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Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 19 February to 16 June 2020

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, dated 10 March 2020 (S/2020/195), including on the provisions of resolution 2485 (2019). The area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained mostly calm, despite increased tensions following several incidents along the Blue Line, in which UNIFIL intervened to prevent further escalation. The impact of the outbreak of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) notwithstanding, UNIFIL maintained a high operational tempo and visibility. Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. Since April, tensions have heightened in connection with activities along the Blue Line, in particular in Udaysah and Mays al-Jabal (both Sector East) and Aytarun (Sector West). On 14 April, following Israel Defense Forces activities north of the technical fence but south of the Blue Line, in an area where Lebanon has reservations on the Blue Line close to Misgav Am/Udaysah, approximately 47 Israel Defense Forces soldiers and 26 Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers deployed to the area, with some of them assuming tactical positions directly facing one another and pointing their weapons across the Blue Line. UNIFIL took up position between the two forces and engaged intensively with the parties for four hours to de-escalate the situation.

3. On 17 April, UNIFIL observed 20 flares fired from different locations south of the Blue Line towards Ayta al-Sha'b, Duhayrah and Yarun (Sector West) and Mays al-Jabal and Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). The UNIFIL investigation suggests that all the flares landed south of the Blue Line. When UNIFIL inquired, the Israel Defense Forces confirmed that they had fired flares from five locations along the Blue Line after having detected activity close to the technical fence. The Israel Defense Forces



also informed UNIFIL that they had discovered damage to the technical fence in three locations. UNIFIL confirmed cuts of the fence in three locations, namely Yiftah/Mays al-Jabal, Metula/Arab al-Luwayzah and Dovev/Yarun. In Yiftah/Mays al-Jabal and Dovev/Yarun, UNIFIL observed that the fence had been repaired overnight although the damage was still discernible.

4. In connection with that incident, the Permanent Representative of Israel, in identical letters dated 19 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2020/318), stated that “Israel condemns in the strongest terms this provocative attempt by Hizbullah to infringe upon its sovereignty ... in blatant violation of Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006), and reserves the right to respond accordingly in order to preserve its sovereignty and protect its population, in line with its rights under international law. Israel holds the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces accountable for these actions emanating from Lebanese territory”. In identical letters dated 7 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/74/849-S/2020/381), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that “no evidence was found indicating that the gaps in the technical fence had been opened from the Lebanese side.” The UNIFIL investigation suggests that cut-lanes through the minefields north of the Blue Line had been used to access the fence in two of the three locations. The investigation is ongoing.

5. On 17 May, the Israel Defense Forces shot and injured a shepherd whom they said crossed the Blue Line close to Kfar Shuba (Sector East), in an area where the Blue Line is unmarked. UNIFIL heard gunshots at the time of the incident and observed blood stains on the ground north of the Blue Line. The injured individual was treated in an Israeli hospital and subsequently repatriated to Lebanon. In identical letters dated 1 June to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/74/879-S/2020/484), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that “at 1336 hours on 17 May 2020, Israeli Army soldiers in the locality of Rus ... opened fire on ... a Syrian citizen, who had been grazing his herd on Lebanese territory. ... Lebanon condemns in the strongest possible terms this flagrant attack on its sovereignty by Israel.” A UNIFIL investigation into the incident is ongoing.

6. In two separate incidents on 2 June near Udaysah and Mays al-Jabal, UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces personnel conducting military drills with tanks north of the technical fence, while remaining south of the Blue Line. Lebanese Armed Forces personnel deployed, and UNIFIL observed the two forces pointing weapons at each other. UNIFIL positioned itself between the parties to ease tension.

7. UNIFIL observed an increase in weapons-pointing across the Blue Line, in particular in Udaysah, Mays al-Jabal (see paras. 2 and 6) and Aytarun. In some instances, Israel Defense Forces weapons were also pointed at UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. UNIFIL brought each incident to the attention of the Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces and asked that urgent remedial measures be taken. In identical letters dated 16 June addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/74/899-S/2020/550), with reference to the 20 April and 13 May incidents of weapons-pointing by Israeli soldiers at Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers and UNIFIL, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that “Lebanon condemns these Israeli violations in the strongest terms and regards them as instances of limiting the freedom of movement of UNIFIL forces.”

8. On 3 May, 29 May and 16 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces reportedly apprehended several Sudanese citizens who were attempting to cross the Blue Line from Lebanon to Israel. On 19 May, the Israel Defense Forces apprehended two Sudanese citizens who had crossed south of the Blue Line.

9. UNIFIL monitored construction work by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Blue Line in Rosh Haniqra, across from Ra's al-Naqrarah (Sector West) (see [S/2020/195](#), para. 3). The Israel Defense Forces completed the work in mid-March.

10. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace on an almost daily basis, in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and Lebanese sovereignty. From 19 February to 16 June, UNIFIL recorded a daily average of 3.7 airspace violations, with 11 daily overflight hours. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 76 per cent of the violations. The remaining airspace violations involved fighter aircraft or unidentified aircraft. UNIFIL continues to protest the repeated violations of Lebanese airspace in letters and virtual meetings with the Israel Defense Forces and to call for their immediate cessation.

11. In identical letters dated 7 April addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2020/281](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel said that “on 26 March 2020, Hizbullah, an internationally designated terrorist organization, launched a tactical remotely-piloted aerial vehicle from southern Lebanon into Israel’s airspace. The Israeli Defense Forces shot down the aerial vehicle.” In identical letters dated 21 April ([A/74/820-S/2020/321](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that “Israel is continuing its policy of inventing events and levelling unsubstantiated accusations against Lebanon”. UNIFIL did not observe the alleged incident, has sought clarification from the Israel Defense Forces and is awaiting a response.

12. The occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces continued. While the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

13. From 19 February to 16 June, UNIFIL recorded 509 ground violations of the Blue Line by unarmed Lebanese civilians crossing south of the Blue Line, including 398 violations by shepherds and farmers, mainly in the Shab'a Farms area, as well as 74 violations by civilians accessing the Shu'ayb well near Blida (all Sector East). UNIFIL observed an armed hunter crossing the Blue Line on two occasions on 1 March in the vicinity of Blida. The Israel Defense Forces crossed the Blue Line on 27 April in Aytarun while undertaking survey work, and on 17 May in Kfar Shuba (see para. 5). In June, UNIFIL observed Lebanese civilians crossing the Blue Line in connection with seasonal work in the riverbed of the Wazzani River (Sector East).

14. During a visit to UNIFIL on 27 May, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Hassan Diab, stated his Government’s commitment to the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and reaffirmed the importance of continued coordination and close cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

15. In order to keep the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent and an average of 70 temporary checkpoints and conducted 141 counter-rocket-launching operations each month. The reduction in temporary checkpoints and counter-rocket-launching operations by 50 per cent and 44 per cent respectively compared with the previous reporting period was due to a 50 per cent reduction in operational activities by the Lebanese Armed Forces in the UNIFIL area of operations owing to COVID-19 restrictions. UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in the area of operations on 168 occasions. All but three incidents involved hunting weapons. On 13 April, UNIFIL observed an individual with a pistol in a holster; on 16 May, UNIFIL observed an individual north of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West) firing a pistol in the air; and on

25 May, one of the individuals who stopped a UNIFIL patrol in Blida (see para. 19) was carrying a pistol.

16. In line with resolution [2373 \(2017\)](#), and as reiterated in resolutions [2433 \(2018\)](#) and [2485 \(2019\)](#), UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence throughout the area of operations, conducting 14,155 monthly military operational activities on average, including 7,048 patrols. Some 2.7 per cent of UNIFIL military operational activities included at least one female peacekeeper, a slight decrease from the previous reporting period, which is attributable to the variation in the profiles of the military personnel deployed to UNIFIL.

17. UNIFIL vehicular, foot and air patrols maintained an operational footprint in all municipalities and villages in the area of operations. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas to which ground patrols have limited access, including private property, rugged terrain or land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines. To prevent the spread of COVID-19, UNIFIL community outreach and civilian-military activities involving physical proximity were suspended in mid-March. Following a request from the Lebanese Armed Forces on 24 March, the number of operational activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was approximately halved, with operational activities close to the Blue Line prioritized. UNIFIL consequently increased its independent activities.

18. UNIFIL continued to stress the need for unrestricted access to the Blue Line in its entirety. In February and March, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, conducted visits to the Green without Borders sites in Ramiyah (Sector West) and Udaysah, as well as two other locations with similar characteristics in Taybah (Sector East) and Naqurah (Sector West). UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several similar sites of interest, as well as to the Green without Borders sites in Aytarun in connection with the mission's investigation into the 1 September 2019 exchange of fire across the Blue Line (see [S/2019/889](#), paras. 6–8).

19. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was generally respected, the mission did encounter several restrictions to its freedom of movement and access (see annex I). On 25 May, a group of individuals blocked the passage of a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Blida and pelted stones at the patrol. One of the civilians carried a pistol. While disengaging, the patrol hit and damaged two cars and a scooter that were blocking the road. No UNIFIL personnel were injured but three of the patrol vehicles were damaged. UNIFIL continues to engage with the Lebanese Armed Forces and community representatives to avoid a repeat of such incidents.

20. In identical letters dated 11 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([A/74/859-S/2020/407](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that the incident at Bar'ashit on 10 February (see [S/2020/195](#), para. 15) was "the result of a failure in coordination prior to the conduct of the patrol". In a note verbale to UNIFIL, dated 16 June, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants informed the mission of "the necessity of enhancing the prior cooperation between UNIFIL troops and Lebanese Armed Forces [during UNIFIL patrols inside Lebanese villages] in order to avoid the incidents that happened ... such as the Bar'ashit and Blida incidents."

21. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out maritime interdiction operations throughout the maritime area of operations, hailing 2,035 vessels. Of those, UNIFIL referred 267 vessels for inspection to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared 132 of those vessels. UNIFIL continues to raise with the Lebanese Armed Forces its concern at the decrease in inspections since July 2019, including in a letter sent by the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander on 7 April.

22. UNIFIL continued to support the capacity-building of the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy by conducting 177 training sessions, although training requiring in-person attendance was suspended in mid-March following the COVID-19 outbreak. UNIFIL and the Navy practised common operational standards for commanding, monitoring and hailing activities. In addition, 37 integration exercises were conducted at sea with the four Navy units that are expected to be deployed as part of the partial transitioning of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force responsibilities to the Lebanese Navy.

23. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. In line with the plan to partially transition responsibilities, presented in February, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and the Lebanese Navy continued to develop a plan to enable existing Navy units to assume autonomous coverage of the maritime entry corridor to the commercial port in Beirut four days a week. Preparations for the European Union-financed refurbishment of the headquarters of the Lebanese Armed Forces model regiment in Sribbin (Sector West) continued, albeit with delays owing to the COVID-19 outbreak.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

24. UNIFIL convened a tripartite meeting on 20 February. Discussions focused on the situation along the Blue Line, violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and liaison and coordination issues. UNIFIL continues its regular liaison and outreach activities with both parties, in person and via telephone and video link.

25. On 14 May, a tripartite meeting was held with a curtailed format and fewer participants owing to COVID-19 restrictions. It focused on incidents along the Blue Line and the impact of COVID-19. UNIFIL cautioned both parties against unilateral actions along the Blue Line that could lead to misunderstandings and escalation and underscored the importance of its liaison and coordination role in that regard. UNIFIL also urged the parties to desist from pointing weapons across the Blue Line, noting an increase in such incidents, including instances when the Israel Defense Forces had pointed weapons at UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon personnel. UNIFIL also reiterated the Secretary-General's appeal for a global ceasefire.

26. Despite the agreement of Israel to the proposal in 2008 for a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, the establishment of the office remains pending.

27. In accordance with the Action for Peacekeeping initiative of 2018 and the commitment to strengthening the protection of civilians, UNIFIL continued to build the national capacity of the Government of Lebanon, including by training 62 officials from the Lebanese Civil Defense in February. UNIFIL redirected \$164,000 in quick-impact project funds to provide personal protective equipment and sanitary kits. Many UNIFIL contingents have donated essential COVID-19 prevention equipment. All interventions were coordinated with national and United Nations actors.

28. Pursuant to resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security, all 6,376 newly deployed UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, including 446 women, participated in UNIFIL training on gender mainstreaming.

C. Disarming armed groups

29. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Hezbollah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains military capabilities. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hezbollah and other

groups in violation of resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1559 \(2004\)](#) continues to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

30. In an interview on 26 May, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, in response to a question about whether the resistance would transform all its missiles into precision missiles, stated that "the resistance should have such an objective."

31. In east and north Lebanon, multiple personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 33 individuals being killed and 73 injured. Nine personal disputes in Baalbek involved the use of rocket-propelled grenades.

32. On 20 February, in south Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested a Syrian national for illegal residency, forming an armed gang, armed robbery, kidnapping, money-laundering, human and drug trafficking, and murder. On 29 February, one Lebanese Armed Forces soldier was killed and another injured by gunmen in Shawaghir, Hirmil. On 3 March, in Mount Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested five Lebanese nationals and a Palestinian national for armed robbery, arms dealing and drug trafficking. On 29 March, during a Lebanese Armed Forces raid in Makneh, north of Baalbek, one individual was killed and narcotics were seized. The Internal Security Forces arrested two Lebanese nationals for the alleged murder of five Syrian nationals, including two children, and four Lebanese nationals, whose bodies were found on 21 April in Mount Lebanon. On 16 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces dismantled an electronic platform allegedly used for transferring funds to terrorist groups in the Syrian Arab Republic, and in that regard arrested a network of Lebanese and Syrian individuals.

33. On 13 April, the security committee in Burj al-Barajinah Palestine refugee camp, near Beirut, arrested 14 alleged drug dealers, confiscating money and weapons, and handed the individuals and the confiscated items over to the Lebanese authorities. Personal disputes in Rashidieh Palestine refugee camp near Tyre, south Lebanon, escalated into heavy shooting on 8 and 25 May, resulting in two fatalities. On 7 June, a woman was killed and her child injured following a shooting inside Shatila Palestine refugee camp near Beirut. There were 10 incidents involving firearms or hand grenades in Ein el Hilweh Palestine refugee camp near Sidon, south Lebanon, with one fatality reported.

34. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

D. Arms embargo and border control

35. Allegations of arms transfers to non-state armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently. Were the allegations proved to be correct, they would constitute a violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (see annex II).

36. In identical letters dated 26 February addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([A/74/725-S/2020/154](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon reported the discovery by a security patrol of a "recently manufactured, Israeli-made MK83 guided bomb weighing 1,000 pounds and equipped with two fuses ... and a SPICE-1000 guidance device" in Surayri, Jazzin, in south Lebanon. The Permanent Representative called upon the Council "to condemn this act in the strongest possible terms and compel Israel to bring an end to its violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land, and fulfil all of its obligations under Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)".

37. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 11 March (A/74/749-S/2020/199), 3 April (A/74/789-S/2020/276), 16 April (A/74/817-S/2020/319) and 30 April (A/74/836-S/2020/349), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon protested against violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces in connection with alleged airstrikes in the Syrian Arab Republic on 5 March, 27 and 31 March, 15 April and 27 April, respectively.

38. Reports of Hizbullah's engagement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

39. On 13 May, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah stated that "nobody denies the existence of smuggling and illegal border crossings because we share long borders with Syria. All factions have called for addressing the issue of smuggling. I am not talking about the movement of resistance combatants and weapons, which is another matter." On 26 May, Mr. Nasrallah noted that "the transport from Syria to Lebanon, which is well known and is not a secret – the arms are not falling from the sky."

40. Through raids in Syrian refugee settlements in east and north Lebanon, the Lebanese authorities reportedly apprehended over 100 Syrian nationals for entering Lebanon in contravention of Lebanese law.

41. Despite the closure of all Lebanese borders on 19 March, owing to the COVID-19 outbreak, and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the north-eastern border, the smuggling of people continued to be reported.

42. On 13 May, the Higher Defense Council issued a decision calling for the establishment of new customs security points and a comprehensive plan to establish military, security and customs control services. The decision was precipitated by the 11 May ambush in Akkar, north Lebanon, of a customs patrol by individuals who had seized two trucks transporting diesel headed towards the border with the Syrian Arab Republic. The drivers of the trucks were later arrested at a Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint. The Lebanese Armed Forces subsequently arrested another 14 individuals and seized fuel, grain and food products that were en route to the Syrian Arab Republic. In Hirmil district, the Lebanese Armed Forces dismantled a dozen illegal border crossings and established checkpoints.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

43. UNIFIL demining units cleared 5,166 m² of land and destroyed 175 anti-personnel mines in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Mine Action Service conducted 26 quality assurance and control monitoring visits to UNIFIL demining teams and delivered risk awareness briefings to military personnel.

44. The Mine Action Service continued to support UNIFIL in the implementation of the memorandum of understanding signed in January 2020 between the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations to contribute to the humanitarian clearance of mines, cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war affecting local communities in the UNIFIL area of operations. Having identified priority areas for humanitarian mine clearance, UNIFIL, in coordination with the Lebanese Mine Action Centre, commenced demining activities near Marun al-Ra's and in the vicinity of Blida. UNMAS conducted 14 on-site refresher training and assessment and accreditation sessions for UNIFIL demining engineering units.

F. Delineation of borders

45. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report dated 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641, annex).

46. There was no progress towards the resolution of the maritime dispute between Lebanon and Israel.

G. Political and institutional stability

47. The first 100 days of Prime Minister Hassan Diab's Government were marked by national efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19 and address the worsening economic and financial situation. Since the first case of COVID-19 was detected in Lebanon on 21 February, 1,473 cases and 32 associated deaths have been reported during the reporting period. On 15 March, the Government declared a national health emergency and enacted nationwide lockdown measures enforced by the security forces. The Prime Minister called on the Lebanese people to "impose a self-curfew" as all businesses, aside from essential services, were closed. All air, sea and land ports were closed on 19 March, notwithstanding the repatriation of Lebanese nationals from abroad. A five-phase reopening plan was adopted on 24 April.

48. While demonstrations abated during the initial lockdown period, the economic and social impact of the restrictive COVID-19 measures, combined with the deteriorating economic and financial situation, triggered opposition. Protests in Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon saw banks vandalized and roads blocked. Coinciding with the convening of Parliament on 21 and 22 April, demonstrators denounced the deteriorating socioeconomic situation, inflation and the devaluation of the Lebanese pound, and called upon the Government to ease lockdown restrictions.

49. On 27 April, clashes in Tripoli between demonstrators and the Lebanese Armed Forces led to the death of a demonstrator. On 28 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces issued a press release lamenting the death and announced the launch of an investigation. Later that night, demonstrators vandalized banks, attacked police vehicles and hurled stones at soldiers. From 27 to 29 April, 77 civilians and 159 soldiers were reportedly injured.

50. On 1 May, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called on everyone to exercise utmost restraint, to refrain from violence and to respect property. OHCHR reminded law enforcement officers that they have an obligation to abide by international norms and standards on the use of force, in particular the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. OHCHR also urged demonstrators not to resort to violence and stressed that the right to peaceful assembly protects non-violent gatherings. OHCHR has received allegations that demonstrators arrested by the Lebanese Armed Forces had been subjected to torture.

51. In protests in Beirut on 6 June, some groups called for the disarmament of all militias, including Hizbullah, in line with resolution 1559 (2004). Demonstrations rapidly deteriorated into clashes along sectarian lines. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces deployed heavily to prevent escalation. The Internal Security Forces used tear gas to disperse protestors vandalizing private and public property near Parliament. A total of 25 soldiers and 48 civilians were reportedly

injured during the protests. On 7 June, the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, stated, “let what happened last night be an alarm bell for everyone.”

52. On 7 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces Command issued a statement that warned against the risks of fuelling strife and urged “all parties to act with responsibility, awareness and wisdom to safeguard civil peace in order to attain national unity and to avoid falling into the trap of strife”. The statement further warned that the Lebanese Armed Forces Command “will not tolerate any acts that undermine security and stability because the security of the nation and its citizens is above any other consideration”.

53. In reaction to further currency devaluation, violent demonstrations were held in Beirut and Tripoli on 12 and 13 June. Some 123 persons, including 26 Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, were injured. The Higher Defense Council met on 15 June, following which the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested 36 people for acts of vandalism, damage to public and private property and attacking security forces.

54. In the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, over 500 prisoners who had served their sentences but were being detained pending the payment of fines were released. A draft general amnesty law was considered by Parliament on 28 May and tabled for further discussion.

55. On 7 March, the Prime Minister announced that “foreign currency reserves have reached a critical and dangerous level, which leads the Lebanese Republic to suspend the fulfilment of its financial obligations in terms of Eurobonds, out of the need to use these reserves to secure the basic necessities of the Lebanese people.” On 9 March, Lebanon officially defaulted on its public debt for the first time by withholding its \$1.2 billion Eurobonds payment. On 23 March, the Ministry of Finance announced that Lebanon would henceforth discontinue payment on all its foreign currency-denominated Eurobonds. In a presentation to the country’s bondholders on 27 March, the Ministry of Finance reported the public debt in 2019 as 178 per cent of GDP.

56. The banking sector continued to impose informal capital controls and largely halted withdrawals of foreign currency. Meanwhile, the Lebanese pound devalued by 70 per cent on the black market. To curtail the growing disparity between the official and parallel exchange rates, the Central Bank of Lebanon capped the conversion rates for licensed currency exchange houses. On 15 May, the Financial State Prosecutor ordered the arrest of the Director of Cash Operations at the Central Bank for alleged currency manipulation. On 3 June, the licensed exchange houses suspended their month-long strike, which began following a crackdown by police on them for lack of compliance with Central Bank circulars and several related arrests, including the President of the Syndicate of Money Changers and his deputy.

57. On 30 April, the Council of Ministers of Lebanon unanimously adopted a five-year Financial Recovery Plan, which is intended to “restore confidence, gather urgent foreign support and put the country back on a long-term sustainable growth path”. The Plan has six key pillars: external financial support; public debt restructuring; an overhaul of the financial sector; fiscal consolidation; foreign exchange regime adjustment; and structural and sectoral reforms. The Plan estimates that the Lebanese economy contracted by some 7 per cent in 2019 and projects a 13.8 per cent contraction in 2020. Inflation is expected to rise by 53 per cent.

58. On 6 May, the President convened a meeting of heads of parliamentary blocs to build consensus around the Financial Recovery Plan. In a joint statement, the participants, with the exception of the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, who was the sole opposition representative, welcomed the Plan. The Plan was widely criticized by the opposition, including the Lebanese Forces, as well as by the

Governor of the Central Bank, Riad Salamé, and the Association of Banks in Lebanon. In a statement dated 13 May, the International Support Group for Lebanon recognized “the importance of domestic political support ... for [the] successful conduct and rapid completion of negotiations” with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and encouraged “the Government to quickly finalize all necessary measures to unlock additional external financial assistance to address the increasingly dire humanitarian needs of the population”.

59. Following its official request on 30 April for financing support from IMF, the Government commenced discussions with IMF on 13 May. On 4 June, an IMF spokesperson stated that the discussions would “be rather lengthy due to the complexity of the issues”.

60. On 31 March, the Government approved the distribution of a one-time assistance package worth 400,000 Lebanese pounds to the country’s most vulnerable households. In the first phase, the Lebanese Armed Forces distributed the assistance to over 150,000 households; a second phase of distribution is under way. On 7 May, the Lebanon COVID-19 Emergency Appeal was launched in line with the revised Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19. The appeal seeks \$350 million for emergency interventions to support those in Lebanon most adversely affected by the combined impact of the COVID-19 outbreak and the socioeconomic crisis. Meanwhile, the United Nations provided technical support to the Government to scale up its emergency social assistance response. On 28 May, Parliament approved an emergency fund of 1.2 trillion Lebanese pounds to assist individuals and sectors most affected by COVID-19 and the socioeconomic crisis.

61. On 1 May, the Ministry of Labour stated that 30 per cent of registered companies had closed and 20 per cent had reduced employee salaries by half. According to the World Food Programme, the monthly average price of a basic food basket increased by 109 per cent between September 2019 and May 2020. The World Bank estimates that the percentage of Lebanese people living below the poverty line will reach 45 per cent and that extreme poverty could affect 22 per cent of the population by the end of 2020, with up to 1 million people potentially unable to buy food.

62. In a *Washington Post* opinion piece on 20 May, the Prime Minister warned that “Lebanon [had] witnessed its first ‘hunger protests’” and that “Lebanon’s resources are extremely limited, and a purely domestic answer will not suffice.” He further cautioned that “it would be a tragedy upon a tragedy if our efforts to beat the COVID-19 epidemic eventually gave way to mass starvation and migration”.

63. With anti-corruption reforms integral to the success of the Financial Recovery Plan, on 12 May, the Council of Ministers endorsed the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, developed with United Nations support in a consultative process with key stakeholders. The Council also adopted executive measures to strengthen the auditing of public expenditures and revenues. On 21 April, Parliament adopted legislation establishing a national anti-corruption institution and approved an amendment to article 61 of the regulations for civil servants, to overcome ministerial permissions for the prosecution of civil servants. On 28 May, Parliament adopted legislation giving certain authorities the power to lift banking secrecy, albeit excluding the judiciary from such powers.

64. Despite incremental steps, reforms in the electricity sector, the adoption of legislation for an independent judiciary, and judicial appointments have yet to materialize. A draft capital controls law remains under discussion in Parliament.

65. On 18 May, Mr. Diab and the Ambassador of France to Lebanon co-chaired the first meeting of the follow-up mechanism of the local group under the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector. The group,

which comprises key bilateral and multilateral donors, the United Nations and private sector and civil society representatives, will meet quarterly to assess progress on the reform agenda of the Economic Conference. At the meeting, civil society representatives emphasized the need for transparency, an independent judiciary and inclusive dialogue.

66. Absent funding, the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, remains inoperative.

67. Since the enactment of nationwide lockdown measures on 15 March, the Internal Security Forces noted a 56 per cent increase in reported domestic violence incidents and a 184 per cent increase in cyberbullying crimes targeting women. National gender-based violence service providers reported receiving four times as many calls in May as in March, with a 40 per cent increase in new callers. In April, the National Commission for Lebanese Women, in cooperation with the Internal Security Forces, launched a national awareness-raising campaign to bolster the reporting of domestic violence. Work on the national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), in particular the priorities of gender-based violence, economic recovery and conflict prevention, continues.

68. As at 31 May, 909,834 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 892,310 Syrian refugees and 17,524 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government since 2015, the actual number of Syrians in need of international protection in Lebanon is unknown. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. According to UNHCR, the continued decrease in the number of registered Syrian refugees is mainly the result of natural deaths, onward movements, resettlement and voluntary returns to the Syrian Arab Republic.

69. In 2020 to date, UNHCR is aware of some 4,700 refugees having returned to the Syrian Arab Republic. The main reasons for return cited by the refugees included reunification with family members in the Syrian Arab Republic, improved security in their place of return and their dire socioeconomic situation in Lebanon. Following the closure of the border by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities amid the COVID-19 outbreak, group movements were suspended.

70. Deportations of Syrians who entered or re-entered Lebanon irregularly after 24 April 2019 continued without due process, until they were largely suspended following the border closures in March. The United Nations continues to raise with the Lebanese authorities the importance of applying the procedural safeguards provided for in national law to ensure that the country's commitment to the principle of non-refoulement is respected.

71. In surveys conducted by UNHCR of more than 8,500 refugee families, around three quarters reported having difficulties paying rent and buying food.

72. UNHCR and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) are leading efforts to prevent and contain the transmission of COVID-19 among the refugee population and ensure their equal access to testing and treatment under the National COVID-19 Response Plan. As at 16 June, 67 Syrian refugees and nine Palestine refugees have tested positive for COVID-19.

73. As at 31 March, international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at \$646 million, including \$450 million disbursed in 2020 and \$186 million carried over from 2019. Donors reported \$452 million in outstanding commitments for 2020 and \$328 million in commitments for 2021 and beyond. Within that overall amount,

United Nations agencies and implementing partners reported \$286 million in funds received in 2020. With an additional \$135 million carried over from the 2019 appeal, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2020 is 16 per cent funded.

74. The financial situation of UNRWA has hampered its ability to adequately meet the accelerating socioeconomic needs of the Palestine refugee community and prompted demonstrations against the Agency. On 7 May, UNRWA announced the roll-out of an emergency cash assistance plan valued at \$11,807,287, although it is insufficient to cover basic needs, with an allocation of approximately 100,000 Lebanese pounds per refugee. The Agency has requested further emergency funding through the UNRWA COVID-19 flash appeal and the Lebanon COVID-19 Emergency Appeal.

75. On 10 May, citing the COVID-19 outbreak, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon postponed the public pronouncement of its judgment in the *Ayyash et al.* case from mid-May to a later date.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

76. UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk prevention and mitigation measures in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities. While the number of civil unrest incidents in the area of operations decreased in February and March, such incidents resumed in late April. Intermittent roadblocks on the highway between Beirut and the UNIFIL area of operations also continued.

77. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by all United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 38 missions to the Arqub area by members of the United Nations country team. In line with the priorities outlined in the Action for Peacekeeping initiative on strengthening the security of peacekeepers, UNIFIL is increasing the ballistic protection of 18 observation posts close to the Blue Line, with the fortification of 4 of those posts already finalized.

78. United Nations preparedness measures were informed by the country's COVID-19 Countrywide Business Contingency Plan, in line with World Health Organization guidelines. UNIFIL has recorded one confirmed (asymptomatic) case of COVID-19. The peacekeeper concerned was quarantined and following two negative test results returned to active duty. Since 18 March, UNIFIL has been taking measures to prevent the spread of the virus, including placing all incoming UNIFIL personnel in mandatory 14-day quarantine.

79. The United Nations continued to follow up with the Lebanese authorities on the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West), in which armed individuals attacked a UNIFIL patrol, as described in my report dated 15 November 2018 (S/2018/1029, para. 16). To date, the United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings in this regard.

80. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against the mission. The Permanent Military Court held hearings on 2 March regarding the attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent in 2007 and the case of terror intent opened in January 2014. The next hearings for both cases are scheduled for 14 July. In the case of the attempted serious attack against UNIFIL in 2008, in which one of the four convicted perpetrators filed an appeal, the hearing of 10 March was postponed. Following the arrest on 3 March 2019 of a suspect in relation to the three cases of serious attacks perpetrated against UNIFIL on 27 May, 26 July and

9 December 2011, the investigating judge issued indictments and referred the cases to the Permanent Military Court for trial. In the 1980 case, in which two UNIFIL peacekeepers from Ireland were shot dead and one was injured, the hearing of 9 March was postponed.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

81. As at 16 June, UNIFIL comprised 10,275 military personnel, including 564 women (5.5 per cent), from 45 troop-contributing countries; 238 international civilian staff, including 90 women (38 per cent); and 580 national civilian staff, including 158 women (27 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised six vessels, two helicopters and 864 of the Force's military personnel, including 35 women (4 per cent). In addition, 49 military observers, including 6 women (12.5 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; the most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

82. Pursuant to the Action for Peacekeeping commitment to strengthen performance and accountability, UNIFIL continued to implement the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System pilot project, which covers conflict management; deterrence, de-escalation and protection; and effective and accountable institutions in the South. UNIFIL applied the analysis generated through the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System to adjust operations following the COVID-19 outbreak. Going forward, the System will systematically inform decision-making, including the 2021–2022 budgetary planning process.

83. In implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative and resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL, from January to March, assessed 13 subordinate military units and one ship for logistics, training and operational preparedness. Seven of the military units and the ship were assessed as having satisfactory operational preparedness. Five military units were assessed as facing minor shortfalls, mainly relating to minor engineering works and logistical aspects. Five of the identified issues have been addressed; the two remaining issues, relating to updating infrastructure, are ongoing. As at 16 June, UNIFIL was assessing 20 additional subordinate units and two ships. Pursuant to the request by the Security Council in resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#) for the Secretary-General to provide “an assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL's resources and options for improving the efficiency and effectiveness between UNIFIL and [the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)]”, I submitted the assessment to the Council on 1 June ([S/2020/473](#)).

V. Conduct and discipline

84. Neither UNIFIL nor UNSCOL received allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse during the reporting period. Both missions modified their preventive mechanism on sexual exploitation and abuse, considered the increased risks associated with protection against sexual harassment and domestic violence among their personnel as a result of COVID-19 work modalities, and continued their efforts to raise awareness among the local population. Military commanders continued to be briefed on their accountability in respect of conduct and discipline matters. UNIFIL and UNSCOL continued to promote a productive, harmonious and inclusive working environment, including among staff working from home.

VI. Observations

85. The unprecedented challenges facing Lebanon require all political forces to put the interests of the people first. In this regard, I urge the Lebanese authorities to implement the necessary socioeconomic reform measures in a transparent, accountable and inclusive manner to address the pressing needs of its people. Political dialogue and effective coordination among the Government, Parliament and all relevant stakeholders, including civil society and the banking sector, are vital to the success of the IMF negotiations, as well as to the economic and governance reforms.

86. The Financial Recovery Plan is a step towards restoring the trust of the Lebanese people and the international donor community. All stakeholders should be guided foremost by the need to minimize the impact on the country's most vulnerable communities and to prioritize the alleviation of food insecurity, poverty and inequality. I strongly encourage members of the international community able to do so to support such efforts.

87. The rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression are fundamental pillars of a democratic society and must be respected at all times. Demonstrators have to exercise these rights without violence. The authorities have to protect these rights and carry out investigations into allegations of violations perpetrated against demonstrators, including those investigations ordered in December 2019 (see [S/2020/195](#), para. 60).

88. I am concerned by the incidents along the Blue Line, including the occasions on which weapons were pointed by the parties across the Blue Line. Each of these incidents had the potential to lead to escalation with serious consequences. I am particularly concerned by the incident in Kfar Shuba on 17 May, when the Israel Defense Forces shot and severely injured a man herding sheep near the Blue Line. I call upon the Israel Defense Forces to conduct a full and transparent investigation into the incident, facilitate the speedy conclusion of the UNIFIL investigation and work with UNIFIL on preventative measures so that incidents of this kind do not recur.

89. I commend the parties for positively responding to the request of UNIFIL for a tripartite meeting despite the COVID-19 restrictions. The tripartite forum remains the key mechanism for addressing security, military and operational issues relating to the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). In addition to addressing violations and incidents that occur between the parties, the forum provides a platform through which UNIFIL can facilitate practical arrangements and area-specific understandings between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces that could remove possible points of friction, defuse tensions in potential flashpoints, stabilize the situation and build confidence.

90. The continued violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft, including to allegedly carry out strikes inside the Syrian Arab Republic, remain of deep concern. The overflights constitute a violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of Lebanese sovereignty. I am also concerned about the continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and my calls for Israel to cease its violations of Lebanese airspace and to expedite the withdrawal of its forces from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in accordance with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

91. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its entire area of operations, including along the full length of the Blue Line, remains critical. The ability of UNIFIL to conduct patrols and activities independently has to be upheld in accordance with the

mission's mandate. Restrictions on the mission's freedom of movement, as outlined in the present report, remain of concern. I call upon the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Government of Lebanon to facilitate the mission's access to all locations necessary for it to implement its mandate. I also call upon the Lebanese authorities to investigate any such restrictions of movement, including with respect to the 25 May incident in Blida. I am also concerned that UNIFIL has yet to gain access to all locations north of the Blue Line in relation to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I urge the Government of Lebanon to expeditiously undertake and conclude all necessary investigations regarding the tunnels on the Lebanese side and to take preventive measures against similar occurrences in the future.

92. I reiterate my concern that UNIFIL has not been able to access locations north of the Blue Line in connection with its investigation into the incident of 1 September 2019, including Green without Borders sites. The Lebanese authorities have the primary responsibility for ensuring that there are no unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area and, to this end, must facilitate the mission's access to such locations for preventive inspections and investigative purposes.

93. Almost two years after the attack on peacekeepers in Majdal Zun, the United Nations has still not been informed of any criminal proceedings against the attackers. I reiterate my call to the Lebanese authorities to fulfil their obligation to ensure the safety and unimpeded freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel and full accountability for those who attack peacekeepers.

94. I strongly condemn violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) by land or air, and violations of the cessation of hostilities by both sides. I reiterate my urgent appeal to all parties to honour their commitments to fully implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), to cease violations, to respect the cessation of hostilities and to refrain from any actions or rhetoric that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize Lebanon or the region. I reiterate my global call for an immediate ceasefire in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic and ask the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel to redouble their efforts towards full adherence to resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and to move decisively towards a permanent ceasefire. I further encourage the parties to work with UNIFIL to resolve outstanding points of contention along the Blue Line. The United Nations will continue to support efforts to defuse tensions through dialogue, to pursue opportunities for confidence-building and to create an environment conducive to resolving underlying grievances, including through the continued good offices of my Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander.

95. The maintenance of unauthorized weapons outside State control by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups represents a persistent violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and is of serious concern. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1680 \(2006\)](#), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State.

96. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration of 2012, and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese-Syrian border in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

97. I welcome the renewed commitment of the Lebanese authorities to strengthening border management. The smuggling of goods and the movement of

weapons and combatants across the border compromise the security and stability of Lebanon.

98. The political support of the Lebanese leadership and the assistance of international partners are more important than ever to reinforce the Lebanese Armed Forces as the sole defender of the sovereignty of Lebanon and to achieve the full deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces model regiment in the area of operations and gradual progress on the Navy transition strategy, in line with resolutions [2433 \(2018\)](#) and [2485 \(2019\)](#). I further call upon the Lebanese authorities to ensure that all vessels referred to them by the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force are duly inspected in order to preserve the effectiveness of maritime interdiction operations.

99. The continued hospitality and generosity of Lebanon towards Syrian refugees is commendable. The United Nations will redouble its efforts to support Lebanon during these difficult times. I recall the importance of maintaining respect for due process of law and the dignity of refugees as the United Nations and international partners continue working collectively towards creating enabling conditions for safe, dignified and voluntary returns and third country resettlement in a sustainable manner. I thank donors for their enduring commitment in responding to the refugee crisis in Lebanon.

100. Moving forward, I appeal to donors to provide flexible and generous funding to the Lebanon COVID-19 Emergency Appeal to ensure the continuity of critical activities foreseen in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan.

101. I also call for increased funding for UNRWA to ensure the provision of essential health, education and relief services for Palestine refugees.

102. I reiterate my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon and encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. I thank my Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Ján Kubiš, and the staff of his office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Stefano Del Col, and the civilian and military personnel under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.

Annex I

Restrictions on the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 19 February to 16 June 2020

1. In its resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), the Security Council called on the Government of Lebanon to facilitate the access of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted an average of 7,048 monthly patrols, of which 2,488 (35 per cent) were foot patrols. UNIFIL conducted an average of 3,108 patrols each month along the Blue Line, both by vehicle and on foot (50 per cent each). UNIFIL also conducted an average of 43 helicopter patrols each month, as well as an average of 695 monthly inspection activities, including the operation of temporary and permanent checkpoints, and counter-rocket launching operations.
3. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was generally respected, several restrictions of freedom of movement and access were encountered, as detailed below.

Access to Green without Borders sites and other locations

4. As detailed in paragraph 18 of the present report, the Lebanese Armed Forces facilitated visits by UNIFIL to a number of locations of interest, including the Green without Borders sites in Ramiyah (Sector West) and Udaysah (Sector East), as well as two other locations in Taybah (Sector East) and Naqurah (Sector West). However, UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several other sites of interest, despite repeated formal requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Among these locations are the Green without Borders sites in Aytarun (Sector West), a visit to which was requested in connection with the mission's technical investigation into the 1 September 2019 exchange of fire across the Blue Line (see [S/2019/889](#), paras. 6–8).
5. In the course of the reporting period, both the Lebanese Armed Forces and members of the local community frequently claimed that the mission had to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces at certain locations to prevent misunderstandings that might result in restrictions. UNIFIL maintains continuous engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure full access across the area of operations.

Freedom-of-movement incidents

6. On 1 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was stopped by a municipal official in Khirbat Silm (Sector West), who claimed that the patrol should not enter the village without a Lebanese Armed Forces escort. He asked the patrol to follow his vehicle out of the village. To avoid tension, the patrol left the area.
7. On 5 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was approached by an individual near Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West), who said that the patrol was not allowed to enter the village without a Lebanese Armed Forces escort. When the Observer Group Lebanon personnel asked for the source of that instruction, the individual responded, "because I tell you so". The patrol left the area. UNIFIL subsequently met with municipal officials, who stated that they were not aware of the incident.
8. On 9 March, a UNIFIL patrol encountered a group of 12 teenagers in Marun al-Ra's (Sector West), one of whom stood in the way, slammed his fist on the patrol vehicle and demanded that it leave the area. The teenagers also threw stones at the patrol, damaging the windscreen of one of the UNIFIL vehicles. Some of the individuals followed the patrol as it reversed out of the area. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel. Municipal representatives informed UNIFIL that the

individuals involved were minors whose parents had been warned about their conduct, which the municipality had publicly condemned.

9. On 10 May, an individual in civilian clothes twice tried to stop his vehicle in front of a UNIFIL vehicle patrol east of Qusayr (Sector East), seemingly aiming to block the road. Meanwhile, a second individual in civilian clothes appeared and threw a stone at the patrol vehicle while making hand gestures for the patrol to leave the area. The UNIFIL patrol continued its movement and completed its task without further ado.

10. On 25 May, a group of individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol after it had turned into a cul-de-sac in the vicinity of Blida by parking several vehicles across the road. The individuals also pelted stones at the patrol vehicles. One of the civilians in the group was seen carrying a pistol. While leaving the spot, the UNIFIL patrol hit and damaged several cars and a scooter that were blocking the road. There were no injuries among either the civilians or UNIFIL personnel, although all three UNIFIL patrol vehicles were damaged.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 19 of its resolution 2485 (2019), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

2. No response was received during the reporting period to my letter dated 22 October 2019 addressed to the President of Lebanon, in which I reminded the Government of Lebanon to share with the Secretariat any pertinent information or developments related to the arms embargo.

3. In line with paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), it is incumbent upon all States to take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types. During the reporting period, no information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.

4. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
