



# Security Council

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report issued on 13 November 2024 (S/2024/817). Intense exchanges of fire between Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces continued, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006), causing casualties, displacement and destruction on both sides of the Blue Line, until a cessation of hostilities came into effect on 27 November 2024. As announced by the United States of America and France on 26 November, the commitments related to a cessation of hostilities included that, within a 60-day period, “Israel will withdraw its forces in a phased manner south of the Blue Line, and in parallel the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] will deploy to positions in the Southern Litani Area” and will dismantle “unauthorized sites and infrastructure” and confiscate “unauthorized arms and related materiel”. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently commenced withdrawal from Lebanese territory and the Lebanese Armed Forces started to redeploy south of the Litani River. On 26 January, the United States announced that “the arrangement between Lebanon and Israel, monitored by the United States, will continue to be in effect until February 18, 2025”. As at 18 February, the Israel Defense Forces remained present in five positions north of the Blue Line. While the level of violence decreased dramatically after 27 November, the continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, the continuing deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River, as well as the large quantities of unauthorized assets and weapons uncovered there, underscore the need for the parties to take urgent steps to consolidate the cessation of hostilities and fully implement resolution 1701 (2006).

#### II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

##### A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon


2. From 21 October to 26 November, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 2,182 trajectories of projectiles fired from within the area of



operations to south of the Blue Line and 14,172 from south to north of the Blue Line, as well as 633 air attacks by the Israel Defense Forces. The highest number of trajectories, 1,527, was detected on 24 October, with 83 from north and 1,443 from south of the Blue Line. Each trajectory can represent multiple projectiles. Almost all projectiles were rockets, mortar bombs and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or projectiles fired from light weapons.

Figure I

**Daily trajectories of projectiles detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, October to November 2024**



Source: UNIFIL.

3. UNIFIL observed daily military activities by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, shifting to large-scale demolition of what Israel stated was Hizbullah infrastructure after 27 November. From 21 October to 27 November, the Israel Defense Forces killed several senior Hizbullah military figures in Lebanon, including in the UNIFIL area of operations. Daily clashes between Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces inside the UNIFIL area of operations continued until the morning of 27 November. Residential areas, civilian infrastructure and agricultural land in southern Lebanon were extensively damaged or destroyed by Israeli operations.

4. In late October, UNIFIL observed incursions by the Israel Defense Forces into villages just north of the Blue Line in both Sectors East and West. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces were observed further north near Khiyam (Sector East) and Bint Jubayl (Sector West). In November, Israeli strikes and ground clashes with Hizbullah escalated around Shama and Bayyadah in Sector West and Khiyam. Shama and Bayyadah marked the deepest ground presence of the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon since 1 October 2024 (see [S/2024/817](#), paras. 16–17).

5. Until 27 November, UNIFIL operational and logistical movements remained heavily constrained due to kinetic activities. Damaged roads, debris blocking key routes and delays in obtaining necessary deconfliction replies from the Israel Defense Forces were further impediments. From 21 October to 27 November, the mission performed 1,204 operational activities, including 276 vehicle patrols, with the resupply of UNIFIL positions prioritized.

6. As Israel continued strikes in areas across Lebanon, Hizbullah continued to strike targets deeper into Israel and to launch missiles at Israel Defense Forces aircraft and drones over the UNIFIL area of operations until 27 November. On 22 October, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for a drone attack on 19 October on the private residence of the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, in Caesarea, Israel. Hizbullah also claimed responsibility for strikes on several Israel Defense Forces bases in the vicinity of Tel Aviv and Haifa. On 24 November, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for an attack on a naval base in Ashdod, its deepest strike into Israeli territory, approximately 150 km south of the Blue Line, since 8 October 2023. On 25 November, Hizbullah claimed 51 attacks, its highest daily number since 8 October 2023.

7. In Lebanon, Israeli strikes, including on residential buildings, caused hundreds of fatalities, including women and children. On 21 October, 18 people, including 4 children, were killed and 60 were injured in a strike next to Rafic Hariri University Hospital in Janah, Beirut. On 25 October, an Israeli air strike on a guesthouse in Hasbaya (Sector East) led to the death of at least three journalists and injuries to several others. The Israel Defense Forces stated that the incident was under review. At least 60 people were killed by strikes on 28 and 30 October in the Bīqā' Valley, while an evacuation order was issued by the Israel Defense Forces for the entire city of Baalbek. On 5 November, over 20 people, including women and children, were killed in Barja, Shuf district. From 10 to 12 November, 70 people were killed in strikes on buildings reportedly housing displaced persons in the Akkar, Alayh, Shuf and Jubayl districts. In identical letters dated 5 November addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/79/591-S/2024/804](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that "Israel has deliberately attacked civilian facilities all over Lebanon on the pretext that they are weapons depots or military headquarters, in a flagrant violation of international laws."

8. An Israeli air strike on 14 November on a civil defence centre in Duris, Bīqā' killed 15 civil defence personnel. In identical letters dated 20 November addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/79/620-S/2024/841](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that [Israel] "has deliberately escalated its attacks against Lebanese Civil Defence personnel, posts and vehicles, killing 27 persons and wounding 76 others," [which] "constitutes a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law and is tantamount to a war crime".

9. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 2 November that, on 1 November, it had captured Imad Amhaz, "an important Hezbollah naval operative", in a naval operation on the coast of Batrun, north Lebanon. Hizbullah denied that he was affiliated with the group, while the Lebanese authorities stated that the operation was a "blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty". On 7 November, following Hizbullah's rocket fire on 6 November in the vicinity of Ben Gurion airport, Tel Aviv, the Israel Defense Forces struck Rafic Hariri International Airport, Beirut. Following three Israeli air strikes on 17 and 18 November on central Beirut neighbourhoods, Hizbullah stated that its spokesperson, Mohammad Afif, had been killed. At least 29 people were killed on 23 November in an Israeli strike on central Beirut. The Israel Defense Forces on 26 November stated that they had again (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 14) struck dozens of branches of Al-Qard Al-Hassan, a Hizbullah-affiliated financial association, in southern and eastern Lebanon and in the southern suburbs of Beirut. In late October and November, the Israel Defense Forces repeatedly bombed Tyre (Sector West) and its surroundings, causing many casualties, including women and children, and mass displacement. In identical letters dated 13 December addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/79/700-S/2024/912](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that

“in the weeks leading up to the cessation of hostilities, Israel planted explosives in and blew up entire residential neighbourhoods in such villages as Yarun, Aytarun, Marun al-Ra’s, Mays al-Jabal, Muhaybib, Dayr Siryan, Udaysah and others”. The Israel Defense Forces also stated that it had found weapons in mosques in the UNIFIL area of operations on several occasions.


10. Despite refraining from engaging in the hostilities, at least 46 Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were killed since 8 October 2023, including approximately 20 while on duty, and including in the UNIFIL area of operations. On 17 November, four soldiers were killed in an Israeli strike on a Lebanese Armed Forces position in Mari (Sector East). In identical letters dated 18 November addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/79/616-S/2024/839](#)), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “attacking the Lebanese army undermines international efforts to implement resolution 1701 (2006)”. The Israel Defense Forces were reported to have stated on 20 November that their operations were “specifically directed against Hezbollah and not against the Lebanese Armed Forces”.

11. Civilian infrastructure in Israel was also reported to have been hit by Hizbullah strikes, including in Akko, Avivim, Haifa, Qiryat Shmona, Ma'alot Tarshiha, Manara, Meron, Nahariyya, Tsfat, Shomera and Tel Aviv. In identical letters dated 13 January 2025 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/29](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “over 22,000 rockets, over 1,500 anti-tank missiles and over 700 drones were fired by Hezbollah at Israeli communities throughout the war, forcing over 63,000 Israeli civilians to evacuate their homes for more than a year”.

12. Three Israeli and four Thai nationals were reported to have been killed in a Hizbullah strike near Metulla on 31 October. In identical letters dated 12 November 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2024/881](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “since the beginning of the war, 72 civilians and soldiers have been killed, 6 of whom were foreign civilians, and 636 have been injured”. As at 13 February, Israeli authorities reported 30 Israel Defense Forces fatalities from strikes by Hizbullah south of the Blue Line since 8 October 2023 and 52 fatalities north of the Blue Line and in northern Israel since 1 October 2024.


13. The Israel Defense Forces continued to violate Lebanese airspace daily. UNIFIL recorded 1,295 air violations from 21 October to 26 November and 1,331 from 27 November to 20 February. Drones accounted for 55 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 41 per cent, and helicopters and unidentified aircraft 4 per cent. The highest number of daily air violations, 66, was detected on 24 October.

**Figure II**  
**Violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, October 2024 to February 2025**



Source: UNIFIL.

**Figure III**  
**Weekly air attacks by the Israel Defense Forces observed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, October 2024 to February 2025**




Source: UNIFIL.

14. After 27 November, the situation remained tense despite the near absence of exchanges of fire across the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces announced on several occasions that they had struck Hizbullah personnel, assets and infrastructure,

with several fatalities reported, including one in Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West) on 19 February. UNIFIL recorded incidents of small arms fire in its area of operations, attributed mostly to Israel Defense Forces door-to-door searches. UNIFIL observed several instances of the Israel Defense Forces spraying defoliant along the Blue Line. On 2 December, Hizbullah fired two rockets at the Rouwaysat al-Alam site in Shab'a Farms (Mount Dov). From 27 November to 20 February, UNIFIL detected 12 trajectories fired from north and 617 from south of the Blue Line, as well as 19 air attacks by the Israel Defense Forces. Eight of the trajectories fired from north to south were detected on 27 November, with one on 2 December, two on 15 February and one on 16 February.

Figure IV

**Daily trajectories of projectiles detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, November 2024 to February 2025**



Source: UNIFIL.

15. While continuing operations on Lebanese territory, including in areas they had been unable to reach prior to 27 November, the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from areas in Sector West as well as from some areas in Sector East, including Khiyam, by 26 January.

16. Until 18 February, the Israel Defense Forces issued repeated warnings to the Lebanese population against entering approximately 60 villages, mostly within 5 to 7 km of the Blue Line, in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL observed white barrels installed by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line with warnings affixed in Arabic advising people not to pass, near Arab al-Luwayzah, Sarda and between Markaba and Hula (all Sector East). In February, the Israel Defense Forces blocked access from north of the Blue Line to Shaykh Abbad's tomb in Hula.

17. On 2 January, the Israel Defense Forces conducted strikes in the Jazzin and Nabatiyah districts, stating that the Lebanese Armed Forces had failed to respond to their request to neutralize an identified Hizbullah threat. Israeli air strikes on 28 January against "a Hezbollah truck and an additional vehicle that transferred weapons" in Nabatiyah injured 24 people.

18. The Lebanese Armed Forces commenced redeployments south of the Litani River immediately after 27 November, as deconflicted with the cessation of hostilities mechanism (see para. 28 below) and facilitated by UNIFIL. UNIFIL facilitated the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to over 50 positions, including to Khiyam on 10 December and to Alma al-Sha'b, Bayt Lif, Naqurah and Tayr Harfa (all Sector West) in early January, following the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces. As at 20 February, the Lebanese Armed Forces had deployed to around 100 positions south of the Litani River, including to re-establish checkpoints, compared with an estimated 10 positions on 27 November.

19. On 24 January, the Government of Israel announced that “since the ceasefire agreement has yet to be fully enforced by the Lebanese state, the gradual withdrawal process will continue, in full coordination with the US”.

20. On 26 January, hundreds of unarmed civilians, some carrying Hizbullah flags, tried to return to their villages through Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoints near villages where the Israel Defense Forces were present along the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces fired at the crowd, including with the use of live ammunition. The Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon reported that 24 people, including 6 women and 1 Lebanese Armed Forces soldier, were killed and 134 people wounded.

21. By 18 February, the Israel Defense Forces had withdrawn from population centres in southern Lebanon but retained a presence in five locations along the Blue Line, in the vicinity of Aytarun, Hula, Labbunah, Marwahin and Sarda. Furthermore, they designated two “buffer zones” in the vicinity of Duhayrah and Kfar Kila.

22. On 19 February, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that their “military units are continuing their deployment in all southern border towns” but noted that “the enemy has not fully complied with the withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories”.


23. After 27 November, UNIFIL increasingly adjusted its posture, and increased the number of operational activities as the mission’s focus shifted from resupply of United Nations positions to supporting the redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in coordination with the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces, and the resumption of patrols, where possible. Operational activities rose to a monthly average of 2,123, with approximately 1,100 monthly vehicle patrols, of which over 100 were conducted per month along the Blue Line. The mission conducted 24 air operations after 16 January and 44 foot patrols after 10 January. Nine per cent of UNIFIL operational patrols involved at least one woman peacekeeper. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces established permanent checkpoints, including on the main entry routes into the area of operations. The average percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, among the activities that could be conducted jointly, increased to 49 per cent, compared with 16.8 per cent prior to 23 September (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 26).

24. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL, independently or in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, discovered 194 weapon caches, consisting mostly of abandoned mobile rocket launching platforms, rockets, mines and ammunition, believed to have belonged to Hizbullah, as well as 6 caches believed to have belonged to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL observed 31 instances of individuals with weapons, including 21 with hunting weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces also independently uncovered several caches of unauthorized assets and weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces responded to over 60 per cent of requests from the mechanism established pursuant to the cessation of hostilities (see para. 28), including related to unauthorized weapons and weapons caches north of the “coordination line” unilaterally set by the Israel Defense Forces prior to their

withdrawal, and to nearly 14 per cent of such findings south of the “coordination line” that were referred by UNIFIL.

Figure V

**United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon operational activities, October 2024 to February 2025**



Source: UNIFIL.

25. On 7 February, UNIFIL submitted to the Lebanese Armed Forces a list of 17 locations of interest, including potential tunnel sites, and inspected 2 of these locations on 20 February.

26. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL started nine technical investigations, including related to impacts on UNIFIL personnel, assets or premises, concluding five. UNIFIL shared the results of the concluded investigations with the parties.

27. All joint training activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces under the strategic dialogue process remain suspended since 23 September 2024. From 21 October to 20 February, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force supported maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,115 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces cleared all 430 vessels referred for inspection by UNIFIL. For the first time, the Lebanese Armed Forces invited UNIFIL to join port inspections; UNIFIL joined eight such inspections from 22 January, finding no unauthorized material.

## B. Security and liaison arrangements

28. The cessation of hostilities agreement provided that the existing tripartite mechanism would be reformulated and enhanced, “hosted by UNIFIL, chaired by the United States, and including France, [and] will monitor, verify, and assist in ensuring enforcement of these commitments” of the parties. On 9 and 18 December 2024, 6 and 20 January and 14 February 2025, UNIFIL hosted meetings of the mechanism. At the meeting held on 6 January, co-chaired by the United States envoy Amos Hochstein and attended by the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, the United



States presented a plan for the phased withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanon and the concurrent deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces within the proposed 60-day time frame. Both parties also recorded their consent concerning UNIFIL sharing information related to violations of resolution 1701 (2006) with the mechanism. On 16 January, the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2025/1) stated: “The Security Council calls on the parties to faithfully implement the provisions of the arrangement and for the full implementation of the cessation of hostilities with the support of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in line with their respective mandates.” On 14 February, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they would maintain positions on Lebanese territory opposite Israeli villages to the south, notwithstanding the UNIFIL offer to establish security arrangements at those positions. UNIFIL has initiated discussions with the parties with respect to the introduction of new technological capabilities to strengthen its monitoring capacities.

29. UNIFIL was in constant contact with the parties to deconflict deployments of the Lebanese Armed Forces, facilitate evacuations and humanitarian access and support de-escalation. UNIFIL coordinated 1,578 civilian or humanitarian activities, including the transportation of medical supplies, the notification of funerals, the repair of civilian infrastructure, the movement of civilians, including journalists, rescue and recovery operations, as well as the clearance of roads. UNIFIL liaised with the Israel Defense Forces 1,454 times on the safety and security of the Lebanese Armed Forces as well as to facilitate their patrols, their redeployment to fixed positions and checkpoints and for explosive ordinance disposal. On 727 occasions, UNIFIL liaised with the parties to ensure force protection and the safety and security of UNIFIL positions and operational activities. UNIFIL supported the Lebanese Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross in the repatriation of seven Lebanese citizens from Israel on 22 December and the return of three Syrian nationals from Israel to Lebanon on 10 January. The UNIFIL liaison function was hampered by limited physical access to the Israel Defense Forces due to the closure of the Rosh Haniqra crossing as well as by the frequent lack of timely responses from the parties. In January, UNIFIL deployed two liaison officers to the Lebanese Armed Forces South Litani Sector headquarters in Tyre. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv remains pending, despite the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for such an office.

30. UNIFIL approved 11 quick-impact projects, 8 of which were in support of crisis response efforts, including in support of the Lebanese Red Cross in Tyre and the provision of food parcels, blankets, hygiene kits and winter clothing.

31. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming for 2,992 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, of whom 361 were women.

### **C. Disarming armed groups**

32. Until 27 November, Hizbullah demonstrated its military capabilities through strikes into Israel, as reported above. Since 27 November, the Lebanese Armed Forces have started to dismantle military infrastructure and to confiscate weapons believed to have belonged to Hizbullah south of the Litani River. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other non-State groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) continues to restrict the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

33. On 29 October, Hizbullah announced Naim Qassem, the group's Deputy since 1991, as its new Secretary-General. Mr. Qassem stated on 30 October that "the blow [to Hizbullah] was painful but we have stood up again, we are cohesive, with big numbers and capabilities".

34. Hizbullah released video footage on 3 November of an underground tunnel network equipped with a missile launchpad. On 6 November, Mr. Qassem stated: "We have tens of thousands of trained fighters capable of holding their ground, with the resources to sustain a prolonged confrontation [...] no place within the [Israeli] entity is off limits." The same day, Hizbullah stated that its "operations have reached as far as 145 kilometres inside occupied territory, utilizing advanced missiles and drones".

35. On 26 November, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated: "A year later [since 8 October 2023], it is not the same Hezbollah. We have pushed them decades back. We eliminated Nasrallah, the axis of the axis. We have taken out the organization's top leadership, we have destroyed most of their rockets and missiles, we have killed thousands of terrorists and we demolished their underground terror infrastructure abutting our border. [...] The length of the ceasefire depends on what happens in Lebanon. [...] If Hezbollah violates the agreement and tries to arm itself, we will attack. If it tries to rebuild terrorist infrastructure near the border, we will attack. If it launches a rocket, if it digs a tunnel, if it brings in a truck carrying rockets, we will attack."

36. On 3 December, Mr. Netanyahu stated that "the current ceasefire with Hizbullah is not tantamount to an end of the war", vowing that Israel would "enforce the ceasefire with an iron fist and respond decisively to any violation, whether minor or significant". The same day, the Minister of Defence of Israel, Israel Katz, stated that Lebanon must "authorize the Lebanese army to enforce their part, to keep Hezbollah away beyond the Litani and to dismantle all the infrastructure".

37. On 14 December, Mr. Qassem stated: "This agreement aims at halting the aggression, not dissolving Hizbullah. This agreement is an implementation derived from resolution 1701 and is exclusively applicable to the south of the Litani area. It has nothing to do with Lebanese internal affairs, the relationship between the resistance and the state, the army, the presence of weapons, or any other issues that require dialogue and discussion." On 18 January, he stated that [Hizbullah's] "weapons are to be discussed within the defensive strategy, through dialogue". On 27 January, Mr. Qassem stated that the "violations of the agreement confirm Lebanon's need for resistance. Israel is giving the pretext for the resistance".

38. On 25 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that "85,000+ weapons, missiles and military items belonging to Hezbollah were confiscated by the IDF in Southern Lebanon". In identical letters dated 13 January ([S/2025/29](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated: "The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation in South Lebanon further exposed [...] the massive military and terror infrastructure that was built in South Lebanon [...] all aimed to attack Israeli civilians, villages and cities. [...] Some encouraging steps have been taken by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Lebanese government to dismantle some of this illicit military infrastructure of Hezbollah south of the Litani, but unfortunately the pace of action by LAF is insufficient, in the light of the vast military arsenal found".

39. Four Palestine refugee camps across Lebanon were impacted by targeted Israeli air strikes. On 31 October, the Israel Defense Forces issued an evacuation order for Tyre, including for Rashidieh refugee camp. Air strikes on the El Buss and Rashidieh camps on 21 and 26 November, respectively, resulted in casualties and property damage. Four facilities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in Baalbek, Tyre and Beirut were damaged by

nearby air strikes. On 17 February, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had eliminated a Hamas official in a strike in Sidon.

40. After 27 November, many of the 6,172 displaced persons at 11 UNRWA emergency shelters returned to their areas of residence, while UNRWA resumed its operations in camps south of the Litani River. Due to the continued presence of armed actors, four UNRWA schools in Ein El Hilweh remained inaccessible.

41. On 24 December, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command stated that “the Front has evacuated all its positions outside the camps in all Lebanese regions ... and handed them over to the Lebanese Army along with the weapons and equipment present there”.

#### **D. Arms embargo and border control**

42. Between 24 and 26 November, the Israel Defense Forces struck several official border crossings between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, stating that they had targeted military infrastructure used by Hizbullah for weapons transfers. Striking border crossings again on 8 and 27 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that they had targeted structures used for the transport of military equipment to Hizbullah. On 12 and 31 January, Israel struck infrastructure in Janta that it stated was used to manufacture and smuggle weaponry and, on 9 February, a tunnel in the Biqa‘ that it stated was used to transport combat equipment from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon.

43. On 12 February, the Israel Defense Forces stated that flights from Tehran to Beirut had been used to “smuggle funds aimed at arming Hezbollah with the objective of carrying out attacks against the State of Israel”, adding that the Israel Defense Forces “will not allow Hezbollah to arm itself and will act through all means at its disposal to enforce the implementation of the ceasefire understandings in order to ensure the security of the citizens of the State of Israel”. On 13 February, Lebanese authorities suspended flights from Tehran, citing security concerns.

44. The Israel Defense Forces stated on several occasions that it had killed Hizbullah members in air strikes on Syrian territory, including “Hezbollah’s representative to the Syrian Military, Salman Nemer Jamaa” on 3 December. On 9 November, Salim Ayyash, who was convicted in absentia for the 2005 assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri (see [S/2020/1110](#), para. 69), was reportedly killed in an air strike in the Syrian Arab Republic.

45. Several clashes between the Lebanese Armed Forces and armed elements from the Syrian Arab Republic near the north-eastern border of Lebanon with the Syrian Arab Republic occurred in December and January. In February, armed clashes between Syrian security forces and Lebanese clans spilled over from the Syrian Arab Republic into north-eastern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces subsequently announced the “establishment of observation points, the conduct of patrols, and the establishment of temporary barriers” in response.

46. On 28 December, Lebanese security forces arrested some 70 Syrian former military personnel who had crossed illegally into Lebanon in the Jubayl region and handed them over to the Syrian caretaker authorities.

#### **E. Landmines and cluster bombs**

47. While routine demining activities remained suspended, UNIFIL dealt with unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices on 34 occasions, removing

91 devices, following impacts on UNIFIL positions, to clear roads for UNIFIL patrols and logistics movements and in support of the redeployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Mine Action Service of the United Nations provided 10 explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions for 192 military and civilian personnel and 9 training sessions for the validation of demining teams.

## **F. Delineation of borders**

48. While no progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, the then caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, announced during his official visit to Damascus on 11 January that there will be a joint Lebanese-Syrian committee to carry out the border demarcation process. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (S/2007/641, annex).

## **G. Political and institutional stability**

49. Nearly 14 months after the eruption of hostilities across the Blue Line, on 26 November 2024 the United States and France announced that “Lebanon and Israel seek a sustainable end to the current escalation of hostilities across the Blue Line and are each prepared to take steps to promote conditions for a permanent and comprehensive solution.” The United States and France further stated that “Israel and Lebanon will implement a cessation of hostilities beginning at 04:00 hours (IST/EET), November 27, 2024”.

50. Following endorsement by the Cabinet of Israel on 26 November, the caretaker Cabinet of Lebanon on 27 November endorsed the announcement of a cessation of hostilities, which Mr. Mikati had welcomed a day earlier as an essential step towards establishing calm and stability in Lebanon and the return of the displaced.

51. Lebanon’s caretaker Cabinet approved on 7 December the deployment plan for the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River. Earlier, on 6 November, the caretaker Cabinet had approved the allocation of a treasury advance to the Ministry of Defence to finance the enlistment of 1,500 new recruits (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 65). On 14 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that the first group of new recruits had begun training and reaffirmed their recruitment target of 6,000 new personnel. Separately, the Lebanese Armed Forces also finalized their anti-sexual harassment policy and gender strategy.

52. After 26 months of presidential vacuum, the Parliament of Lebanon on 9 January elected the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun, as the fourteenth President of Lebanon. Mr. Aoun secured the support of 99 out of 128 parliamentarians in a second voting round. In his inaugural address as President, Mr. Aoun declared “a new phase in the history of Lebanon” and expressed his commitment to “ensure the state’s right to hold a monopoly on weapons, and to invest in the army to monitor the borders, maintain their security in the south, define the boundaries in the east, north and at sea, prevent smuggling, fight terrorism and preserve the unity of the Lebanese territory”. Mr. Aoun also expressed his commitment “to ask for an integrated defense policy to be debated, as part of a national security strategy on the diplomatic, economic and military levels, to enable the Lebanese state, I repeat, the Lebanese state, to eradicate the Israeli occupation and repeal its aggressions on all Lebanese territories”.

53. Major General Hassan Audi, Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, subsequently became Acting Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces.
54. Following binding consultations with parliamentary blocs, on 13 January the President designated Nawaf Salam, President of the International Court of Justice, as Prime Minister to form a Government. Mr. Salam, who secured the support of 84 of 128 parliamentarians, stated on 14 January that his designation was a “call to action” to achieve “aspirations for change and for building a fair, strong, modern, and civil state”. On 8 February, the President signed the decree forming the Prime Minister’s “Government of reform and rescue”. Five of the 24 ministers are women.
55. Following the White House statement on Agreement Extension between Lebanon and Israel of 26 January (see para. 1 above), Mr. Aoun on 7 February stated that “permanent stability in the South is closely linked to the completion of Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it occupied during the last war, and the full implementation of resolution 1701, including the provisions of the November 27 agreement”. The 26 January announcement further stated: “The Government of Lebanon, the Government of Israel, and the Government of the United States will also begin negotiations for the return of Lebanese prisoners captured after October 7, 2023.” Following the announcement by Israel that its forces would remain in five positions in southern Lebanon past 18 February, Mr. Aoun, the Speaker, Nabih Berri, and Mr. Salam issued a joint statement calling on the Security Council “to compel Israel to immediately withdraw” and stating the right of Lebanon to use all necessary means to ensure the withdrawal of the Israeli enemy.
56. Protests against the Government’s decision to deny entry to flights from the Islamic Republic of Iran (see para. 43) turned violent. A UNIFIL convoy was attacked by protesters outside Rafic Hariri International Airport, Beirut, on 14 February, resulting in injuries to the Deputy Force Commander and one other peacekeeper (see annex I).<sup>\*</sup> Condemning the attack, Mr. Aoun on 15 February stated: “The security forces will not be lenient with any party that tries to destabilize and undermine civil peace in the country.” The Ministry of Interior announced that “more than 25 people have been arrested” in connection with an investigation. On 15 February, protesters clashed with the Lebanese Armed Forces outside the airport.
57. The Parliament of Lebanon convened on 28 November to adopt legislation again postponing the retirement of generals in military and security agencies by one year (see [S/2024/222](#), para. 55).
58. On 4 December, the caretaker Cabinet approved \$7.9 million for assistance, including medical treatment, to those in need in South Lebanon. On 17 December, it approved funding for reconstruction efforts, including approximately \$10 million each for the South and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
59. The Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon stated that, as at 13 February 2025, over 4,244 people had been killed, including 341 children and 962 women, and 17,506 injured, due to the hostilities since 8 October 2023. More than 55 Lebanese civilians have been killed by Israeli military operations since 27 November 2024, including at least nine women and seven children.
60. With more than 90,000 housing units damaged or destroyed, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and the presence of explosive ordnance, many of those displaced during the hostilities faced significant obstacles upon returning home, especially to villages near the Blue Line. As at 19 February, 98,994 people remained displaced, while 950,652 people had begun returning to their areas of origin.

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<sup>\*</sup> Circulated in the language of submission only.

61. At least 160 healthcare facilities were impacted by air strikes and 241 health workers killed and 295 injured while on duty from 8 October 2023 to 20 February 2025. As at 20 February, three hospitals and 26 primary healthcare centres remained closed. At least 45 water facilities were damaged, impacting nearly 500,000 people. An estimated 1.65 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity. In addition, at least 14 public schools were destroyed and 105 were heavily damaged since 8 October 2023.

62. The Lebanon flash appeal, calling for \$425.7 million to meet the needs of 1 million vulnerable people from 1 October to 31 December, was extended until March 2025, with an additional \$371.4 million requested. As at 31 December, the 2024 appeal was 71 per cent funded, with \$304 million mobilized. The 2024 appeal for the Lebanon Response Plan was 49 per cent funded at \$1.32 billion out of \$2.72 billion requested. On 24 October, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, hosted an International Conference in Support of Lebanon's People and Sovereignty to mobilize humanitarian assistance and support for the Lebanese Armed Forces.

63. In identical letters dated 17 December addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (A/79/703-S/2024/933), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that "the country has been left facing significant economic challenges owing to the destruction of farmland and crops, the death of livestock and the destruction of infrastructure". In a letter conveyed as an annex to identical letters dated 6 November addressed to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (A/79/671-S/2024/806), the caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, stated that "the ongoing Israeli aggression, particularly the attacks on cities like Baalbek and Tyre, has resulted in the displacement of entire populations and the destruction of invaluable cultural heritage sites".

64. On 7 February, Judge Tarek Bitar resumed his investigation into the Beirut port explosion of 4 August 2020, summoning officials for questioning from the Customs Directorate, the General Security Directorate, the Lebanese Armed Forces Intelligence and the Beirut Port Administration.

65. As at 31 January, 763,707 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 752,675 Syrian refugees and 11,032 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown, but is estimated at 1.5 million by the Government.

66. An estimated 540,000 people (63 per cent Syrian and 37 per cent Lebanese) seeking protection crossed from Lebanon to the Syrian Arab Republic between 3 October 2023 and 27 November 2024. The majority returned to Lebanon after 27 November. After 8 December, an estimated 95,500 Lebanese and Syrian nationals entered Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic, while at least 112,700 exited Lebanon to the Syrian Arab Republic. Since 1 January 2025, UNHCR recorded 120 deportation incidents by Lebanese authorities affecting at least 5,303 Syrian nationals.

### III. Security and safety measures

67. The designated officials north and south of the Litani River continued to coordinate to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel in Lebanon. From 27 November, some programme-critical personnel were permitted to return to south of the Litani River, with additional safety measures in place.

Restrictions on non-programme critical United Nations civilian personnel north of the Litani River (see [S/2024/817](#), para. 71) were lifted from 1 February.

68. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL registered at least 39 instances of impacts on United Nations positions and vehicles, including 10 after 27 November (see annex I). Most affected were Naqurah headquarters, Sector West headquarters and a position near Kfar Shuba (Sector East). From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL positions or vehicles came under fire leading to injuries to 25 peacekeepers, including 3 after 27 November. UNIFIL peacekeepers were also fired upon by small arms on several occasions, without any casualties. On 7 November, the Israel Defense Forces damaged a UNIFIL position near Naqurah and removed four blue barrels from near Mays al-Jabal, Hula, Yarun and Labbunah.

69. All UNIFIL positions remained staffed throughout the reporting period. The mission's freedom of movement was restricted, however, including due to Israel Defense Forces advisories for peacekeepers to remain at level 2, in base, or level 3, in shelter, for their own safety. The exception was two battalions in the northern part of Sector West, which returned partly to level 1, normal activity after 27 November (see annex I).

70. The next trial hearing in the case of the fatal attack against UNIFIL near Mazra'at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, which had been scheduled for 12 February 2025, was postponed again, to 17 September 2025. The United Nations still has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in Majdal Zun (Sector West). Investigations into the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022 continued.

#### **IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

71. As at 20 February, UNIFIL had 10,280 military personnel, including 891 women (8.7 per cent), from 48 troop-contributing countries, and 782 civilian staff (238 international and 544 national), including 254 women (32.5 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force consisted of five vessels, with 620 of the mission's military personnel, including 54 women (8.7 per cent). In addition, 43 military observers, including 9 women (21 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization served with Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command of UNIFIL. The most senior military woman had the rank of colonel, while the most senior civilian woman served at the D-2 level.

72. The mission is working with United Nations Headquarters and troop-contributing countries to rapidly deploy strengthened capacities in the areas of mine clearance, unexploded ordnance disposal and engineering to clear roads and facilitate a return to full patrolling and monitoring functions across the area of operations. Two explosive ordnance reconnaissance teams and four explosive ordnance disposal teams have been deployed since 27 November.

73. UNIFIL continued to issue statements, give interviews and conduct in-person and virtual media visits to clarify its mandate and activities and counter mis- and disinformation. Following the Israeli naval raid at Batrun (see para. 9), UNIFIL issued a statement refuting false media allegations that the mission was involved in the incident.

74. UNIFIL continued to implement the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System and to assess the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see

S/2020/473), pursuant to Security Council resolution 2539 (2020). The mission also utilized indicators from the Action for Peacekeeping Plus monitoring framework to enhance its data-driven analysis and reporting. UNIFIL conducted 15 evaluations of units for preparedness, in implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and Security Council resolution 2436 (2018). No major shortfalls were identified.

## V. Conduct and discipline

75. From 1 October to 30 January, UNIFIL recorded seven allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct, without any allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse. Induction training on United Nations standards of conduct was delivered to 1 civilian and 2,601 military personnel. Self-study modules on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and the prevention of sexual harassment were provided to 728 civilian and 217 military personnel.

## VI. Observations

76. I welcome that the cessation of hostilities has continued to hold since 27 November, despite challenges, with progress made towards the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanese territory concomitant with the strengthened deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River. The restoration of a cessation of hostilities has brought significant relief to communities on both sides of the Blue Line who endured profound violence, destruction and suffering over the past year. This relief must not be fleeting. During my visit to Lebanon in January, an atmosphere of opportunity and hope was palpable. A long-awaited opportunity exists to deliver the enduring security and stability that the people of Lebanon and Israel deserve and that will enable those displaced on both sides to return home and rebuild their lives.

77. The situation remains fragile, however. The Israel Defense Forces have not yet completely withdrawn from Lebanese territory, remaining at five locations, and designating two areas as “buffer zones” along the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces continue to deploy throughout southern Lebanon, with the active support of UNIFIL, while displaced communities also return to their homes. The Lebanese Armed Forces also continue to dispose of large quantities of abandoned weapons believed to have belonged to Hizbullah. I call on all concerned actors to refrain from unilateral or provocative actions that could undermine the cessation of hostilities. The parties are urged to fully respect and swiftly implement their commitments, including respect for the Blue Line, and to build on this political momentum towards the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and its ultimate goal, a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. I welcome the coordination between UNIFIL, the parties, and the mechanism established pursuant to the cessation of hostilities. I reiterate that the United Nations stands ready to support arrangements that can strengthen confidence in communities to return home on both sides of the Blue Line.

78. It is in the interest of both parties that the Lebanese Armed Forces be able to reassert and consolidate their authority and that of the Lebanese State throughout its territory, including to ensure that the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line is free of all armed personnel, assets and weapons outside the authority of the State, in line with the cessation of hostilities agreement and resolution 1701 (2006). I regret that the Lebanese Armed Forces suffered casualties despite refraining from the hostilities. The strengthened presence and capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces is at the core of resolution 1701 (2006). I extend my appreciation to Member States



for their support provided to date and call on donors to bolster their material and financial support commensurate with their commitment to the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

79. At the same time, the Israel Defense Forces must complete their withdrawal from Lebanese territory. The presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), and undermines the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to extend State authority throughout all of its territory. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty from Israel and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I also condemn any violation of the sovereignty of Israel from Lebanon.

80. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line is also in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and must cease. I again urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line. I note that the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

81. I welcome the election of a President of Lebanon, the designation of a Prime Minister and the subsequent swift formation of a new Government. The United Nations looks forward to working in close partnership with the new President and Prime Minister and the new Government on its priorities, including the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities and the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while supporting all efforts to address the pressing needs and aspirations of the population of Lebanon, including through humanitarian response, recovery and reconstruction and by advancing a comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable reform agenda.

82. The massive devastation caused by the hostilities will require a comprehensive and inclusive recovery and reconstruction process. Even as the cessation of hostilities has enabled the return of most of those displaced to their areas of origin, many others are unable to return, with civilian infrastructure and homes destroyed, essential services disrupted, the continued presence of explosive ordnance and limited livelihood opportunities. I call on donors to fully fund the 2025 Lebanon Response Plan and the flash appeal to address continuing humanitarian needs and support the recovery, reconstruction and stabilization of Lebanon, which is also critical to extending the authority of the Lebanese State throughout its territory. An empowered Government capable of delivering on long-overdue reforms to restore international confidence and unlock donor funding will be critical. Towards this end, I welcome the commitments of the President, Joseph Aoun, and the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, to advance comprehensive economic and governance reforms, including with respect to the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law.

83. I am also encouraged by Mr. Aoun's pledge to ensure that the Lebanese State has a monopoly over all weapons throughout its territory and to convene a dialogue towards elaboration of a national security strategy. The exchanges of fire demonstrated the possession of weapons outside the authority of the State in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in violation of resolutions [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1559 \(2004\)](#). I call upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#), [1701 \(2006\)](#) and [1680 \(2006\)](#), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon and the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. Proactive steps taken by the Lebanese Armed Forces towards the dismantling of the

bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada are notable in this regard.

84. To support the parties in upholding their commitments in a new operating environment, UNIFIL is adapting its posture. In this regard, I welcome the support of troop-contributing countries that are working with the mission to rapidly strengthen its capacities to facilitate a return to full patrolling and monitoring functions across the area of operations. The comprehensive resumption of UNIFIL mandated activities requires that there be no restrictions imposed by either party, including with respect to the mission's freedom of movement and access to all locations of interest and all parts of the Blue Line, as required under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). In addition, UNIFIL is planning to introduce new technologies to improve monitoring and verification; enhance tactical responsiveness; and reassess operational frameworks with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces. Acceptance by the parties of these adaptations will be a testament to their commitment to upholding their obligations under the resolution. Furthermore, the essential partnership between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces must continue to become more effective, including through joint operational planning, to support the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

85. I reiterate my call on both parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, and ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, their freedom of movement and the absolute inviolability of United Nations premises and property at all times. I strongly condemn the attack on a UNIFIL convoy near the airport on 14 February in which several peacekeepers were injured. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL must be held to account.

86. I reiterate my call upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area as provided in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 ([S/2007/641](#)).

87. Developments in the Syrian Arab Republic also offer hope for the eventual safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrian refugees. I call on the international community to work with the Syrian caretaker authorities towards creating conditions conducive to such returns. The consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement, remains essential.

88. I reiterate my appeal to support the work of UNRWA and for donors to increase their financial support to ensure the continuity of essential services and support by UNRWA to all Palestine refugees in Lebanon.

89. I welcome resumption of the judicial investigation into the Beirut port explosion on 4 August 2020, as well as the stated commitment of the Prime Minister, Mr. Salam, to ensure justice for the victims of the explosion and their families.

90. Lastly, as I conveyed during my visit to Lebanon, I express my deep admiration and appreciation for our peacekeepers, who stayed in position and stood with courage and dedication despite the persistent danger. They in no small part contributed to the return to a cessation of hostilities becoming possible, and their continued efforts, in implementation of their mandate under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), will be vital in supporting the parties in upholding their obligations under the cessation of hostilities and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I express my sincere gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I thank the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, as well as the troop-contributing countries that remained united in this difficult period, and all members of the United Nations country team for their continued dedication to peace and stability.

## Annex I

### **Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 October 2024 to 20 February 2025**

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in S/2019/237) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution 1701 (2006), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. From 21 October to 26 November, normal operational and logistical activities outside UNIFIL positions were suspended throughout the area of operations. Only essential logistics movements to resupply UNIFIL positions with food, water and fuel were conducted during this period. The prolonged periods of time that UNIFIL peacekeepers spent in shelter following security advisories from the Israel Defense Forces, stated by the latter to be necessary for the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel, further impeded mandated activities. Between 16 and 18 November, for instance, some positions were in bunkers for a continuous 57 hours.
3. From 27 November to 26 January, UNIFIL conducted 1,632 patrols. Of these, an average of 70 independent vehicle patrols were conducted each month along the Blue Line, out of an overall monthly average of 810 vehicle patrols, conducted during the day and at night. Some foot patrols resumed in January in Sector East, while market walks remained suspended. Air operations, including image collection, also resumed in January. In addition, the mission conducted an average of 412 inspection activities each month, which included the operation of permanent checkpoints and the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols.
4. From 27 January to 20 February, operational activities continued to increase, with UNIFIL conducting 3,496 operational activities, including 1,706 patrols. Of the patrols, 160 independent vehicle patrols were conducted along the Blue Line, during both the day and at night. In addition, the mission conducted 1,376 inspection activities, which included the operation of permanent and temporary checkpoints as well as the conduct of counter-rocket-launching patrols.
5. During the conduct of ground operations by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, Israel Defense Forces personnel and infrastructure were on occasion situated directly next to United Nations positions. In several instances, UNIFIL positions were damaged as a result of exchanges of fire between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah. Blue Line barrels, marking the Blue Line, were removed or damaged on four occasions by the Israel Defense Forces in Mays al-Jabal, Hula, Labbunah and Rumaysh.
6. During the reporting period, UNIFIL observed white barrels placed by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, near Arab al-Luwayzah, Sarda, and between Markaba and Hula (all Sector East). A warning sign reading, in Arabic, “beware, your life is in danger, passing prohibited” was seen on some of the barrels. UNIFIL movement beyond those white barrels was thus restricted. In addition, the movements of UNIFIL patrols continued to be impeded on several occasions due to IDF checkpoints and roadblocks that were either human-made or caused by debris or the cratering of roads in air strikes.

7. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents of restrictions of movement with both Lebanese and Israeli authorities. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission continued to experience restrictions, as detailed below. In addition, between 21 October and 20 February, UNIFIL access was restricted by the Israel Defense Forces on at least 16 occasions and by population gatherings on 12 occasions, in various locations within the mission's area of operations. In most cases, patrols resumed on alternative routes.

#### **Access to all locations of interest**

8. Owing to the security situation during the reporting period, UNIFIL was not able to systematically monitor locations of interest, including Green without Borders sites. Many of these sites were destroyed or damaged by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL continues to request unrestricted access to the entire area of operations. On 7 February, UNIFIL communicated a list detailing 17 locations of interest to the Lebanese Armed Forces and requested coordinated inspections of these locations. UNIFIL visited two of these locations independently on 20 February. A series of tunnel openings was discovered by UNIFIL patrols on 19 February. UNIFIL communicated the coordinates to the Lebanese Armed Forces and they inspected the sites the next day.

#### **Freedom of movement incidents**

9. On 21 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers with two tanks blocked the movement of a UNIFIL logistical convoy on a road near Rumaysh (Sector West), with the soldiers stating that UNIFIL could not proceed as there was armed activity in the area. As the patrol was not able to use an alternative route, the activity was cancelled and the peacekeepers returned to their position.

10. On 23 October, a UNIFIL team conducting a medical evacuation encountered rubble blocking a road south-west of Yarin (Sector West). As the patrol could not proceed, an additional team from another UNIFIL position was dispatched to retrieve the patient. As the first UNIFIL team was waiting for the second team to arrive, it was caught in crossfire of unknown origin. The team was forced to withdraw, together with the patient, to a UNIFIL position. A few minutes later, the second team arrived at the location and was also caught in the crossfire. The second team also withdrew, but one of the vehicles was damaged by the gunfire and had to be left at the scene. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that the firing was probably not deliberately targeting the peacekeepers' vehicles.

11. Also on 23 October, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL logistics convoy in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East) and questioned the peacekeepers about the convoys' route, the number of peacekeepers and the movement order, while a second Israel Defense Forces soldier filmed the convoy. The Israel Defense Forces told the peacekeepers that the area was not safe and requested the UNIFIL convoy to return to its position. On its way back, the UNIFIL convoy was stopped by two Israel Defense Forces bulldozers placing trees, debris and rocks on the road, impeding the movement of the convoy. The convoy continued its movement on an alternative route. UNIFIL protested the incidents to the Israel Defense Forces, which said that the movement had not been coordinated in advance and had to be stopped as the convoy was approaching an active combat zone. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

12. On 1 November, 15 Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol on the way back to its position north of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The patrol was returning from having cleared debris and unexploded ordnance near Hula. The Israeli

soldiers instructed the patrol to move back to the nearest UNIFIL position. The patrol diverted from its planned itinerary and continued to a nearby observation post.

13. On 3 November, 10 armed individuals on scooters encircled a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Burj al Qibli (Sector West) and looked into the UNIFIL vehicles. UNIFIL contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces, which reached the location shortly thereafter. An additional Lebanese Armed Forces team arrived at the location approximately an hour later and spoke with the individuals, following which the individuals left the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces accompanied the UNIFIL patrol out of the area, whereafter the patrol resumed its planned itinerary. In official correspondence, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that the patrol had been stopped as it had conducted some road works that had raised suspicion among the local residents.

14. On 6 November, a stone was thrown towards a UNIFIL logistical convoy near the Sidon-Tyre highway (outside the area of operations). The convoy continued its planned itinerary without interruption. One UNIFIL vehicle sustained minor damage to a door.

15. On 7 November, five UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting a logistics movement on the Beirut-Sidon highway (outside the area of operations) were injured following an Israel Defense Forces drone strike on a vehicle that was in close proximity to the UNIFIL convoy. The windows and windshields of two UNIFIL vehicles were also damaged. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces, which erroneously stated that the movement had not been coordinated in advance.

16. On 14 November, south-west of Qallawiyah (Sector West), a UNIFIL patrol was subject to direct fire. The shots came from an approximate distance of 75 m. The peacekeepers responded by firing warning shots into the air, whereafter they continued to a nearby UNIFIL position. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel or damage to vehicles. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed of the incident and responded that access to narrow roads in neighbourhoods and to private properties and the inspection of locations without prior coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces were not in keeping with national laws. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

17. On 16 November, a UNIFIL patrol observed an abandoned rocket launcher near Hallusiyat al Tahta (Sector East). Shortly thereafter, five individuals, at least one of whom was armed with a rifle, attempted to block the patrol on a road in the vicinity of Bidyas and Maarakeh (Sector East), but the patrol was able to bypass the individuals and continued its movement. An hour later, as the patrol passed Maarakeh (Sector East), three individuals fired approximately 40 times towards the rear vehicle of the patrol. Two UNIFIL vehicles were damaged by bullets. There were no injuries to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident. The mayor of Bidyas informed UNIFIL that he had engaged with the youths involved in the incidents and expressed his disapproval of actions interfering with UNIFIL patrols.

18. On 19 November, two unknown individuals in a building opened fire at a UNIFIL patrol near Khirbat Silm (Sector East), prompting the patrol to fire warning shots. The patrol then continued to its position south-east of Haddatha (Sector West) approximately 30 minutes later. Due to the rapid manoeuvring and the firing of warning shots from inside the patrol vehicle, one peacekeeper sustained acoustic trauma and light bruising on his leg. A second peacekeeper reported pain under his right eye. There was no damage to the UNIFIL vehicles. UNIFIL liaised with the local municipal authorities, which described the incident as an act of mistrust against UNIFIL troops amid ongoing hostilities.

19. On 19 November, armed individuals who identified themselves as Hizbullah members stopped a UNIFIL vehicle on the Damascus highway in Beirut (outside the area of operations). The peacekeepers were told to refrain from using any electronic equipment. The armed individuals took the peacekeepers' UNIFIL identification cards. One of the armed individuals forcibly entered the UNIFIL vehicle and drove it to what appeared to be an unofficial checkpoint. At the checkpoint, the identification cards were returned, and another driver took over and drove to nearby Lebanese Armed Forces barracks. The peacekeepers had remained in their vehicle throughout. Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces accompanied the patrol to UNIFIL House in Beirut. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Lebanese Armed Forces and has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

20. On 21 November, approximately 20 individuals surrounded a UNIFIL convoy in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the area of operations). The convoy had to divert from the main road due to a roadblock, and while trying to exit the area, the individuals started to fire shots in the air and subsequently also directly at the UNIFIL vehicles. The convoy managed to move out of the area while being pursued by individuals on scooters and in vehicles. Both UNIFIL vehicles were damaged, one with bullet holes. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

21. On 27 November, a crowd of 12 individuals blocked a UNIFIL logistical convoy on a road north-west of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) by placing vehicles across the road. Peacekeepers asked the individuals to allow them to pass, but the crowd refused. The peacekeepers cancelled their activity and returned to their position. The local civil defence informed UNIFIL that the incident was not directed against the mission but was a show of general discontent from residents at not being allowed to enter their village.

22. On 27 November, a UNIFIL patrol was told to wait by Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers in the vicinity of Kfar Kila (Sector East). After waiting for about 10 minutes, the patrol continued its movement. A few minutes later, the patrol observed two Israel Defense Forces tanks, with a soldier on one of the tanks signalling that the patrol could continue. The patrol therefore proceeded but encountered debris blocking the road. While the peacekeepers tried to clear the road, eight Israel Defense Forces soldiers approached the peacekeepers and said that the patrol had to turn back. The peacekeepers cancelled the activity and returned to their position.

23. On 29 November, approximately 30 individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-east of Naffakhiyah (Sector West). The individuals were neither armed nor aggressive but did not let the patrol continue towards the village centre. As the peacekeepers were not able to continue, they cancelled the patrol and returned to their position.

24. On 30 November, nine Israel Defense Forces soldiers with four vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-east of Jubbayn (Sector West) and told the peacekeepers they could not pass. The patrol returned to its position. Later the same day, the patrol resumed the activity without restriction.

25. On 1 December, Israel Defense Forces soldiers with two tanks stopped a UNIFIL patrol south-west of Zallutiyah (Sector West) and instructed the peacekeepers to return to their position. The peacekeepers cancelled the activity and returned to their position.

26. On 3 December, a UNIFIL patrol observed a cache of rockets on the side of the road, south-east of Udaysah (Sector East). As the patrol continued its movement, two individuals in civilian clothes and armed with a machine gun and a rifle fired at the patrol. The patrol fired back in the direction of the assailants and accelerated to leave the area. The patrol activity was subsequently cancelled, with the peacekeepers

returning to their position. No damage or injury was detected. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

27. On 4 December, 10 individuals, one of whom had a concealed gun, stopped a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Suwwanan (Sector East). The peacekeepers reversed and used an alternative route to return to their position.

28. On 5 December, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Sarda (Sector East) and requested the patrol to turn back. The patrol returned to its position.

29. On 10 December, after having encountered Israel Defense Forces soldiers and an infantry vehicle, 10 (warning) shots of unknown origin were fired, impacting approximately 100 m ahead of a UNIFIL patrol west of Yarun (Sector West). The patrol continued its activity, using an alternative route.

30. On 16 December, 12 Israel Defense Forces soldiers blocked a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Yarin (Sector West) and asked the peacekeepers to turn back. The patrol, which was escorting a truck with gravel from one UNIFIL position to another, had to interrupt its activity, with the truck proceeding to a nearby UNIFIL position south of Marwahin, while the escort team returned to its position south-east of Bayt Lif (Sector West).

31. On 23 December, Israel Defense Forces soldiers with a tank blocked a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Yarun (Sector West). The peacekeepers engaged with the Israeli soldiers but were not allowed to proceed. The patrol returned to a nearby UNIFIL position, south-west of Aytarun (Sector West).

32. On 25 December, unknown individuals fired small-arms fire over a UNIFIL patrol escorting the Lebanese Red Cross on a mission to evacuate an elderly woman, north of Yarun (Sector West). The convoy observed one tank, one heavily armoured combat engineering vehicle and five Israel Defense Forces soldiers, approximately 200 m to the south. The convoy withdrew from the location, moving north. Five minutes after the first shots were fired, a second sequence of three bursts was fired from the south towards the convoy. Shortly thereafter, a third burst was fired towards the convoy. At the request of the Lebanese Red Cross, the activity was cancelled, with the patrol returning to UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah (Sector West). No casualties or damage was reported. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

33. On 26 December, six Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol south-east of Qantarah (Sector East) and informed the peacekeepers that they could not proceed due to operations in the area. The patrol cancelled the activity and returned to its position.

34. On 29 December, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that patrols should avoid passing near Taybah (Sector East), as the security of the peacekeepers could not be guaranteed. UNIFIL protested to the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL resumed patrolling in the area on 30 December.

35. On 10 January, 20 Israel Defense Force soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol, which was preparing to support the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to a position in Salihani (Sector West), as the patrol was passing south-east of Ramiyah (Sector West). The patrol cancelled the activity and returned to its position.

36. On 14 January, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by an Israel Defense Forces vehicle parked across the road south-east of Dayr Mimas (Sector East). Peacekeepers engaged with the Israel Defense Forces soldiers, but they refused to remove the vehicle. The patrol cancelled its activity and returned to its position.

37. On 16 January, a UNIFIL patrol attempting to access an area to dispose of an improvised explosive device north-east of Marwahin (Sector West) was blocked by debris placed on a road by the Israel Defense Forces. The UNIFIL patrol had to wait until the roadblock was removed seven hours later before carrying out the disposal.

38. On 16 January, Israel Armed Forces soldiers with two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East) and told the patrol that it had to turn around. The peacekeepers cancelled the patrol and returned to their position.

39. On 17 January, 11 Israel Defense Forces soldiers with four vehicles again stopped a UNIFIL patrol south of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East) and instructed the patrol to turn around. Peacekeepers engaged with the Israel Défense Forces soldiers but were not granted passage. The patrol cancelled its activity and returned to its position. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

40. On 20 January, Israel Defense Forces soldiers blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Duhayrah (Sector West). Peacekeepers engaged with the Israel Défense Forces soldiers but were not granted passage. The patrol cancelled the activity, and the peacekeepers returned to their position.

41. On 22 January, an explosion occurred approximately 20 m from a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Markaba (Sector East). UNIFIL has launched an investigation to determine the origin of the explosion. Three UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained minor injuries and one UNIFIL vehicle was severely damaged.

42. On 22 January, Israel Defense Forces soldiers stopped a UNIFIL patrol that was supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces in redeploying to a position in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) and asked where the patrol was going and who had sent them. The Israeli soldiers informed the patrol that it could not pass, since the Israel Defense Forces were conducting demolitions and search and destroy operations in the area. The patrol cancelled its activity and returned to its position.

43. On 22 January, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed a weapon at UNIFIL peacekeepers carrying out a reconnaissance mission of a Lebanese Armed Forces position west of Sarda (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces soldier threatened to “take action” if UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces returned, stating that the position was under the control of the Israel Defense Forces. The UNIFIL patrol turned back and proceeded with another planned activity.

44. On 23 January, five individuals in civilian clothes, armed with at least three pistols and two automatic weapons, stopped a UNIFIL reconnaissance team returning from a mission in Sector East, close to the Sidon-Tyre highway (outside the area of operations). The patrol immediately alerted the Lebanese Armed Forces, which arrived at the location after about five minutes. The Lebanese Armed Forces personnel talked to the five individuals, and after approximately 15 minutes the patrol was able to continue its movement.

45. On 23 January, 11 Israel Defense Forces soldiers instructed a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces patrol south-west of Naqurah (Sector West) to leave the area, stating that the Israel Defense Forces were about to dispose of unexploded ordnance. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces cancelled their patrol and left the area.

46. On 27 January, a crowd of individuals south-west of Marun al-Ra’s shouted, threw stones and displayed aggressive gestures towards a UNIFIL patrol, which was conducting a joint patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces tried unsuccessfully to calm the crowd. After 10 minutes the peacekeepers and the Lebanese Armed Forces left the location and continued their activity on an alternative road. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported but a camera on one vehicle was damaged.



47. On 27 January, approximately 700 individuals in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) impeded the movement of a UNIFIL patrol. The patrol stopped and after 10 minutes the individuals started throwing stones towards the UNIFIL vehicles, climbed on top of them and told peacekeepers to leave. Due to the large crowd, it took the patrol 15 minutes to leave the location. The peacekeepers returned to their position. One vehicle sustained minor scratches on the windscreen.

48. On 28 January, approximately 10 individuals in civilian clothes threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol south-west of Bint Jubayl (Sector West). The patrol turned back to reach their UNIFIL position, east of Bint Jubayl, while some of the individuals followed it for a few minutes on motorcycles. No injury to peacekeepers or damage to UNIFIL property was reported.

49. On 29 January, approximately 30 individuals sitting on a road south-east of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West) blocked a UNIFIL patrol. The individuals approached the patrol and told the peacekeepers that the Israel Defense Forces had apprehended some individuals and seized an ambulance, and that they would not release the patrol until the Israel Defense Forces released the individuals. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and arrived at the location 30 minutes later, stating that the apprehended individuals would be released shortly. The patrol was able to leave and returned to its position, south of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West).

50. On 29 January, peacekeepers heard two rounds of gunfire fired just above their vehicles while on patrol in the vicinity of Taybah (Sector East). The peacekeepers, who had just deviated from the original itinerary due to an Israel Defense Forces roadblock, estimated that the shots originated from an approximate distance of 300 m. While advancing, the patrol encountered a second Israel Defense Forces roadblock, where Israeli soldiers warned the peacekeepers that they would open fire if they attempted to proceed. The patrol diverted and returned to its position, south of Marji'yun (Sector East).

51. On 31 January, an entrance to a UNIFIL position north-west of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East) was blocked with a barbed wire fence, preventing a UNIFIL patrol's planned movement to enter the position. Three Israel Defense Forces soldiers, two tanks and an armoured fighting vehicle were observed 300 m away from the position. The peacekeepers waited for five minutes, then turned back, and continued patrolling without concluding the planned stop at the UNIFIL position.

52. On 31 January, a UNIFIL patrol moving between Taybah and Udaysah (Sector East) encountered an Israel Defense Forces roadblock. The Israel Defense Forces soldiers told the patrol to continue towards Udaysah. Shortly thereafter, peacekeepers heard approximately 10 gunshots impacting close to their location. The patrol continued its itinerary but later encountered another Israel Defense Forces roadblock. Peacekeepers then moved along a secondary road to reach their United Nations position north-east of Dayr Kifa (Sector East).

53. On 2 February, approximately 100 individuals, acting aggressively, denied a UNIFIL patrol passage near Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The Lebanese Armed Forces, which were part of the joint patrol, intervened but could not persuade the crowd to allow the patrol to continue. The peacekeepers interrupted the movement and returned to their position north-west of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East).

54. On 7 February, 11 young individuals with two motorcycles and two cars blocked a UNIFIL patrol, south-west of Frun (Sector East). The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and advised that the peacekeepers should stay on main roads. The peacekeepers did not observe any weapons, nor did the individuals behave aggressively, but they refused to clear the road. The peacekeepers decided to interrupt the activity and returned to their position, north-east of Dayr Kifa (Sector East).

55. On 10 February, a group of individuals on a road in the vicinity of Suwwanan (Sector East) threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed, and arrived after 10 minutes at the location and calmed the situation down. The patrol continued its planned movement. One side mirror was damaged in the incident.

56. On 14 February, a crowd ambushed a UNIFIL convoy, consisting of three vehicles and nine peacekeepers, in the southern suburbs of Beirut (outside the area of operations) (see para. 56 of the main report) as the peacekeepers were driving towards Rafic Hariri International Airport. Peacekeepers in two of the vehicles were able to escape, but the third vehicle was blocked by the crowd. The crowd set the vehicle on fire and, as fire broke out, the four peacekeepers exited the vehicle. Two peacekeepers, including the outgoing Deputy Force Commander of UNIFIL, were attacked and injured while trying to escape. The injured peacekeepers were transported to a nearby hospital where they underwent treatment. The following day, the Deputy Force Commander was able to continue his repatriation flight to his home country while the other peacekeepers returned to UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah.

57. On 15 February, a warning shot was fired at a UNIFIL patrol by Israel Defense Force soldiers in the vicinity of a UNIFIL position north-west of 'Aytit (Sector West). The UNIFIL patrol quickly left the area and returned to its position, north of Dayr Kifa (Sector East). No injury to UNIFIL personnel or damage to the vehicles was reported.

#### **Impact on United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon positions and personnel**

58. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL positions and assets were directly or indirectly impacted on at least 39 occasions. At least 12 of these incidents had implications for UNIFIL freedom of movement. UNIFIL continued to protest to Lebanese authorities, where non-State armed groups were seen to be operating in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. UNIFIL also protested to the Israel Defense Forces regarding incidents involving their troops.

59. On 22 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers at the permanent UNIFIL observation post in Duhayrah (Sector West) observed Israel Defense Forces soldiers conducting "house-clearing" operations nearby. After the Israel Defense Forces soldiers noticed the UNIFIL peacekeepers, they fired at the peacekeepers. The peacekeepers cancelled their activity and sought shelter within the position. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation and protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces. The Israel Defense Forces launched an internal investigation into the incident, concluding that it could not determine whether the incident was the result of an Israel Defense Forces operation.

60. On 23 October, four points of impact were reported inside a UNIFIL position south-east of Kfar Shuba (Sector East), likely from rocket fire from north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL filed a complaint with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

61. On 25 October, an artillery rocket hit the level 1 hospital located inside a UNIFIL position south-east of Yater (Sector West), causing extensive damage to several buildings. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

62. On 29 October, a workshop building and a vehicle in the UNIFIL headquarters Green Hill camp, south-west of Naqurah (Sector West), were damaged as a 122 mm rocket impacted inside the position. A fire ignited but was extinguished shortly thereafter. Two peacekeepers sustained minor injuries. At the time of the incident, UNIFIL radars detected several rockets fired from the outskirts of Tyre (Sector West) in a southerly direction. UNIFIL conducted an investigation into the incident and determined that the rockets were likely fired by Hizbullah, falling short of their target.

The investigation report was shared with the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL strongly protested the incident.

63. On 6 November, an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer forcefully removed a Blue Line barrel from its position in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East).

64. On 7 November, UNIFIL peacekeepers reported that a Blue Line barrel in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East) had been removed. Israel Defense Forces construction machinery had been observed in the area earlier the same day.

65. On 10 November, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed a Blue Line barrel south-west of Rumaysh (Sector West) having been knocked over, with an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer working adjacent to a nearby Blue Line barrel. UNIFIL protested these incidents to the Israel Defense Forces. On 10 November, the Israel Defense Forces stated that “it is possible that as part of the troops’ activity, part of the Blue Line infrastructure was harmed”. The Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “no intention of altering the Blue Line”. The Israel Defense Forces further informed UNIFIL that three Blue Line barrels “may have been unfortunately displaced”.

66. On 7 November, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed an arm of an Israel Defense Forces excavator extending into a UNIFIL position south of Naqurah (Sector West) while conducting digging and clearing works inside the position, destroying parts of the position’s protective fence and one concrete garret. Later the same day, two Israel Defense Forces excavators and one bulldozer again intruded into the UNIFIL position and conducted clearing and digging works. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces, which denied any activity had taken place inside UNIFIL positions.

67. On 15 November, an undetonated 155 mm artillery shell hit a UNIFIL position in Shama (Sector West). The shell did not detonate, and a UNIFIL explosive ordnance disposal team secured the area, removed the ordnance and conducted a controlled detonation. There was no injury among peacekeepers, but there was minor damage to a gym. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that the shell was inert and did not contain explosives but had the colorations and markings attributable to a 155 mm projectile used by the Israel Defense Forces.

68. On 16 November, UNIFIL reported damage to a mural and two barriers at a UNIFIL position south-east of Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West), likely caused by an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer. UNIFIL protested the incident to the Israel Defense Forces.

69. On 19 November, a rocket impacting a UNIFIL position south-east of Ramiyah (Sector West) resulted in six peacekeepers sustaining injuries. Three of the six peacekeepers were evacuated to Tyre hospital for further treatment. There was extensive damage to the UNIFIL position. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that a rocket fired from north of the Blue Line had impacted the position. The investigation did not find evidence of a deliberate attack. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

70. On 19 November, eight rockets impacted a workshop, the warehouse and a military vehicle inside a UNIFIL position north-west of Shama (Sector West). One peacekeeper sustained minor injuries. An internal UNIFIL investigation concluded that the rockets were fired by Hizbullah or an affiliated group, from the vicinity of Malkiyah (Sector West). At the time of the incident, the Israel Defense Forces were operating in the proximity of the impacted UNIFIL position. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

71. On 22 November, two 122 mm rockets launched from an unidentified position impacted a UNIFIL position north-west of Shama, resulting in four peacekeepers injured and damage to a bunker, the base’s post exchange, the gym, the chapel and a

military vehicle. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

72. On 23 November, initial assessment showed that an uncrewed aerial vehicle impacted the external barrier at a UNIFIL position near Shama (Sector West). In addition, parts from a 122 mm rocket were found inside the UNIFIL position. UNIFIL has launched an internal investigation into the incident.

73. On 24 November, a briefing room and the campsite warehouse at a UNIFIL position north-east of Bayyadah (Sector West) sustained damage due to direct fire in the area.

74. On 26 November, a UNIFIL peacekeeper sustained a minor injury to his leg after debris fell through the roof at his office in UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah, following a nearby Israeli air strike.

75. On 7 December, an accommodation unit at a UNIFIL position southwest of Burj Qallawiyah (Sector West) sustained damage due to gunshots fired during a funeral procession in the area. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel.


76. On 10 December, a bullet from nearby firing impacted an office building at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah (Sector West). There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel.

77. On 26 December, a civilian UNIFIL contractor was shot and injured by the Israel Defense Forces on his way to work at the nearby UNIFIL position near Qantarah (Sector West). UNIFIL escorted an ambulance to pick the civilian up and take him to a civilian hospital close by.

78. On 4 January, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed an Israel Defense Forces bulldozer destroying a Blue Line barrel in Labbunah (Sector West).

79. On 15 January, a UNIFIL vehicle inside a UNIFIL position north-west of Shama (Sector West) was pierced by bullets. An additional 7.62 mm bullet projectile was found inside the position.

Figure  
**Incidents of restriction of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon freedom of movement and impacts on the mission’s positions and personnel, October 2024 to February 2025**



Source: UNIFIL.

## Annex II

### Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

2. In identical letters dated 13 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (S/2025/29), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “Israel has sounded the alarm bells in consistent letters and briefings, alerting that Hezbollah is building a massive military infrastructure south of the Litani River and beyond, that advanced weapon systems are being smuggled from Iran into Lebanon in flagrant breach of resolution 1701 (2006), but unfortunately no action was taken.” The Permanent Representative of Israel further stated that “they [Hezbollah] are now attempting to regain strength and rearm with the assistance of Iran, and thus, remain a serious threat to Israel and to regional stability. To prevent further escalation, it is imperative that the government of Lebanon and the international community focus on curbing the smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and financial support through the Syria-Lebanon border and via air and sea routes. Since the Understandings were reached, there have been several attempts to transfer weapons and cash to Hezbollah.”

3. In response to the above-mentioned letters, in a letter dated 24 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (S/2025/55), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations stated: “The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects this unfounded accusation [that ‘advanced weapon systems are being smuggled from Iran into Lebanon’], which is nothing more than a pretext to justify Israel’s persistent violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and its blatant disregard for the ceasefire arrangements with Lebanon. [...] it [Israel] fabricates such groundless allegations to legitimize its continued illegal occupation of Lebanese territory.”

4. In identical letters dated 20 February addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General (S/2025/107), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated: “Since the entry into force of the Ceasefire Understandings between the parties, Israel has reported to the mechanism hundreds of violations by Hezbollah in breach of resolution 1701 (2006) and contrary to the Ceasefire Understandings. These violations include, inter alia, continued Hezbollah military activity, including south of the Litani River, arms smuggling through the Syria-Lebanon border, money transfers through the Beirut International Airport, active weapons production facilities and launching of uncrewed aerial vehicles towards Israel.”

5. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

## Annex III

### Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), in which it urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as in the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.

2. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([A/78/712-S/2024/36](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated: "The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with UNIFIL [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)." Subsequently, on 29 February 2024, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated that, to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), the army would need allied countries to help with everything from "fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the army needs".

3. In the statement by the President of the Security Council of 16 January 2025 ([S/PRST/2025/1](#)), the Council called for further international assistance to strengthen State institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces.

4. A key aim of the International Conference in Support of Lebanon's People and Sovereignty, convened by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, on 24 October 2024, was the mobilization of support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. According to a communiqué released by France, the Conference "enabled the Lebanese security forces, guarantors of [Lebanon's] unity, stability and sovereignty, to be lent additional support".

5. The Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701, which was circulated to the Security Council at the request of the United States of America and France (see [S/2024/870](#)), noted the intention of the United States and France to work with the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon and the wider international community to support enhanced Lebanese Armed Forces deployment to southern Lebanon and to strengthen the capabilities of the army.

6. During the reporting period, regional and global leaders have strongly advocated a surge in support to enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Similarly, Lebanese leaders have made several calls for increased international support to be channelled to the army. In his inaugural address on 9 January, the President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, underscored the need to invest in the Lebanese Armed Forces, including through investment from the Lebanese State itself, in order to secure the country's borders and contribute to stabilization in the south. During my

visit to Lebanon in January, I also encouraged the international community to strengthen its support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United Nations, including the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), continued to leverage advocacy and engagement opportunities to highlight the funding needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

7. The Military Technical Committee for Lebanon was convened in Rome, on 25 November, and in Madrid, from 27 to 28 February. These meetings were attended by military representatives of France, Germany, Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, with both military and civilian officials from observer States and entities also present, including the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL. Representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces participated in both meetings, providing updates on progress made in capability enhancement, the extension of State authority and support for reconstruction and service resumption in southern Lebanon, while highlighting remaining capability and financial needs.

8. Meanwhile, the Beirut Executive Committee Working Group, an in-country technical forum chaired by the United Kingdom within the overarching framework of the Military Technical Committee, which aims to enhance the coordination of bilateral efforts to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, scaled up its efforts to ensure a responsive posture following the coming into effect of the cessation of hostilities on 27 November 2024. Several sub-working groups under the auspices of the Working Group became operational during the reporting period, through which representatives of Military Technical Committee member countries and observers collaborated with representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces in several priority areas, including strategic communications, planning and recruitment. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and UNIFIL supported such efforts, including to enhance joint engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces and donors to enable their timely deployment in southern Lebanon and to coordinate and align efforts with national priorities.

9. UNIFIL participates in four subcommittees of the Joint Supervision and Coordination Committee, constituted by the Lebanese Armed Forces in December 2024, to support the efforts to coordinate international assistance and plans with the partner nations to recruit, train, equip and deploy additional troops to southern Lebanon in support of the cessation of hostilities and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

10. The European Union continued its support of the Lebanese Armed Forces through a grant of €15 million, approved by the European Council on 13 November, and the announcement on 21 January of a third assistance measure from the European Peace Facility amounting to €60 million to support the Lebanese Armed Forces to “redeploy, secure and maintain stability” in southern Lebanon, among other objectives.

11. On 16 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, José Manuel Albares Bueno, announced that his country would provide €10 million to support the Lebanese Armed Forces. Two days later, the United States announced that it would provide “more than \$117 million in new, expanded security assistance” to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces, while noting that such assistance would directly support both security institutions “as they work to assert Lebanese sovereignty across the country and fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701”. Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States continued to provide in-kind support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, most of which was directed towards equipment, infrastructure and training needs.

12. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces also accelerated during the reporting period. Funding from Denmark (\$1 million), France (\$3 million), Germany (\$5 million) and Norway (\$2.7 million) was provided to support the well-being and livelihood of Lebanese service members and their families. Ongoing projects supported by the European Union entailed the provision of sustainable energy equipment and other energy efficient measures (amounting to \$4 million) and support for the maritime technical and operational capacities of the Lebanese Armed Forces (\$6.2 million), while Japan supported the delivery of medical equipment and renewable energy solutions (\$1 million).

13. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support for the Lebanese Armed Forces.

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