27 May, at its session chaired by President Aoun, the Council of Ministers approved the draft 2019 national budget and submitted it to Parliament. The proposed budget would reduce the fiscal deficit from 11.5 per cent last year to 7.6 per cent of gross domestic product, exceeding the commitment of a 1 per cent yearly reduction forged in 2018 at the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with
the Private Sector. Anticipated austerity measures, including a decrease in public sector benefits and an increase in some taxes, sparked peaceful protests from public and private sector employees, including retired military and security personnel, while heightened rhetoric along sectarian lines resurfaced in the political debate.

51. On 14 April, eight candidates contested the Tripoli by-elections to fill the seat that was vacated by the Constitutional Council’s ruling on 21 February (S/2019/237, para. 55). The only woman candidate, Dima Jamali, of the Future Movement, was re-elected on 15 April. Voter turnout was 12.6 per cent. On 13 May, an independent civil society candidate lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Council alleging electoral violations. The Council’s review is ongoing.

52. On 21 May, the National Commission for Lebanese Women submitted its draft national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) to the Council of Ministers. The same day, the Commission presented to Prime Minister Hariri its proposal for amending the nationality law to allow citizenship to be passed through matrilineal lines for Lebanese women married to foreigners. The draft national action plan, inter alia, commits Lebanon to a 1 per cent annual increase in women in the security sector through 2022. On 19 June, the Commission and the United Nations jointly convened a round-table discussion, attended by Prime Minister Hariri, the Ministers of Defence, Interior and Social Affairs and international partners, to present the draft national action plan.

53. To ensure support for the development of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the priorities outlined during the Rome II ministerial meeting, held in March 2018, and in the capability development plan, my Special Coordinator and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander intensified their engagement with the Lebanese authorities to encourage a coordinated approach to increasing the presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the UNIFIL area of operations and the development of the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy. Similarly, to strengthen the Internal Security Forces in line with their five-year strategic plan, my Special Coordinator agreed with the Lebanese authorities to develop an enhanced donor coordination mechanism.

54. On 11 May, a Lebanese national, Hassan Toufic Dika, who had been arrested by the Internal Security Forces in November, died in custody. In contravention of the Lebanese law on the criminalization of torture, no investigation was launched. In addition to interventions by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, three United Nations special procedures mandate holders sent a joint letter dated 25 January to the Government of Lebanon outlining their grave concern regarding the alleged arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of the individual since his arrest. The Government did not respond to the joint letter, which was made public in April.

55. On 12 May, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Ms. Al-Hassan, announced that she had instructed the Internal Security Forces to open an immediate investigation, while the Minister of Justice, Albert Serhan, stressed his Ministry’s full commitment to the provisions of anti-torture agreements that guarantee the rights of detainees. The same day, the Internal Security Forces issued a statement denying the allegations of torture of Mr. Dika.

56. The Government of Lebanon has not yet allocated funding for the national human rights institution or its related national preventive mechanism against torture, whose members were appointed by the Cabinet on 7 March. Members of both the institution and the mechanism have yet to be sworn in by the President.

57. As at 31 May, 953,476 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon,
including 935,454 Syrian refugees and 18,022 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government since 2015, the actual number of Syrians in need of international protection in Lebanon is unknown. The Government of Lebanon estimates that 1.5 million Syrians are displaced in Lebanon. The decrease in the number of registered Syrian refugees since the issuance of my previous report was mainly the result of natural deaths, onward movement, resettlement and spontaneous returns of individuals to the Syrian Arab Republic.

58. There were 6,212 Syrian refugees registered by UNHCR who returned on their own between January and May. UNHCR is aware of 2,955 refugees having returned to the Syrian Arab Republic during the same period in group movements, mainly facilitated by the General Directorate of General Security. The reasons cited by refugees most frequently for their return included difficult living conditions in Lebanon, the improved security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the desire for reunification with family members.

59. The long-term sizeable presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon represents a growing challenge, especially in the context of economic crisis, high unemployment and rising concerns over environmental pollution. Those factors, combined with a perception that returns are not happening at the pace expected and fears that a considerable number of Syrians will remain in Lebanon for years to come, are affecting the protection space for refugees.

60. As mentioned in paragraph 42 above, the Higher Defence Council adopted measures to systematically combat illegal entry, work without permits and unauthorized construction, as well as to protect sewers. Collective evictions of Syrian refugees increased during the first quarter of 2019, with environmental concerns and lack of legal residency cited as justifications. In several cases, refugees were not given notice prior to their eviction.

61. At the third Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, hosted by the European Union in March and co-chaired by the United Nations, participants pledged around $7.0 billion (€6.2 billion) for 2019 for both the Syrian Arab Republic and the region, including Lebanon, an increase of $2.5 billion from 2018. Prime Minister Hariri, who led the Lebanese delegation, stressed that the only solution was the safe return of refugees to their home countries, in accordance with international laws and treaties, and reiterated the Government’s commitment to working with UNHCR on any pragmatic initiative that would ensure the safe return of the displaced Syrians.

62. As at 31 March, donors reported that $334.0 million had been disbursed and $530.0 million had been committed for 2019. Funding committed for 2020 and beyond amounted to about $298.0 million. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (2017–2020) is 15 per cent funded, with $402.0 million available out of the overall appeal of $2.6 billion, including $213.0 million in funds received in 2019 and $189.0 million carried over from 2018.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

64. UNIFIL continually reviewed its security plans and risk prevention and mitigation measures, in close coordination with Lebanese authorities. Strong channels of communication and cooperation with Lebanese security forces were maintained. Security exercises were conducted to test the readiness of civilian and military personnel in the event of evacuation or relocation during a crisis. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 117 missions to the Arqub area by members of the United Nations country team.

65. UNIFIL continued to monitor ongoing proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against the mission. The Permanent Military Court held hearings on 5 March regarding the attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent in 2007 and in the case of terror intent opened in January 2014. The next hearings for both cases are scheduled for 5 July. In the case of the attempted serious attack against UNIFIL in 2008, in which one of the four convicted perpetrators filed an appeal, a hearing was held on 21 May. The next hearing is scheduled for 2 July. In the three cases of serious attacks perpetrated against UNIFIL on 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011, a suspect was arrested on 3 March. On 3 June, the cases were referred to the first investigating judge. In the 1980 case, in which two UNIFIL peacekeepers from Ireland were shot dead and one was injured, the next hearing is scheduled for 23 October.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

66. As at 24 June, UNIFIL comprised 10,292 military personnel, including 549 women (5 per cent), from 43 troop-contributing countries; 235 international staff, including 83 women (35 per cent); and 584 national civilian staff, including 157 women (27 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised 6 vessels, 2 helicopters and 717 of the Force’s military personnel, including 21 women (3 per cent). In addition, 53 military observers, including 3 women (6 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; the most senior civilian women serve at the P-5 level.

67. In line with resolutions 2436 (2018) and 2433 (2018), UNIFIL continues to maintain a mechanism for monitoring, evaluating and reporting on the performance of all military units, including with respect to mandate comprehension and support, command and control, training and discipline, sustainment and health. It assesses the willingness and ability of the units to implement assigned tasks related to the protection of civilians. Of the 15 evaluations of units from nine troop-contributing-countries, 11 reported a rating of excellent, with the remainder satisfactory or higher. In order to keep improving the performance of those units, UNIFIL is addressing gaps identified in information and communications technology and logistics.

V. Conduct and discipline

68. Neither UNIFIL nor UNSCOL received allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse. The missions continued to implement and enhance measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse and to assess changes in the risk environment in Lebanon.
They continued to brief military commanders on their accountability in respect of
cconduct and discipline matters. The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse
network in Lebanon, operated by the United Nations country team, and the sexual and
gender-based violence working group, which includes international and national
non-governmental organizations, continued to inform local communities of the
expected standards of conduct for United Nations personnel and to promote the
community-based complaints mechanism to raise awareness regarding the procedures
for reporting all forms of misconduct involving United Nations personnel. UNIFIL
and UNSCOL continued to promote a productive, harmonious and inclusive working
environment, with an emphasis on developing a prevention strategy to protect against
sexual harassment and other forms of prohibited conduct.

VI. Observations

69. I welcome the initial positive steps taken to address the economic situation,
recognizing that more is needed to put Lebanon on a sustainable path. The adoption
of an electricity plan and the preparation of a draft national budget are testaments to
the progress that the Government of Lebanon can achieve in a spirit of shared
responsibility and compromise. I applaud the intensified efforts of the Council of
Ministers to reach agreement on the priority areas outlined in its ministerial statement
(ibid., para. 53) and urge it to address outstanding aspects, including the formation of
associated regulatory bodies, to ensure its full implementation. To move the reform
agenda forward, I encourage Parliament to actively embrace its critical oversight role
with a view to enhancing accountability and transparency. I also call upon the
leadership of Lebanon to engage in constructive political debate and abide by the Taif
Accords.

70. The economic situation in Lebanon poses a significant threat to the country’s
stability. In that context, its swift implementation of the commitments made at the
Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector is
urgently needed to avoid further deterioration and to generate investor confidence.

71. The continued commitment by all sides to resolution 1701 (2006) remains
essential for the stability of Lebanon and the region. Persistent non-compliance and
violations increase the risk of tensions, miscalculation and the possible escalation into
hostilities. I urge both parties to redouble their efforts to adhere fully to resolution
1701 (2006) in order to sustain and consolidate the period of calm of the past years.
The United Nations will continue to support efforts to defuse tensions through
dialogue, pursue opportunities for confidence-building and create an environment
conducive to resolving underlying grievances in support of a permanent ceasefire.

72. I note that UNIFIL still has not been able to gain access to all relevant locations
north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line in
violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I call upon the Lebanese Armed Forces to
expeditiously undertake and conclude all necessary investigations on the Lebanese
side to ensure that the tunnels no longer pose a security threat and to prevent any
similar occurrences in the future. UNIFIL and UNSCOL stand ready to assist as
required. I renew my call for the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Armed Forces
to make further efforts to ensure that UNIFIL is fully able to implement its mandate.

73. I strongly encourage the parties to find an agreement on the way forward to
resolving existing points of contention along the Blue Line. Unilateral action in those
areas escalates tensions along the Blue Line and must be avoided. I reiterate my call
for the parties to avail themselves of the UNIFIL liaison and coordination
arrangements to the fullest extent possible. My Special Coordinator for Lebanon and
the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander will continue to explore opportunities with the parties for progress to that end.

74. I remain seriously concerned that Israeli flights over Lebanese territory continue, including overflights by fighter aircraft, causing distress to Lebanese civilians, in particular in southern Lebanon. Such overflights constitute a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and of resolution 1701 (2006). I am also concerned about the continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of the resolution. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and my call for Israel to cease its violations of Lebanese airspace and to withdraw its forces from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

75. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its entire area of operations and along the full length of the Blue Line remains critical. I regret that almost a year after the attack on peacekeepers in Majdal Zun, the United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings against any of the attackers, while it has continued to request further updates on this matter. I reiterate my call upon the Lebanese authorities to fulfil their obligation to ensure the safety and unimpeded freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and full accountability for those who attack peacekeepers.

76. While the maritime dispute between Lebanon and Israel continues to be a source of tension, I am encouraged that the Lebanese authorities have reached a united position and welcome the shuttle diplomacy of the United States aimed at eliciting commitments from the parties to engage in negotiations in pursuit of an eventual solution. The United Nations stands ready, and I am prepared to exercise my good offices, to support the parties in facilitating such efforts, at their request.

77. The repeated self-acknowledged maintenance of unauthorized weapons outside of State control by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups represents a persistent violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Allegations of illegal arms transfers to non-State armed groups in Lebanon also continue, and they warrant serious concern. While the United Nations is not in a position to verify those reports independently, if substantiated, the transfers would constitute a grave violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I call upon Member States to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to prevent the sale or supply of arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon.

78. Furthermore, I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all action necessary to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that there will be no weapons or authority in the country other than those of the Lebanese State.

79. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration, and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese-Syrian border in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

80. I welcome the efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces in support of the durable extension of State authority. Efforts to consolidate security and State authority along the northern and eastern borders should not detract from increasing the presence of troops deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations. I thank the Member States who have pledged their support for the deployment of the model regiment in line with the joint statement issued by the Rome II ministerial meeting. I regret the lack of progress in the model regiment initiative and call upon the Government of Lebanon, with
continued support from UNIFIL and the international community, to prioritize the operationalization of the regiment with a view to increasing the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon.

81. I welcome the continued discussions between the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL regarding the gradual transition of Maritime Task Force responsibilities to the Lebanese Navy, in line with the provisions of resolution 2433 (2018). I encourage a partial assumption of Maritime Task Force responsibilities by the Lebanese Navy in the short term in line with current capacities. I also urge the Lebanese Armed Forces to finalize its long-term development plan for the Navy. I continue to encourage Member States to support a practical and sustainable transition plan, in line with the provisions of resolution 2433 (2018).

82. I welcome further measures to curb illicit smuggling through illegal crossings in Lebanon. I urge the Government to continue to improve border control to prevent smuggling and to increase customs revenues. UNSCOL will continue to advocate the adoption of an integrated border management strategy to promote coordination among relevant border security and trade authorities.

83. I commend Lebanon for joining the Arms Trade Treaty. This represents an important milestone towards addressing the illicit flow and proliferation of arms in the country.

84. I reiterate the importance of moving forward with the commitment of the President to convene a national dialogue to determine a national defence strategy. It is important that such a process be Lebanese-owned and Lebanese-led, inclusive, comprehensive and sustainable, and in line with the country’s international obligations. Earlier decisions of the national dialogue pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada should be implemented.

85. I am saddened by the death in custody of Hassan Dika and I welcome the instruction of the Minister of Interior and Municipalities to open an investigation, which should be thorough and credible, as called for by my High Commissioner for Human Rights.

86. I call upon the Lebanese authorities to provide support to the National Commission for Human Rights and its associated national preventative mechanism against torture. The operationalization of that mechanism, if adequately resourced, can support Lebanese authorities in ensuring adherence to the provisions of the Convention against Torture, including in places of detention. I also appeal to the President to swear in the nominated members of those important entities.

87. I encourage the Council of Ministers to expeditiously consider and provide adequate support for the proposed national action plan on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

88. The remarkable generosity and hospitality of Lebanon in temporarily hosting Syrian refugees is widely appreciated within the international community and by the United Nations. The United Nations will continue to support Lebanon in those efforts. It is recognized that this hospitality has not been without cost to Lebanon. I call upon the authorities and political forces of Lebanon at the national and municipal levels to avoid making inflammatory statements that could heighten tensions between host communities and refugees. It is important that due process of law and the dignity of refugees be maintained while the United Nations and international partners collectively work towards creating conditions enabling larger-scale, safe, dignified and voluntary returns in a sustainable manner, in line with the expressed wishes of the majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the region.
89. The response of the United Nations in Lebanon to the refugee crisis would not have been possible without the enduring commitment of donors over the past eight years. I thank international donors for the tremendous generosity they exercised once again, including through multi-year commitments, at the third Brussels Conference.

90. Regarding the country’s crisis response plan, I appeal to donors to provide flexible funding to enable humanitarian partners to address critical protection needs, especially in the context of issues surrounding informal settlements.

91. I welcome efforts to improve the security situation in the Mieh Mieh Palestine refugee camp and applaud the coordination between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Palestinian factions to arrive at such an agreement. I encourage the Palestinian factions to abide by that agreement in order to keep camp residents and surrounding Lebanese communities safe. I am deeply grateful for the trust of Member States, for their recent pledges and their continued commitment to the dignity and rights of Palestine refugees. Such funding is critical to ensuring the stability of Palestine refugee communities in Lebanon and to enable the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to continue the uninterrupted delivery of essential services. It allows UNRWA to preserve the dignity and rights of Palestine refugees and contribute to the stability of the region.

92. I extend my appreciation to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon and encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. I thank my Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Ján Kubiš, and the staff of his office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Stefano Del Col, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.
Annex I

Restrictions on the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 18 February to 24 June 2019

1. On 11 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol encountered two new concrete blocks on a road near Blida (Sector East). There were no civilians or military personnel in the area. The patrol continued its assignment using an adjacent road. According to the Lebanese Armed Forces, the road was blocked by the landowner following a dispute with local residents who were using the road and passing through his property. Following the incident, UNIFIL has patrolled through Blida 18 times a week. UNIFIL is also engaging with the Mayor of Blida with the aim of identifying a permanent solution with regard to the road.

2. On 14 March, a UNIFIL vehicle was stopped by an individual dressed in civilian clothes near Kunin (Sector West). Subsequently, vehicles blocked the road in front of and behind the UNIFIL vehicle. The individual wearing civilian clothes told UNIFIL that it had to wait for the Lebanese Armed Forces to escort it in order to continue. Thirty minutes later, the same individual told the UNIFIL staff that they could proceed. The Lebanese Armed Forces was so informed. On 18 March, UNIFIL met with the Mayor of Kunin, who said that he did not condone the behaviour of the individuals blocking the road. He also advised UNIFIL to refrain from patrolling along narrow roads. Following the incident, UNIFIL has patrolled independently through Kunin six times a week without further incident.

3. On 27 March, a UNIFIL patrol encountered a group of children standing on the road near Wadi Jilu (Sector West). As the patrol attempted to turn around, two vehicles stopped behind it, blocking the road. The patrol then attempted to turn around again. The first of the three patrol vehicles was successful in leaving the area, but the remaining two were blocked by a crowd of some 20 to 30 civilians who had appeared shortly after the vehicles had blocked the road. The crowd took photographs of the patrol and attempted to open the UNIFIL vehicles. One of the men warned the patrol not to return to the village. After about 10 minutes, the crowd dispersed, and the patrol was able to continue its assignment. The Lebanese Armed Forces was informed. On 28 March, UNIFIL contacted the Mukhtar of Wadi Jilu, who said that “a few boys” had stopped the patrol because they had seen some members of the patrol taking photographs inside the village, an allegation UNIFIL disputes. The Mukhtar expressed his disapproval of how the local individuals had acted but insisted that it was an insignificant incident. Subsequently, UNIFIL patrolled independently though Wadi Jilu nine times a week without further incident.

4. On 9 April, four individuals dressed in civilian clothes approached one of the UNIFIL temporary observation posts near Ramiyah (Sector West) and introduced themselves as members of Hizbullah. The individuals told the UNIFIL patrol that the temporary observation post was on private property and that UNIFIL was therefore not allowed to be there unless they were accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces or local police. The individuals also told the peacekeepers that they were staying in the area “at their own risk”. The patrol maintained its position at the temporary observation post while unsuccessfully trying to contact the Lebanese Armed Forces; it then moved to another nearby position from which it could continue to observe the same area. Following the incident, UNIFIL set up temporary observation posts in Ramiyah six times a week, which offered a clear view of the above-mentioned area.

5. On 5 May, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was stopped by an individual dressed in civilian clothes at the eastern gate of the Green without Borders site in Aytarun (Sector West). The individual said that, in accordance with the instructions of the Mayor of Marun al-Ra’a’s (Sector West), Observer Group Lebanon would need
to be escorted by the Lebanese Armed Forces on that particular road. The patrol contacted the Mayor of Marun al-Ra’s, who confirmed that the requirement was coming from the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces similarly confirmed the instruction that UNIFIL needed to obtain the prior approval of the Lebanese Armed Forces for all patrols on that road. Following the incident, UNIFIL contacted the Mayor of Marun al-Ra’s, who said that he had directed Observer Group Lebanon to raise issues of access with the Lebanese Armed Forces rather than local authorities. UNIFIL also followed up on the incident with the Lebanese Armed Forces, which explained that UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon were allowed to patrol the site and that the incident had occurred because the person at the gate was new and inexperienced. Following the incident, UNIFIL has patrolled along the road independently on 34 occasions and in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces on 15 occasions. Observer Group Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, visited the site on 23 May.

6. On 10 May, a UNIFIL military convoy consisting of a civilian vehicle and a vehicle with United Nations licence plates that was transporting military personnel who had recently arrived in Lebanon as part of a contingent rotation was stopped at a Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint near Kafra (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces explained that UNIFIL civilian vehicles needed to have an escort while in the area. Two and a half hours later, the convoy was able to continue its movement together with two UNIFIL armoured personnel carriers. Following the incident, UNIFIL has patrolled through Kafra 52 times a week on average.

7. On 29 May, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol driving near Blida (Sector East) was stopped by the Mukhtar of Muhaybib (Sector East) and denied entry into the village. The Mukhtar cautioned that the villagers might have reacted aggressively if the patrol had entered the village, owing to their dislike of vehicles patrolling through its narrow streets. Three Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, who had been called by the Mukhtar, asked Observer Group Lebanon why it was entering the village without informing them, arguing that UNIFIL was in charge of patrolling the Blue Line, while the Lebanese Armed Forces was responsible for securing the village. An hour later, the Lebanese Armed Forces escorted the Observer Group Lebanon patrol out of the village. On 31 May, UNIFIL met again with Lebanese Armed Forces representatives, who stressed the necessity to coordinate future patrols in Muhaybib with them. Following the incident, UNIFIL has patrolled through Muhaybib three times a week on average.
Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. The present annex contains a report on the implementation of the arms embargo in accordance with Security Council resolution 2433 (2018), in which the Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), according to which all States should take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

2. The United Nations continues to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

3. In accordance with paragraph 14 of resolution 1701 (2006) and pursuant to the request in 2006 from the Prime Minister of Lebanon, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to assist the Lebanese Navy to monitor the maritime border and entry points by carrying out maritime interdiction operations and assisting in preventing the unauthorized entry of arms or related materiel into Lebanon by sea. The Task Force accordingly conducted more than 2,765 hailing procedures, leading to some 801 inspections by the Lebanese authorities. No smuggling attempts were detected during those activities.

4. In line with paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), it is incumbent upon all States to take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related material of all types.

5. United Nations enhanced reporting would further benefit from Member States providing the Secretariat with relevant and detailed information on the sales or supply of arms and related materiel and/or the provision of any technical training or assistance to any entity in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon.

6. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2016) and any decision that would be adopted by the Council in this regard.

7. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
Annex III

Efficiencies and effectiveness between the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

1. Further to my letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 31 December 2018 (S/2018/1182), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) are taking steps to increase their coordination and enhance their efficiency and effectiveness in line with my recommendations.

2. My Special Coordinator and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander enhanced their coordination through a formal mechanism to further the strategic priorities of both missions in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), assess progress and develop joint messaging and complementary engagement with national authorities and international partners. Areas of current focus include maritime and Blue Line developments, as well as capacity-building and support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, including its Navy, and efforts towards a permanent ceasefire. UNSCOL and UNIFIL also continue to coordinate their contingency planning for preparedness.

3. Pursuant to the request of the Security Council in its resolution 2433 (2018) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UNIFIL and UNSCOL, a formal review of the memorandum of understanding between the two missions was undertaken in 2018, in which it was deemed that it remained comprehensive and covered a wide range of areas relating to the coordination of support. The memorandum of understanding provides for cost-recovery support in the following areas: financial (transactional), procurement (UNIFIL holds delegated authority on behalf of UNSCOL), write-off and disposal of UNSCOL assets, supply of ration packs, engineering advice, field technology back-up systems, voice and data connectivity, in-house training, ground transportation support for out-of-contract maintenance and spare parts provision, issuance of driving licences, air transport for the Special Coordinator and accompanying staff between Ra’an Naqurah and Israel for meetings related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), medical support and customs clearance.

4. In accordance with my aforementioned letter to the President of the Security Council and prior to extending the UNSCOL rental agreement in January 2020, UNSCOL will report to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts before the end of 2019 on its efforts to reassess its space requirements, explore the possibility of co-location in Beirut with other United Nations entities and evaluate the commercial market for more cost-effective premises. To that end, UNSCOL has established a premises working group, which is making progress in exploring options, to determine their feasibility, including from a security perspective. An internal review of the options is expected to inform my Special Coordinator’s assessment of the operational and staffing impact of each option and to determine the most viable way forward.