Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 June to 20 October 2023

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, issued on 13 July 2023 (S/2023/522), including on the provisions of resolution 2695 (2023). Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). With repeated exchanges of fire across the Blue Line from 8 October between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces, there was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. Following the attack by Hamas on Israel on 7 October and subsequent developments in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the situation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) area of operations escalated, with daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, beginning in the contested Shab’a Farms area on 8 October and subsequently extending all along the Blue Line. From 8 to 20 October, UNIFIL recorded over 1,000 trajectories of projectiles fired in both directions across the Blue Line. In Lebanon, impacted areas included Bastrah, Hula, Kfar Kila and Shab’a (all Sector East) and Duhayrah, Alma al-Sha’b, Aytat al-Sha’b, and Rumaysh (all Sector West). In Israel, Israel Defense Forces positions as well as Qiryat Shmona, Metulla, Misgav Am, Nahariyya, Shlomi and Shtula were impacted. The Israel Defense Forces reported infiltration attempts from Lebanon into Israel on 13–14 and 17–19 October.

3. According to public statements, at least one Israeli civilian and seven Israel Defense Forces personnel were killed. At least 5 Lebanese civilians, 17 Hizbullah fighters, 3 Hamas fighters and 2 Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters were killed, while an undetermined number of civilians and combatants on both sides of the Blue Line were reportedly injured. In Lebanon, one journalist was killed near Alma al-Sha’bon 13 October. On 14 October, two civilians were killed in Shab’a and one near Hula;
another civilian was killed near Hula on 19 October. In Israel, one civilian was killed in Shtula on 15 October.

4. On 8 October, UNIFIL observed around 40 rockets and mortars fired from near Bastrah, Kfar Shuba and Shab’a targeting three Israel Defense Forces positions in the occupied Shab’a Farms area. The Israel Defense Forces responded with artillery fire towards Kfar Shuba and Bastrah and destroyed the tent south of the Blue Line (see S/2023/522, para. 7) with fire from an uncrewed aerial vehicle. A new tent was subsequently installed in the same location. In identical letters dated 8 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2023/744), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that Hizbullah, “fired 45 mortar shells from within Lebanon, at least 41 of them landing in Israel”. On 8 October, Hizbullah stated that it had conducted the attack “in the path of liberating the remaining parts of our occupied Lebanese land and in solidarity with the triumphant Palestinian resistance”.

5. On 9 October, UNIFIL observed several instances of indirect fire and detected over 100 explosions from both sides of the Blue Line near Alma al-Sha’b, Ayta al-Sha’b, Rumaysh and Yarun (all Sector West). In addition, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had, “neutralized a number of terrorist infiltrators who crossed from Lebanon into Israel”. The al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the infiltration. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed the death of one of its soldiers; two Islamic Jihad members were reportedly killed. Following subsequent artillery fire and air strikes by the Israel Defense Forces across the Blue Line near Ayta al-Sha’b, on 9 October Hizbullah stated that three of its fighters had been killed. One Lebanese Armed Forces soldier was also injured by Israel Defense Forces artillery fire. In identical letters dated 11 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2023/756), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated, “On 9 October, four terrorists infiltrated Israel from Lebanon. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this attack, which could not have been executed without Hezbollah’s consent”. He added, “an anti-tank missile and mortar shells were fired towards Israel. Hezbollah … claimed responsibility for that shelling”.

6. Exchanges of fire subsequently expanded in scope and intensity all along the Blue Line, with casualties reported on both sides. Between 8 and 20 October, Hizbullah issued several statements claiming responsibility for targeting Israel Defense Forces positions, equipment or personnel with anti-tank missiles and mortar fire. The Al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks against both the Israel Defense Forces and Israeli communities, while the Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for attempted infiltrations of Israeli territory. On 18 October, the Al-Fajr Forces of Al-Jama’a al-Islamia stated that they had targeted Israel Defense Forces positions “in response to the Israeli aggressions on south Lebanon and the killing of journalists and civilians”. The Israel Defense Forces issued daily statements regarding attacks from Lebanon and their responses across the Blue Line, as well as with respect to fatalities among their personnel. The Israel Defense Forces responded with mortars, artillery fire and air strikes at suspected militant positions, rocket-launch sites and Green Without Borders infrastructure. With respect to the death of the journalist on 13 October in southern Lebanon, the Israel Defense Forces were reported to have expressed their regret and that they were investigating the matter. In identical letters dated 13 October addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/539-S/2023/771), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “From 1 October 2023 to date, Israeli attacks against Lebanon have been increasing. Those attacks have included firing shots at and hurling bombs towards Lebanese civilians and farmers inside Lebanese territory. Other transgressions have included …
the continued violation of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft.”, adding “On 10 October, the Israelis fired artillery and tank shells and rockets, including phosphorous artillery shells ...”.

7. On 15 October, UNIFIL detected an Israel Defense Forces aircraft in Lebanese airspace which fired a missile on a target located just north of the UNIFIL area of operations. On 19 October, UNIFIL detected the firing of a projectile from north of the UNIFIL area of operations. The remnants of the projectile impacted north of the Blue Line, close to a UNIFIL position.

8. On 16 October, the Israel Defense Forces announced, “a plan to evacuate residents of 28 communities in northern Israel who live in the area up to 2 kilometers from the Lebanese border”.

9. On 19 October, a civilian building in Qiryat Shmona, northern Israel, was hit by rockets fired from Lebanon, injuring three people. The Lebanese authorities asked UNIFIL to convey that the strike had been accidental and that civilians had not been the target. On 20 October, Israel announced the evacuation of Qiryat Shmona. Also on 20 October, the Israel Defense Forces announced it had killed a gunman in Margaliyyot, northern Israel. Hizbullah claimed that it subsequently fired a rocket into Margaliot, that killed an Israeli reservist. Three Hizbullah members were killed in ensuing Israeli air strikes on Hizbullah positions in Lebanon. The same day, Hizbullah issued several statements claiming responsibility for attacking Israel Defense Forces locations in the occupied Shab’a Farms area.

10. As at 20 October, over 200,000 people were reportedly evacuated from northern Israel. According to the International Organization for Migration, over 20,000 people were displaced from southern Lebanon. On six occasions between 8 and 20 October, scores of civilians sought temporary shelter in or near a UNIFIL position near Duhayrah (Sector West).

11. Despite these developments, UNIFIL continued its operations. In close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL increased counter-rocket launching patrols, checkpoints and Blue Line patrols. UNIFIL operations were often interrupted as personnel sought shelter from the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line.

12. Several UNIFIL positions close to the Blue Line were caught in the crossfire. On 9 October, an Israel Defense Forces tank machine gun fired in the direction of a UNIFIL observation tower near Yarun. On 11 October, an artillery round was found in UNIFIL headquarters in Naqourah. On 15 October, UNIFIL detected 16 rockets fired towards Israel from banana groves in Qulaylah. One landed in UNIFIL headquarters in Naqourah, four landed nearby and the rest impacted south of the Blue Line. The same day, small arms fire from individuals north of the Blue Line hit a UNIFIL position near Hula, damaging UNIFIL communications equipment. On 16 October, artillery shell fragments damaged a warehouse and two vehicles at a UNIFIL position near Duhayrah.

13. Prior to 8 October, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations had been tense but relatively stable. On 6 July, UNIFIL recorded an explosion near northern Ghajar (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces subsequently fired artillery rounds impacting north of the Blue Line near Kfar Shuba, informing UNIFIL that they had responded after an anti-tank missile had been fired south across the Blue Line, landing west of Ghajar. UNIFIL has opened an investigation into the incident.

14. Until 7 October, the Israel Defense Forces had continued construction and engineering works near the Blue Line. Tensions ensued on several occasions, particularly related to actual or alleged Blue Line violations by Israel Defense Forces excavators. There were several incidents of weapons-pointing between Lebanese
Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces personnel, near Hula and Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) and near Duhayrah and Matmurah (Sector West). In each instance, UNIFIL acted to de-escalate tensions.

15. Tensions persisted in the occupied Shab’a Farms area. Despite repeated requests by UNIFIL to the Lebanese Armed Forces to have the tent placed by Hizbullah south of the Blue Line near Bastrah removed, it remained in place until destroyed and replaced on 8 October, as described above. UNIFIL observed individuals repeatedly crossing from north of the Blue Line to gain access to the tent, including after 8 October. A second tent, first observed south of the Blue Line on 17 June (see S/2023/522, para. 7), was observed on 1 July to have been moved north of the Blue Line. On 26 August, UNIFIL observed the commencement of works on a track to the tent, north of the Blue Line, and, on 3 September, the installation of a metal structure. On 19 September, the Israel Defense Forces initiated construction of a road nearby, south of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces fired shots into the air and smoke or tear gas grenades after Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and individuals crossed south of the Blue Line on 23 September and a Lebanese excavator crossed the Blue Line on 27 September. The two forces pointed weapons at each other during works by the Israel Defense Forces on 19–21 September and during works by Lebanese individuals on 25 and 28 September. UNIFIL confirmed that the Israel Defense Forces works had crossed north of the Blue Line in several locations. These violations were subsequently corrected. On 5 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces dismantled a structure that had crossed the Blue Line from the Lebanese side near Ayta al-Sha’b immediately after being informed by UNIFIL of the violation. UNIFIL engaged with the parties to de-escalate tensions in connection with these incidents.

16. The Israel Defense Forces continued construction of a T-wall south of the Blue Line (S/2023/522, para. 9). As at 20 October, the T-wall measured 36.75 kilometres in total, including 26.02 kilometres installed since construction resumed in April 2022 (S/2022/556, para. 7). On 18 July, UNIFIL observed eight sections of T-wall installed by the Israel Defense Forces near Kfar Shuba. Lebanese residents and politicians protested the works on several occasions. On 19 July, Israel Defense Forces personnel fired tear gas grenades towards Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and an individual north of the Blue Line. On 23 July, the Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces pointed weapons at each other; UNIFIL engaged the parties to de-escalate. On 25 August, an Israel Defense Forces tank pointed its barrel at a gathering of approximately 90 individuals north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL intervened to have the tank moved away. UNIFIL confirmed that some of the T-wall crossed north of the Blue Line and requested the Israel Defense Forces to adjust it accordingly. As at 20 October, this had not been done. In addition, a new section of T-wall was constructed near Sheikh Abbad’s tomb near Hula: before 8 October, this had been the site of regular stone-throwing at the Israeli technical fence.

17. Prior to 8 October, UNIFIL observed 27 confrontations between the Israel Defense Forces and individuals north of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces fired smoke or stun grenades across the Blue Line on several occasions after individuals tampered with or threw stones at the Israeli technical fence or crossed the Blue Line near Hula, Mays al-Jabal and Bustan (Sector West). Israel Defense Forces personnel fired shots in the air or pointed weapons at individuals north of the Blue Line near Bastrah, Hula, Kfar Shuba, Sarda and Shab’a (all Sector East), as well as near Bustan, Rumaysh and Yarun. On 30 June, Israel Defense Forces personnel threw stones north across the Blue Line towards a shepherd near Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East).

18. Between 21 June and 7 October, UNIFIL completed 3 technical investigations and launched 11 new investigations, including into an incident on 12 July that UNIFIL had not observed in which three individuals in the vicinity of Bustan had reportedly
been injured while attempting to damage the Israeli technical fence. UNIFIL submitted four requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces and nine requests to the Israel Defense Forces for access to sites, information and witnesses in support of investigations, and received two positive responses from the Lebanese Armed Forces. Between 8 and 20 October, UNIFIL launched five more investigations, including into the following: the firing at a UNIFIL observation post by an Israel Defense Forces tank on 9 October (see para. 12 above); an incident on 13 October involving shelling near Alma al-Sha’bin which a journalist was killed and others injured (see para. 3 above); the discovery of unfired rockets in Sector West and a partially exploded rocket at UNIFIL premises in Naqourah on 15 October (see para. 12 above); small arms fire by civilians towards UNIFIL and Israel Defense Forces positions on 15 October (ibid.); and the impact of a UNIFIL position by shelling on 16 October (ibid.).

19. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. From 21 June to 20 October, UNIFIL recorded 188 airspace violations, totalling 322 hours and 20 minutes. Uncrewed aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 80 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 15 per cent, unidentified aircraft 3 per cent and helicopters 2 per cent. UNIFIL protested all air violations to the Israel Defense Forces and urged their immediate cessation. The Lebanese Armed Forces violated Israeli airspace on 13 July. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that the violation had inadvertently occurred during a fire extinguishing mission. On 25 July, UNIFIL observed the launch of an uncrewed aerial vehicle by individuals north of the Blue Line near Sarda and the subsequent downing of it south of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces. On 3 August, UNIFIL observed a quadcopter dropping a stun grenade north of the Blue Line near Sarda, where two individuals claimed that their vehicle had consequently been damaged. UNIFIL subsequently observed the quadcopter cross south of the Blue Line.

20. From 21 June to 7 October, UNIFIL observed 600 ground violations by Lebanese individuals in civilian clothing crossing south of the Blue Line, including 284 violations by shepherds and farmers and 316 by other individuals. On 5 July, UNIFIL observed Blue Line violations by the Israel Defense Forces and Lebanese Armed Forces near Mays al-Jabal. Lebanese Armed Forces personnel crossed the Blue Line on 9 August near Mays al-Jabal. UNIFIL observed nine violations of the Blue Line by Israeli excavation or construction equipment, including near Arab al-Luwayzah and Hula, as well as near Matmurah, Duhayrah, Alma al-Sha’band Mays al-Jabal.

21. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond. In June and July, Israeli contractors conducted road and construction works in the occupied area (S/2023/522, para. 14), notwithstanding a request by UNIFIL for the Israel Defense Forces to cease such works. In identical letters dated 11 July addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/77/966-S/2023/523), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that Israel is “trying … to consolidate its total occupation and complete the annexation of the Lebanese northern part of the town of Ghajar, which extends to the outskirts of the town of Mari… [and] surrounded the town with a metal fence, a concrete wall and barbed wire, and installed cameras”.

22. To help keep the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent checkpoints and 114
temporary checkpoints and conducted an average of 372 counter-rocket-launching patrols each month, from 21 June to 7 October. From 8 to 20 October, UNIFIL maintained 16 permanent checkpoints and 13 temporary checkpoints and conducted 237 counter-rocket-launching patrols in total (for an extrapolated monthly average of 565).

23. From 21 June to 7 October, UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in its area of operations on 330 occasions, including hunting weapons on 287 occasions. UNIFIL observed rocket-propelled grenade launchers, light machine guns or assault rifles altogether on 36 occasions, pistols on 4 occasions and unknown light weapons on 3 occasions. Most of the assault weapons were observed at the unauthorized firing ranges (S/2022/556, para. 10, and S/2022/858, para. 10) in Zibqin and Dayr Amis (both Sector West) and Qantarrah (Sector East). UNIFIL continued to observe yellow flags with Hizbullah symbols at the Zibqin firing range (S/2023/522, para. 15) where, on 12 August, UNIFIL observed 90 individuals in military-style attire and yellow headbands, armed with 21 weapons (3 machine guns, 16 assault rifles and 2 rocket-propelled grenade launchers) performing a weapons-handling exercise. On 9 August, UNIFIL observed weapons at a site in Wadi Hamul (Sector West) and subsequently confirmed the site was a fifth unauthorized firing range in the area of operations. UNIFIL continued to observe a progressive upgrade of facilities at these firing ranges.

24. From 21 June to 7 October, UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence, undertaking an average of 15,399 operational activities each month, including 6,792 vehicular, air or foot patrols. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas where ground patrols had limited access, including private property, land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines and wadis. At least one woman peacekeeper was involved in 17.5 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities. From 8 to 20 October, UNIFIL undertook 5,891 operational activities, including 2,466 patrols (equivalent to a monthly average of 14,048 operational activities, including 5,880 patrols).

25. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission did encounter several restrictions (see annex I). The Lebanese Armed Forces helped resolve several such incidents by facilitating onward passage of the UNIFIL patrol or by escorting the patrol from the area.

26. Prior to 8 October, there were several other incidents in which the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers was endangered. On 26 July, near Shab’a, Israel Defense Forces personell pointed a weapon north of the Blue Line where UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were present. On 31 August, an Israel Defense Forces machine gun was pointed at a UNIFIL vehicle near Yarun. On 29 August, an individual approached a UNIFIL position near Al Tir (Sector West), made inappropriate remarks to a female peacekeeper, exposed himself and threw two stones towards her.

27. Before 8 October, UNIFIL observed laser-pointing between individuals north of the Blue Line and Israel Defense Forces personnel, as well as by individuals or Israel Defense Forces at UNIFIL, on several occasions, including near Sarda, Mays al-Jabal and Kfar Kila. On 15 and 20 September, near Dayr Amis and Ramadiyah (both Sector West), respectively, lasers were pointed at UNIFIL helicopter patrols by unknown individuals. On 10 August, the Israel Air Force responded to a UNIFIL letter regarding the 26 April incident involving a UNIFIL Maritime Taskforce vessel (S/2023/522, para. 18), stating that “the [Israel Air Force] does not intercept or lock radars on maritime vessels, including [United Nations] ships”.

28. Notwithstanding repeated requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several locations of interest, including Green Without
Borders sites, the tunnels crossing the Blue Line (see S/2019/237) and the five unauthorized firing ranges (see annex I).

29. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL met on 3 August and 15 September within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. Prior to 8 October, the average percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, among the activities that could be conducted in close coordination, was 18.7 per cent, down from 19.8 per cent percent in the previous reporting period. From 8 to 20 October, this number was 16.7 per cent. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted 171 coordinated training activities. As at 20 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated it had deployed 100 personnel, including 5 officers and 11 women, to its model regiment headquarters in Sribbin (Sector West).

30. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,580 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared all 358 vessels referred to it by UNIFIL. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy increasingly assumed command functions for maritime interdiction operations, including hailing and tracking duties, with support by the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and equipped with three Protector-class patrol boats and four rigid-hull inflatable boats received from the United States of America in August and October, respectively. The Lebanese Armed Forces Naval school in Jounieh was inaugurated on 4 October. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy conducted 291 coordinated activities and training events.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

31. UNIFIL convened tripartite meetings on 16 August and 12 September, during which incidents along the Blue Line and violations of resolution 1701 (2006) were discussed. UNIFIL continued to engage with the parties, seeking a means to address the outstanding contentious points along the Blue Line, which include the Lebanese “reservation areas”, the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from northern Ghajar and the contested coastal terminus point of B1.

32. UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanisms were used to de-escalate tensions associated with ground works by the Israel Defense Forces (see para. 14 above), the tent near Bastrah (see para. 15 above), and construction works in Kfar Shuba (see paras. 16–17 above). Since 8 October, UNIFIL has actively engaged with the parties to mitigate miscalculation and prevent further escalation.

33. UNIFIL, the Office of the Prime Minister of Lebanon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Lebanese Armed Forces participated in an informal working group on impediments to mandate implementation on 13 July and 14 September. Discussions focused on freedom of movement of UNIFIL and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon, as part of efforts to strengthen coordination with the Government of Lebanon on operational matters.

34. Notwithstanding the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, the establishment of the office remains pending.

35. UNIFIL, through quick-impact projects and outreach initiatives, continued to assist local authorities in the delivery of basic services. In total, 22 per cent of the quick-impact projects approved in the reporting period directly benefited women.

36. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming for 4,093 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, of whom 247 were women, and by supporting the National Commission for Lebanese Women
in the implementation of the Lebanese national action plan on resolution 1325 (2019) and the gender unit of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

C. Disarming armed groups

37. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains military capabilities and, since 8 October, such capabilities were observed during exchanges of fire across the Blue Line. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) continues to restrict the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

38. On 26 August, Hizbullah showcased military equipment, including what were reported to be anti-aircraft missiles, drones, air interceptor missiles, radar systems, tanks and military vehicles, at an exhibition in Baalbek, eastern Lebanon (see S/2023/755, para. 45).

39. As noted in paragraph 6 above, since 8 October, Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas) and the al-Fajr (Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya) have engaged in hostilities across the Blue Line.

40. During five counter-terrorism operations between 21 June and 20 October, Lebanese security forces arrested 15 individuals on terrorism-related charges, including over affiliation with Da’esh.

41. Multiple personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 23 fatalities, including 5 women, and at least 140 injuries, mostly in northern and eastern Lebanon.

42. In the Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp near Sidon, South Lebanon, at least 30 people were killed and hundreds injured during armed clashes between the Fatah movement and Islamist groups from late July to September. Following the killing of an individual affiliated with an Islamist group on 29 July and the killing of the head of the Palestinian National Security Forces and four companions on 30 July, armed clashes between the Fatah movement and Islamist groups occurred from 29 July to 3 August, resulting in 13 fatalities, at least 60 injured and hundreds displaced. On 31 July, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon said, “We call on the Palestinian leadership to cooperate with the army to control the security situation and hand over those meddling with security to the Lebanese authorities”.

43. Isolated incidents of armed violence continued, and armed fighters occupied United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) facilities within the camp, including schools, interrupting the Agency’s ability to provide its services.

44. Armed clashes resumed on 7 September, with at least 11 people killed and over 100 injured. Stray bullets and explosives caused one death and damage to property outside the camp. On 10 September, five Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were injured when shelling hit a military outpost close to the camp.

45. After several attempts, a ceasefire was agreed on 14 September following talks convened by Lebanon’s Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, and representatives of the Fatah movement and Hamas. On 25 September, a Palestinian joint security force deployed inside Ein El Hilweh to consolidate the ceasefire agreement while the Lebanese Armed Forces cordoned off the camp perimeter. On 27 September, UNRWA announced that the start of the school year would be postponed for more than 11,000 Palestine refugee children owing to the continued presence of armed actors in and around schools in the camp, major reconstruction outstanding in damaged camp
schools and rehabilitation works in schools that hosted refugees during the conflict. On 16 October, UNRWA reopened one of two health centres in the camp.

46. During his visit to Beirut, on 1 September, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with leaders of Palestinian groups in Lebanon. He stated that, “The unity of action of the various Palestinian groups has increased the strength of the resistance and there is no doubt that the resistance has the final say in any issue.” On 2 September, Mr. Amir-Abdollahian also met separately with his Lebanese counterpart, Abdallah Bou Habib, and Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.

47. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

D. Arms embargo and border control

48. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex II). While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

49. Reports of Hizbullah’s military engagement in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

50. On 9 August, two people were killed in an exchange of fire between Hizbullah members and residents of Kahhalah, Aley District, Mount Lebanon, a predominantly Christian village 12 kilometres southeast of Beirut, after a truck belonging to Hizbullah travelling from the Biqa’ to Beirut overturned near Kahhalah. On 10 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated, “An army unit was dispatched to the scene and worked to contain the situation. The truck’s cargo was transported to a military post, and an investigation was initiated under the supervision of the competent judicial authorities.” On 14 August, The Secretary-General of Hizbullah stated, “I always said openly that we are improving our preparedness and readiness and our arms in quality and quantity and that ammunition and arms are transported from one area to another.” On 18 August, four Kahhalah residents were summoned by the military court for questioning as witnesses in the case; on 22 August, four Hizbullah members were summoned. No charges have been filed.

51. During the reporting period, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces arrested 61 individuals in at least 26 counter-narcotics operations.

52. Lebanese security forces arrested 887 individuals, including 33 smugglers, to combat the smuggling of people. Between 18 August and 20 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that it had prevented the irregular entry of 6,838 Syrian nationals along the Lebanese Syrian border.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

53. UNIFIL cleared 12,273 square metres of land, finding and disposing of 1,937 anti-personnel mines and 1 unexploded ordnance in its area of operations. Demining teams refurbished 13 cut-lanes and Blue Line markers. UNIFIL conducted 93 quality assurance and quality control monitoring assessments and six risk awareness briefings for 192 United Nations military and civilian personnel, including 13 women. UNIFIL also supported the Lebanon Mine Action Centre by conducting two explosive ordnance risk education activities, benefitting more than 240 students. Since
8 October, the threat to the safety and security of civilians and United Nations personnel posed by explosive ordnance contamination has increased.

F. Delineation of borders

54. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab’a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab’a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641, annex).

G. Political and institutional stability

55. Amid the escalations along the Blue Line, the caretaker Cabinet convened on 12 October, following which the caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, stated, “Lebanon is in the eye of the storm.” On 13 October, while highlighting his efforts to “shield Lebanon from the conflict”, Mr. Mikati stated that “The decision to go to war or not is not in the hands of the Government.”

56. Parliament did not convene during the reporting period to elect a new president. On 17 July, representatives from Egypt, France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States (“the quintet”) met in Doha to discuss “the urgent need for Lebanon’s leadership to expedite presidential elections and implement imperative economic reforms in order to fulfill their responsibilities to their citizens”. The Quintet also met on 19 September in New York.

57. On 15 August, in response to a proposal from French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian for an inter-party dialogue, 31 parliamentarians representing the Lebanese Forces, the Kata’ib and some independent and emerging groups issued a joint statement declaring “the futility of any dialogue formula with Hizbullah”.

58. On 31 August, Speaker Berri called on all parties to participate in a dialogue, to be followed by successive parliamentary sessions, “until the election of a new president”. There was no response to this call.

59. Parliament convened on 17 October to elect the heads and members of parliamentary committees. No other sessions were convened during the reporting period. The Lebanese Forces, the Kata’ib, independent and emerging groups, joined by the Free Patriotic Movement, maintained that Parliament could not legislate during the presidential vacuum.

60. The caretaker Prime Minister convened the caretaker Cabinet on 13 occasions during the reporting period. On 16 August and 12 September, the caretaker Cabinet approved the State budgets for 2023 and 2024, respectively, and referred them to Parliament. The eight Free Patriotic Movement-affiliated ministers continued to boycott all Cabinet sessions.

61. Eighteen months since the signing of the staff-level agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Lebanon (see S/2022/556, para. 50), most prerequisite actions for a board-level agreement remain outstanding. On 15 September, following its visit to Lebanon, the IMF stated, “the outlook remains difficult and unstable”.

62. On 31 July, Riad Salameh concluded his 30-year tenure as Central Bank Governor, with first vice governor, Wassim Manssouri, assuming the functions of
interim governor on 1 August. The Central Bank, meanwhile, began its transition from the “Sayrafa” exchange platform to an inter-bank currency trading platform.

63. The forensic audit report of the Central Bank, conducted by Alvarez and Marsal for the period from 2015 to 2020, was issued on 11 August (see S/2021/953, para. 53) and highlighted a “lack of overall good governance and risk management arrangements”.

64. On 10 August, the Ministry of Justice requested the recusal of the investigative judge leading the investigation into corruption allegations against Mr. Salameh. The case was referred to the General Assembly of the Court of Cassation, which has not convened since January 2022 due to judicial vacancies (see S/2022/214, para. 56).

65. Amid increased dollarization of the economy, the unofficial exchange rate remained relatively stable at around 89,000 Lebanese pounds to the dollar. According to the Central Administration of Statistics in Lebanon, inflation in Lebanon hit an annual rate of 251.5 per cent in July 2023. In June, Lebanon recorded a nominal food price inflation rate of 280 per cent year over year, the second highest worldwide, according to the World Bank.

66. On 24 August, caretaker Minister for Energy and Water, Walid Fayyad, announced that exploration drilling in block 9, situated along the maritime boundary with Israel, had commenced.

67. Demonstrations, roadblocks and sporadic strikes to protest the deteriorating economic conditions continued. Countrywide demonstrations in solidarity with Palestine took place after 7 October. Following a Hizbullah call for an “unprecedented day of rage” on 18 October, protestors clashed with security forces outside the embassies of France and the United States. Some United Nations premises were vandalized. Separately, there was a rise in protests, hate speech and violence against the LGBTQ+ community.

68. The judicial investigation into the Beirut port explosion remains stalled. Marking the third anniversary of the explosion, the International Support Group for Lebanon issued a statement on 3 August, lamenting “the lack of progress into the judicial proceedings” and calling on “the Lebanese authorities to lift all obstacles hindering the pursuit of justice and facilitate the completion of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation”.

69. As at 20 October, the prosecution of 68 individuals in the case of the deadly 14 October 2021 Tayyunah clashes (see S/2021/953, para. 57) remains pending. No progress has been made in the investigation into the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim (see S/2021/240, para. 46).

70. The National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, released its first annual report in June.

71. The two-track inclusive dialogue process continued between 25 senior women from traditional political parties and emerging groups, alongside 11 local women’s mediation networks, to build trust and explore joint action in response to the protracted crisis in Lebanon. Over 700 women political candidates received specialized training on communications and campaign skills.

72. As at 30 September, 801,462 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 789,842 Syrian refugees and 11,620 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown. As indicated in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023, the Government estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.
73. Thus far in 2023, there have been 38 actual or attempted movements by sea from Lebanon, mostly destined for Cyprus, carrying 2,297 passengers, most of whom were Syrian.

74. Also thus far in 2023, in an increase from 1,500 in 2022, UNHCR is aware of an estimated 11,000 Syrians deported from or refused entry to Lebanon, including an estimated 6,000 Syrians in August.

75. On 30 August, UNRWA appealed for $15.5 million to repair infrastructure damaged in the Ein El Hilweh clashes, to provide alternate schooling locations for children and to provide cash assistance to people whose shelters have been rendered uninhabitable or irreparably damaged.

76. The United Nations estimates that, in 2023, approximately 3.9 million people in Lebanon need humanitarian assistance, including 2.1 million Lebanese, 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 211,400 Palestine refugees and 81,499 migrants. Between May and October, approximately 1.4 million people in Lebanon experienced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 806,000 Lebanese, 540,000 Syrian refugees, 54,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon and 11,000 Palestine refugees from Syria.

77. As at 30 September, overall international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at $1.46 billion, including $911.52 million disbursed in 2023 and $552.5 million carried over from 2022. Donors reported $197.92 million in outstanding commitments for 2023 and $186 million in commitments for 2024 and beyond. The appeal for the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023 is 29 per cent funded, at $1.02 billion of $3.59 billion requested, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting $634.1 million in funds received in 2023 and $395.5 million carried over from 2022. As at 30 September, the Emergency Response Plan to provide life-saving humanitarian support to the most vulnerable Lebanese citizens, Palestine refugees and migrants affected by the crisis was 14 per cent funded, with $22.1 million received out of $200.2 million requested.

III. Security and safety measures

78. Since 8 October, United Nations security and contingency plans for both north and south of the Litani were activated, with close coordination between the respective designated officials. Contingency planning has been undertaken both north and south of the Litani. Threat assessments were conducted, and plans in case of relocation and evacuation were updated. Dependents of both international and national staff were advised to relocate north of the Litani.

79. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by all United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 71 missions to the Arqub area, including by members of the United Nations country team.

80. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers. Concerning the fatal attack against a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, the first trial hearing was held on 30 August. The next hearing is scheduled for 15 December 2023.

81. On 7 July, regarding the attack in which six UNIFIL peacekeepers were killed and two injured in Khiyam on 24 June 2007, the Permanent Military Court sentenced the perpetrator to life imprisonment with hard labour for having detonated the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. The same day, in the case of terrorist intent opened in January 2014, the Permanent Military Court sentenced the perpetrator to
15 years imprisonment with hard labour for the possession of explosive materials to commit terrorist acts against UNIFIL.

82. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Military Prosecutor has instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces to expand the investigations into the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022, and in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

83. As at 20 October, UNIFIL comprised 10,205 military personnel, including 774 women (7.58 per cent), from 47 troop-contributing countries, and 792 civilian staff (239 international and 553 national), including 249 women (31.43 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised four vessels until 24 August and five vessels from 25 August, with 692 of the Force’s military personnel, including 40 women (5.78 per cent). In addition, 40 military observers, including 7 women (17.5 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of lieutenant colonel. The most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

84. Since 8 October, United Nations- and contingent-owned facilities and equipment have sustained damage, including a UNIFIL communications tower (see para. 12 above), which resulted in loss of communication services to multiple UNIFIL positions. Mission support operations have been impacted, with the suspension or cancelation of construction; engineering and maintenance work; vendor, welfare and external visits; and training. Catering services have been reduced, and some rotation and resupply flights delayed. UNIFIL enterprise risk management and emergency planning preparedness has enabled the mission to maintain its operations, however, with sufficient reserve of fuel, rations and backstopping services.

85. As part of Action for Peacekeeping efforts to support effective performance and accountability, UNIFIL completed its regular Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System evaluation, including data collection, analysis and performance assessment, and adopted recommendations confirming the effectiveness of mission operations.

86. In accordance with the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and Security Council resolution 2436 (2018), UNIFIL finalized the assessment of 13 evaluations of subordinate units for logistics, training and operational preparedness. No shortfalls were identified in this reporting period.

87. UNIFIL continued the implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see S/2020/473), pursuant to Security Council resolution 2539 (2020).

88. UNIFIL continued to address misinformation and disinformation, in line with the mission’s strategy adopted in February 2023. In Lebanon, media responses to the adoption of resolution 2695 (2023) renewing the UNIFIL mandate were mixed, while overall measured. The caretaker Prime Minister issued a statement on 31 August expressing “satisfaction” with the resolution’s emphasis on UNIFIL coordination with the Government of Lebanon. UNIFIL issued statements to underscore the sovereignty of Lebanon, the mission’s impartiality and cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since 8 October, UNIFIL has issued statements dispelling misinformation concerning the continued presence and operation of the Mission.
IV. Conduct and discipline

89. From 1 June through 30 September, UNIFIL recorded three allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct. No allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse was reported in either the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon or UNIFIL. Induction and targeted awareness training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 141 civilians and 3,354 military personnel in UNIFIL. Both the Office and UNIFIL remain committed to strict adherence to the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. In this regard, UNIFIL conducted a workshop for 16 medical, HIV/AIDS and counselling staff to enhance their knowledge on the policy, reporting mechanisms and implementation of the victim assistance strategy. UNIFIL conducted four outreach events, distributing sexual exploitation and abuse “No Excuse” cards and materials to municipal officials.

V. Observations

90. I am gravely concerned by the breaches of the cessation of hostilities along the Blue Line since 8 October, involving exchanges of fire between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces, which have resulted in numerous casualties, including civilians, on both sides, internal displacement of thousands, and raised the spectre of a conflict that both parties state they do not seek. While the exchanges of fire have been largely confined to the immediate vicinity of the Blue Line, the danger of miscalculation and broader conflict is ever-present. These developments are an urgent reminder that full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1701 (2006), is key for peace, security and stability in Lebanon and the region. I call on the parties to fully respect the cessation of hostilities in line with resolution 1701 (2006).

91. I call on all parties to respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including obligations related to the protection of civilians, including journalists. UNIFIL positions have been impacted during these clashes, fortunately without fatalities so far. All parties are urged to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and to respect the inviolability of United Nations premises.

92. I urge the parties to continue to utilize UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanisms and de-escalate. Prior to 7 October, the communications channels maintained by UNIFIL with both parties, as well as the physical intervention of peacekeepers, helped prevent the deterioration of the security situation. Events since have only underscored the importance of the mission’s liaison and coordination mechanisms.

93. The exchanges of fire underscore serious concerns regarding the possession of unauthorized weapons outside of the authority of the State in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

94. I once again call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. I also reiterate my call to address the outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of the national defence strategy. It remains important that earlier decisions of the National Dialogue are implemented, especially those pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese.
groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

95. Nearly one year since the presidency was vacated, recent developments underscore the urgent need for the political leaders of Lebanon to set aside their differences and embrace an approach that would facilitate the election of a president and the subsequent formation of a fully empowered Government and preserve stability.

96. The capacity of State institutions to provide basic public services continues to erode, compounding the humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people. The enduring commitment of international donors cannot replace functioning State institutions. Lebanon urgently needs progress on reforms to stabilize the economy and catalyse its recovery.

97. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I also condemn any violation of the sovereignty of Israel from Lebanon.

98. The continued occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line represents a persistent violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease. Construction in the area runs contrary to the necessary withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces and exacerbates tensions. I again urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

99. I regret that there has been no progress made on the issue of the Shab’a Farms in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006) and underscore the need for renewed political efforts. I reiterate my call upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab’a Farms area as provided in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641). Meanwhile, and without prejudice to the status of the Shab’a Farms, all parties should fully respect the Blue Line, here as elsewhere, and act with maximum restraint.

100. The ability of UNIFIL to implement its mandate fully is more critical than ever. Incidents affecting the freedom of movement of UNIFIL remain of great concern. I reiterate the obligation of the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate access by UNIFIL to all areas requested by the mission, including the unauthorized firing ranges, and the need for the Government of Lebanon to investigate any restrictions on the movement of UNIFIL.

101. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL, including those responsible for the killing of a peacekeeper and injuries to three others near Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, must be held to account. I welcome the verdicts of 7 July in two cases of attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers, one of which resulted in six deaths. The role of the Lebanese authorities is crucial in helping to prevent such incidents in future. This includes publicly dispelling misinformation and disinformation regarding the mission’s mandate.

102. The importance of a strong and well-resourced Lebanese Armed Forces, which remain central to the successful implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), is further underscored by recent events. Welcoming the continued international support for the State security institutions of Lebanon, further support is required to facilitate an effective and durable deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to southern Lebanon, notably the model regiment, with a headquarters that stands equipped and ready. At sea, the gradual assumption of maritime interdiction operation command functions by the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy is encouraging. I commend efforts to strengthen coordination between UNIFIL and the Government of Lebanon.
103. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration (2012), and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the border of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

104. I am deeply alarmed by the violent clashes in Ein El Hilweh. The role of UNRWA in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon is more critical than ever. The international community is urged to provide the Agency with the necessary resources to ensure continuity of essential services and support to all Palestine refugees in Lebanon, as elsewhere.

105. I deeply appreciate of the remarkable hospitality the Lebanese people have extended to large numbers of refugees for decades. A robust, united and well-funded response to the rising needs of the refugees and their host communities remains vital, as does the consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement.

106. More than three years since the explosion at the port of Beirut on 4 August 2020, the families of the victims and the Lebanese people continue to demand truth, justice and accountability. I again call on the Lebanese authorities to follow through on an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation.

107. I express my condolences to all those affected by events in the region and urgently reiterate the need for the breaches of the cessation of hostilities to cease. I express my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon and encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. They are serving under increasingly challenging conditions with professionalism and courage, while further demonstrating the value of peacekeeping. I extend my appreciation to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, and the staff of her office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Areldo Lazaro Sáenz, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.
Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 June 2023 to 20 October 2023

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, were fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by the mission for the purpose of swift investigations, including several Green Without Borders sites, the tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in S/2019/237), unauthorized firing ranges and other locations of interest, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. From 21 June to 7 October, UNIFIL conducted an average of 6,747 monthly patrols during the day and at night, of which 2,782 (41.2 per cent) were foot patrols. The mission conducted an average of 2,938 patrols each month along the Blue Line, half by vehicle and half on foot. In addition, the mission conducted an average of 44 helicopter patrols and 985 inspection activities, which included the conduct of temporary and permanent checkpoints and counter-rocket-launching operations each month. From 8 to 20 October, UNIFIL conducted 2,460 patrols, of which 501 were foot patrols. In the present period, the Mission conducted 899 Blue Line patrols, 6 helicopter patrols and 458 inspection activities (for an extrapolated monthly average of 5,866 patrols, of which 1,194 were foot patrols, and including 2,144 Blue Line patrols and 14 helicopter patrols, as well as 1,092 inspection activities).

3. Prior to 8 October, the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, while the mission continued to experience some restrictions, as detailed below. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces on incidents in which the mission's freedom of movement has been restricted. Since 8 October, patrolling has been affected owing to force protection issues, with UNIFIL peacekeepers and the Lebanese Armed Forces sheltering in bunkers in areas affected by shelling for prolonged periods of time. When UNIFIL was able to conduct operational activities, the mission focused on Blue Line and counter-rocket-launching patrols, as well as the staffing of checkpoints in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces at entry points to the UNIFIL area of operations. Operations were conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, where possible, including after 8 October.

Access to all locations of interest

4. UNIFIL has yet to gain access to the unauthorized firing ranges, with a fifth site in Wadi Hamul identified in the present reporting period, as well as installations close to the Blue Line and elsewhere in the area of operations, despite repeated requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Access to these locations is required both in connection with inspections and as part of the mission's daily monitoring of the Blue Line, as mandated under resolution 1701 (2006) and recalled in resolution 2695 (2023). As at 7 October, there were 17 containers and 6 watchtowers, the tent south of Blue Line that was destroyed on 8 October but subsequently replaced, 2 makeshift shelters and 20 permanent structures at a total of 18 locations – some being the site of multiple structures. Twelve of the sites had insignia associated with Green Without Borders. UNIFIL had observed professional cameras at two sites and closed-circuit television at five sites. On 24 August, the containers located by the gate of a UNIFIL position near Hula (see S/2023/522, para. 20) was replaced by a structure of a more permanent nature. On several occasions, individuals associated with these sites threw stones at
the Israeli technical fence or engaged in aggressive behaviour towards UNIFIL. Since 8 October, several of the abovementioned sites were targeted by the Israel Defense Forces and damaged or destroyed.

5. Other locations of interest in the UNIFIL area of operations, which are monitored by UNIFIL, include sites associated with Green Without Borders since 2017 or locations from where rockets were fired in the past, which are the focus of UNIFIL counter-rocket launching patrols, conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 20 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces discovered the site from where rockets had been launched the previous day in an area with heavy vegetation in the vicinity of Qulaylah. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL determined that 23 rockets had been launched from the site, with 1 rocket left unlaunched and 1 exploded on the ground. The Lebanese Armed Forces removed the unlaunched rocket for destruction.

6. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes proposed by UNIFIL to expand its presence outside main routes and municipal centres on the grounds that they were either private roads or areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents with the appropriate authorities. It continuously coordinates with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure freedom of movement and unrestricted access to its entire area of operations.

**Freedom of Movement Incidents**

7. On 27 July, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was blocked by seven vans in the vicinity of Ayn Ibil (Sector West) after making an unplanned turn. Individuals from the vans then covered one of the patrol vehicle’s side mirrors and rear window with plastic bags and cardboard. The patrol contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces, which arrived at the incident site and accompanied the peacekeepers away from the area. The patrol cancelled the rest of its planned activity. UNIFIL followed up with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Bint Jubayl Union of Municipalities on the incident.

8. On 3 August, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was surrounded by three vehicles and 20 individuals in civilian clothes, in the vicinity of Bayt Yahun (Sector West) after making an unplanned turn. Several of the individuals took pictures of the patrol, without displaying aggressive behaviour. The Lebanese Armed Forces swiftly arrived and accompanied the peacekeepers away from the area. The peacekeepers cancelled the rest of their patrol. UNIFIL engaged with the Mayor of Bayt Yahun to prevent reoccurrence of such incidents.

9. On 6 August, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol, after making an unplanned turn, was blocked by 20 individuals in civilian clothes, in the vicinity of Kunin (Sector West). The group, mostly male teenagers with scooters and cars, threw stones and were verbally aggressive. The patrol commander managed to restore calm, and another civilian arrived and told the teenagers to leave, which they then did. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and accompanied the peacekeepers back to a United Nations position without completing the patrol. Two patrol vehicles suffered minor damage with one wing mirror damaged and one ballistic window cracked. UNIFIL liaised with the Mayor of Kunin to prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents.

10. On 7 August, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by three individuals in civilian clothes in the vicinity of the village of Shab’a (Sector East). When the patrol was assessing how to proceed, a larger group of individuals gathered around. The individuals ran towards the first patrol vehicle, hitting it with their hands and shouting that the peacekeepers should leave the area. One individual seized a map from the second patrol vehicle and ran away. The peacekeepers returned to their position, while no injuries or damage to United Nations vehicles was reported.
11. On 19 August, a UNIFIL patrol, conducted with the Lebanese Armed Forces, was stationary at the side of a road in the vicinity of Sarda (Sector East) when an individual in a passing vehicle pointed a handgun and pretended to shoot at the patrol. The patrol was unable to determine whether the pistol was real or a replica. The Lebanese Armed Forces personnel did not observe the weapon and did not take any action.

12. On 20 August, a UNIFIL patrol was surrounded by 20 individuals displaying aggressive behaviour in civilian clothes in the vicinity of Sarda (Sector East). The individuals, in five vehicles with yellow flags displayed, had been observing towards south of the Blue Line when they approached the patrol and threw approximately 20 stones. They tried to place one of the yellow flags on the patrol vehicle while taking pictures, but the peacekeepers prevented them. UNIFIL requested the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide support. While waiting, a second UNIFIL vehicle arrived at the site and the individuals moved away and resumed their observation towards south of the Blue Line, waving yellow flags before leaving the area. No injuries or damage were reported.

13. On 21 August, a large stone thrown at a UNIFIL patrol vehicle lightly injured a peacekeeper in the vicinity of Bayyadah (Sector West). An individual in civilian clothes threw the rock through an open vehicle window. Minor damage to the vehicle was also reported. UNIFIL liaised with the Mayor of Sham‘ to protest the incident.

14. On 22 August, five individuals in military-style attire, one carrying a pistol, approached a stationary patrol in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector West). The individuals told the peacekeepers to leave and not to return and threatened to open fire. The peacekeepers departed but returned two hours later, accompanied by six Lebanese Armed Forces personnel. The Lebanese Armed Forces engaged the individuals who then left the area, and the peacekeepers were able to resume their patrol. UNIFIL followed up with the Mayor of Ramiyah and informed him about the incident.

15. On 4 September, two individuals in civilian clothes threw a total of 17 stones on two separate occasions towards UNIFIL personnel located at a static position in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha‘b (Sector West), without causing any injuries. The individuals demanded that the peacekeepers leave. The individuals then entered a prefabricated construction in the area which belongs to Green Without Borders. UNIFIL engaged with the Mayor of Ayta al-Sha‘b and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces, protesting the incident.

16. On 15 September, three lasers were pointed from different locations at a UNIFIL helicopter conducting an aerial patrol in the vicinity of Dayr Amis (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

17. On 20 September, a laser was pointed at a UNIFIL helicopter conducting an aerial patrol in the vicinity of Ramadiyah (Sector West).

18. On 21 September, UNIFIL peacekeepers were approached by four individuals in civilian clothes, who were walking in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector West). One of them was seen carrying a pistol. Two of the individuals aggressively told the peacekeepers to vacate the position. They then left the area. A short time later, two other individuals demanded that UNIFIL peacekeepers withdraw from the position. As two Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers arrived in the area and interacted with the individuals, they left without any further disturbance of the peacekeepers.

19. On 24 September, UNIFIL was patrolling in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha‘b (Sector West), on the way towards a Green without Borders container at point BP13, to verify the presence of two excavators working in the area. Two individuals in civilian clothes parked a vehicle in the middle of the road, blocking the movement of the patrol. The
individuals approached UNIFIL personnel and told them to contact the Lebanese Armed Forces to continue their route. Once the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the UNIFIL patrol conducted the verification jointly and determined that there were no ongoing works.

20. On 26 September, a UNIFIL patrol carrying out its task was blocked by a barrier and by civilian vehicles on a road in the vicinity of Dayr Mimas (Sector East). The group was made up of 17 individuals in civilian clothes with five vehicles. The individuals told the patrol that it could not enter the area since it was private property and demanded the patrol take an alternative route. Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were present at the site but were unable to resolve the issue. The patrol then left the area and returned to its base.

21. On 30 September, unidentified individuals threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol, northeast of Kafra (Sector West). While the vehicle was taking a turn, individuals started pelting stones, one of which hit the windshield of the vehicle, injuring one peacekeeper. The perpetrator could not be identified because of the darkness. The patrol moved back to a United Nations position, where the injured peacekeeper received treatment and the damaged vehicle was replaced. Then, the patrol resumed its activities and continued the planned route. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

22. On 7 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers on a joint patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces, moving northeast of Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West), were approached by 11 individuals (10 young boys) in civilian clothes with a car. The individuals asked the peacekeepers to leave the area and one of them threw a stone at the patrol. The Lebanese Armed Forces patrol leader negotiated with the driver of the vehicle to let UNIFIL continue with its planned itinerary. The patrol was able to resume its activities and continued the planned route.

23. On 8 October, three individuals with a pickup truck in the vicinity of Kfar Shuba (Sector East) broke the left side mirror of a United Nations vehicle with a wooden stick. The patrol then continued with its itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

24. Between 10 and 11 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers encountered a group of aggressive individuals southwest of Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West). As a patrol vehicle had broken down on the road, the peacekeepers were waiting for the UNIFIL recovery team. The individuals hit the patrol vehicles and tried to enter one of them. They also climbed on top of one vehicle and hit it. The vehicles were slightly damaged. When Lebanese Armed Forces personnel arrived, the individuals left.

25. On 12 October, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by 21 individuals in civilian clothes with a car and a motorbike southeast of Batuliyah (Sector West). A Lebanese Armed Forces soldier in civilian clothes reached the area with a vehicle and accompanied the patrol away from the location. The patrol continued with its planned itinerary.

26. On 18 October, 70 individuals in civilian clothes with yellow and Palestinian flags blocked a UNIFIL patrol’s access to the coastal road northwest of Ra’s al-Ayn (Sector West). Some of the individuals climbed on the United Nations vehicles and others took pictures. After some time, calm was restored and the patrol returned to United Nations position 1-26. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.
Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL. The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

2. It is stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types. During the reporting period, no new information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.

3. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution 2591 (2021) in which it urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and all state security institutions, which are the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.

2. Further to paragraph 10 of resolution 2591 (2021), a ministerial-level international conference hosted by France and co-chaired with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon on 17 June 2021 focused attention on the impact of the economic crisis in Lebanon on the Lebanese Armed Forces. Participants unanimously agreed that support for the Lebanese Armed Forces reflects the international community’s interest in the unity, sovereignty and stability of Lebanon. A follow-up mechanism was subsequently put in place by the Office with the Lebanese Armed Forces to track, for transparency and accountability, the receipt of in-kind bilateral support.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2650 (2022) and in line with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, a livelihood support programme for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces, funded through a financial transfer and accountability mechanism managed by the United Nations Development Programme under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, was launched in the first quarter of 2023 with funding allocated for a six-month period. The sixth and final monthly disbursement to the Internal Security Forces was issued in September, while the final monthly disbursement to the Lebanese Armed Forces will be issued in November.

4. Financial support from Qatar, which started on 12 July 2022, was suspended pending the completion of the livelihood support programme. On 30 August, Qatar pledged to donate $30 million to cover fuel costs for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The first shipment of fuel arrived in Lebanon on 28 September. In June, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provided armoured vehicle parts worth $1.2 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 21 August, the United States of America announced the donation to the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy of three patrol boats. On 4 October, Germany announced that it would donate fuel in the amount of €1 million, as well as medical supplies valued at €1 million, to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.