Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 October 2023 to 20 February 2024

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, issued on 16 November 2023 (S/2023/879), including on the provisions of resolution 2695 (2023). Throughout the reporting period, exchanges of fire across the Blue Line intensified, with extended geographical reach, in breach of the cessation of hostilities and in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While most exchanges of fire were confined to within a few kilometres of either side of the Blue Line, some strikes impacted much deeper into Lebanese and Israeli territory. On both sides of the Blue Line, fatalities were reported, with residential areas impacted and tens of thousands of civilians displaced. The repeated exchanges of fire in breach of the cessation of hostilities across the Blue Line underlined the imperative for urgent steps towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. From 21 October to 20 February, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) recorded 8,918 trajectories of projectiles fired in both directions across the Blue Line. Of these trajectories, 7,948 were fired from south of the Blue Line and 978 from north of the Blue Line. Each trajectory potentially included multiple projectiles. Most of the trajectories detected were from projectiles fired by artillery and mortars. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or those fired from light weapons. UNIFIL detected rockets fired from north of the Litani River – and therefore outside the Mission’s area of operations – on 2 and 7 November, 21 December and 26 January, with 26 trajectories detected, originating from north-east of Burghuz (Sector East). On 2 November, 5 December, and 26 January, UNIFIL detected 17 trajectories from south of the Blue Line, which landed just north of the Litani River. The highest number of trajectories, 308, was detected on 19 November.
Figure I
Weekly trajectories detected by UNIFIL (8 October 2023 to 17 February 2024)

3. In public statements, Hizbullah claimed responsibility for almost daily strikes from Lebanon against Israel Defense Forces positions or personnel south of the Blue Line. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas and Al-Quds Brigades of Palestinian Islamic Jihad also publicly claimed responsibility for attacks from Lebanon on northern Israel, including on 29 and 30 October; 2, 6 and 12 November; 10, 19 and 25 December; and 17 January. Al-Fajr Forces, the military wing of Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyah, and Sarayah al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah also claimed responsibility for attacks on northern Israel, while the Amal Movement and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party acknowledged fatalities among their members. Several strikes from Lebanon impacted residential areas in northern Israel, with the most affected areas including Yuval, Metulla, Qiryat Shmona, Yiftah and Zar’it. In a letter dated 28 December addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/1059), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that “the gravity and volume of these attacks is unprecedented and includes the launching of hundreds of rockets, anti-tank missiles and mortar shells, the firing of gunshots towards Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions, personnel and Israeli communities along the northern border, and various drone infiltrations”.

4. The Israel Defense Forces issued almost daily public statements regarding their operations. It reported to have intercepted or found drones on at least 17 occasions, and to have thwarted an attempted infiltration of Israeli territory by militants on 14 January. The most impacted residential areas north of the Blue Line in the UNIFIL area of operations included Alma al-Sha’b, Ayta al-Sha’b, Aytarun, Jubayn, Bazzuriyah, Bayt Lif, Dayr Amis, Labbunah, Majdal Silm, Marwahin, Naqurah, Shihin, Tayr Harfâ, Yarin, and Zibqin (all Sector West), and Blida, Hula, Kfar Kila, Markaba, and Mays al-Jabal (all Sector East). In identical letters dated 5 December addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/688/S/2023/966), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that Israel “persists in violating the sovereignty of Lebanon and to attack it by land, sea and air”.

5. From late October, the Israel Defense Forces intensified air activity and increasingly conducted strikes on specific targets. In this regard, on 21 November a drone struck a vehicle near Tyre (Sector West), reportedly killing several members of
Hamas’s Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, including the group’s deputy commander in Lebanon. A house in Bayt Yahun (Sector West) was hit on 22 November, reportedly resulting in the killing of five Hizbullah members, including a Hizbullah Radwan unit commander, as well as the killing of a son of the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc.

6. From 24 November to 1 December, there was a pause in the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line coinciding with the humanitarian pause in Gaza. Exchanges of fire across the Blue Line resumed on 2 December, with a shift from shelling and rocket fire to the increased use of aerial platforms. Increased aerial surveillance activity from both sides of the Blue Line, with attacks on surveillance devices, was reported.

7. In what appeared to be targeted strikes, a Hizbullah commander was killed in Khirbat Silm (Sector West) on 8 January. A subsequent attack on a vehicle near his funeral procession in Khirbat Silm caused further Hizbullah casualties, with the Israel Defense Forces claiming to have killed Hizbullah’s south Lebanon aerial unit commander. Hizbullah acknowledged the killing of its member but denied he was in charge of its aerial activities. On 20 January, a vehicle on the road between Bazuriyah and Burj al-Shamali (Sector West) was struck, reportedly killing a Hizbullah member as well as a civilian. The following day, two vehicles near a Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoint in Kafra were hit, reportedly killing one Hizbullah member in the first vehicle and a civilian woman in the second. No one claimed responsibility for the strikes on 20 and 21 January.

8. Hizbullah claimed responsibility for attacking the Israel Defense Forces Mount Meron base with rockets on 6 January, in response to the killing of Hamas members in Beirut on 2 January (see para. 37 below), and for a drone attack on the Israel Defense Forces northern command headquarters in Tsfat on 9 January, in response to the abovementioned 8 January strike in Khirbat Silm.

9. On 17 January, Hamas claimed an attack on the Israel Defense Forces barracks in Liman with 20 rockets. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently struck Qulaylah (Sector West), which they claim eliminated a Hamas unit. Hamas publicly acknowledged two related fatalities. On 14 February, an Israel Defense Forces soldier was killed following an unclaimed rocket attack on the Israel Defense Forces northern command headquarters.

10. Residential areas and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the Blue Line were increasingly impacted, including in the vicinity of hospitals, schools and religious sites. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported as at 20 February at least 39 civilian fatalities in Lebanon, including 3 journalists, related to the exchanges of fire since 8 October 2023. Civilian fatalities were also reported in Israel. Within the UNIFIL area of operations, three children and their grandmother were reportedly killed by an Israel Defense Forces strike on their vehicle near Ayn Ata (Sector West) on 5 November. Hizbullah subsequently announced a strike on Qiryat Shmona, the first reported use of Grad rockets by Hizbullah against an Israeli town, reportedly killing an Israeli reservist. Two journalists and their driver were reportedly killed by Israel Defense Forces fire near Tayr Harfa (Sector West) on 21 November. There were strikes reported on a church in Yarun (Sector West) on 20 November, and, on 24 December, on a school in Taybah (Sector East) and in proximity to a monastery in Dayr Amis. South of the Blue Line, a church was reportedly struck in Iqrit on 26 December. There were also reported strikes proximate to a hospital in Mays al-Jabal on 1 January, and on ambulances on 11, 21 and 31 January in Hanin (Sector West), Kfar Kila, and Bayt Lif, respectively, with two medical workers reportedly killed on 11 January. A woman and two children were reportedly killed following a strike on Suwwanah (Sector West) on 14 February. A
man and his elderly mother were reportedly killed in an anti-tank missile strike on a house in Yuval, northern Israel, on 14 January, later claimed by Hizbullah as targeting the Israel Defense Forces.

11. In a letter dated 28 December addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/1059), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that the “attacks have already led to the deaths of 5 civilians and 11 soldiers, and to the injuries of 41 civilians and 127 soldiers”, while “to date, approximately 50,000 Israeli civilians have had to evacuate their homes along the northern border for their own safety and are still internally displaced”. In identical letters dated 9 January addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/78/712-S/2024/36), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated, “We note that these repeated and continuous Israeli attacks have led to the displacement of more than 75,000 Lebanese civilians from their homes in southern towns.” He further stated that “Full and comprehensive implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) within an integrated package of explicit international guarantees … could bring about lasting security and overall stability”.

12. As at 20 February, Hizbullah had announced the deaths of 209 of its members since 8 October, while the Amal Movement had announced 11 fatalities and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad had announced approximately 25 between them.

13. Numerous Israeli strikes impacted areas north of the Litani River, including in the vicinity of residential areas of Jazzin, Nabatiyah and Sidon. In identical letters dated 15 February addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/781-S/2024/168), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “a guided missile was fired from an Israeli drone towards a residential building in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatiyah, killing 10 persons, including women and children”. On 19 February, the Israeli Defense Forces claimed responsibility for an attack on two industrial buildings near Ghaziyyah, south of Sidon, after locating “an unmanned aerial vehicle from Hezbollah near Tiberias [in Israel]”. The Minister of Defense of Israel, Yoav Gallant, on 11 November, stated, “What we are doing in Gaza, we know how to do in Beirut.” The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, on 2 December stated, “If Hezbollah makes a mistake and enters into a broad war, it will be destroying Lebanon with its own hands.” On 12 February, Israeli Minister without portfolio, Benny Gantz, stated, “the one responsible for the fire from Lebanon is not only Hezbollah or the terrorist elements that carry it out, but also the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese state that allows the shooting from its territory. There is no target or military infrastructure in … Lebanon that is not in our sights”.

14. The Lebanese Armed Forces did not engage in the breaches of the cessation of hostilities, despite coming under fire. In identical letters dated 9 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/712-S/2024/36), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that there had been “34 Israeli attacks on Lebanese army posts”, including on 5 December, when “Israeli forces fired four shells directly at a Lebanese army post in the South, destroying the post, killing a Lebanese soldier and injuring three others”. On 5 December, the Israel Defense Forces stated that “IDF soldiers operated in self-defense to eliminate an imminent threat that had been identified from Lebanon. The threat was identified within a known launch area and observation point of the Hezbollah terrorist organization … The Lebanese Armed Forces were not the target of the strike. The IDF expresses regret over the incident”.

15. Several more Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were reportedly injured, including on 27 October, when a Lebanese Armed Forces convoy was hit during Israel Defense Forces shelling in the vicinity of Nabi Yusha’ (Sector East). Following
liaison and coordination by UNIFIL with the parties, the firing ceased and the convoy was able to move on. Separately, UNIFIL observed individuals using two Lebanese Armed Forces watchtowers located near the Blue Line to fire rockets into Israel on 16, 21 and 25 November.

16. On several occasions, individuals carried out attacks against Israel from the vicinity of UNIFIL positions, drawing return fire by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL protested these actions endangering peacekeepers and UNIFIL premises in letters to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces, and initiated patrols around UNIFIL positions to prevent hostile activity.

17. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL recorded 1,816 violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces, totalling 5,859 hours in overflight time. This represented a nearly nine-fold increase compared with the similar period for 2022/23. Uncrewed aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 73 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 25 per cent and unidentified aircraft and helicopters less than 2 per cent. The number of detected air strikes increased considerably from early November. The highest number of air violations, 38, was detected on 15 November. UNIFIL protested air violations to the Israel Defense Forces. On several occasions, Hizbullah reportedly targeted Israeli uncrewed aerial vehicles with surface-to-air missiles.

18. UNIFIL observed one ground violation on 30 November in the vicinity of Wadi Khancha (Sector East), where eight civilians with two vehicles crossed south of the Blue Line to harvest olives.

19. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence despite the daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line. The Mission undertook an average of 14,133 operational activities each month, including 6,046 vehicular patrols, a slight decrease compared with the previous reporting period. A minimum of one woman peacekeeper was involved in 12.3 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities. UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, conducted an average of 2,052 Blue Line vehicle patrols and 605 counter-rocket-launching patrols, and maintained eight permanent checkpoints each month, including on the main northern entry routes into the area of operations. Foot patrols, market walks, temporary checkpoints and air operations remained suspended, except for a limited resumption of foot patrols in areas sufficiently distant from the Blue Line.
20. There was an increase in the number of UNIFIL freedom of movement incidents, although most were relatively minor (see annex I).* The Lebanese Armed Forces helped to resolve several such incidents through dialogue and travelling with the affected patrols from the areas in question.

21. UNIFIL observed that at least 38 locations of interest, including Green without Borders infrastructure, had been damaged or destroyed since 8 October (see S/2023/879, para. 6). On 15 January, 18 rocket trajectories were detected from the vicinity of the unauthorized firing range in Frun (Sector East) (see S/2023/184, para. 14). As conveyed by the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 20 November, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated, “We have stressed that the unlawful construction of military outposts along the Blue Line by Hezbollah Radwan command forces, under the guise of ‘Green without Borders’ [non-governmental organization] … is designed precisely to enable infiltration into Israel of such forces in order to perpetrate the same kind of horrific terror attacks committed by Hamas and other terror groups from Gaza on October 7th”.

22. UNIFIL initiated 15 technical investigations related to incidents of cross-Blue Line fire in the reporting period, concluding 7 of them. The Mission initiated 19 internal investigations related to projectiles landing in or near UNIFIL positions, attacks on UNIFIL personnel and restrictions of freedom of movement. Eighteen of these investigations were concluded.

23. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

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* Circulated in the language of submission only.
24. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL observed on 43 occasions other unauthorized weapons in its area of operations, including anti-tank guns, a cannon, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, a vehicle-mounted rocket-launcher and, on 36 occasions, hunting weapons. Seven weapon caches, which included rocket-launching platforms, were discovered by UNIFIL, or by UNIFIL in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces disposed of all the weapons they found.

25. From 21 October to 20 February, the average percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, among the activities that could be conducted in close coordination, was 18.2 per cent, compared with 18.7 per cent for the previous reporting period (see S/2023/879, para. 29).

26. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process, focused on support to the Lebanese Armed Forces model regiment and the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy (see annex III). As at 20 February, the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed the deployment of 110 personnel, including 5 officers and 13 women, to its model regiment headquarters in Sribbin (Sector West), a 10 per cent increase since the previous reporting period (see S/2023/879, para. 29). UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted 151 joint training exercises.

27. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,031 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces cleared all 370 vessels referred to it for inspection by UNIFIL. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force also conducted maritime assessment operations, with 34 hours of helicopter flight time. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy continued to gradually assume command functions for maritime interdiction operations, including hailing and tracking duties, with support from the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. UNIFIL conducted 96 training activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy, including at the Jounieh Naval School.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

28. UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanisms continued to be used to mitigate miscalculation and prevent further escalation. At a tactical level, UNIFIL facilitated or coordinated 366 events in support of civilian and humanitarian activities in areas close to the Blue Line, including to facilitate agricultural harvests, funerals, repair of civilian electricity and communications infrastructure, and movement of civilians, including journalists. The Mission supported 18 rescue and body recovery operations by the Lebanese Red Cross as well as 24 Lebanese civil defence operations, including to extinguish bushfires. UNIFIL liaised with the Israel Defense Forces 166 times with respect to the safety and security of the Lebanese Armed Forces as well as to facilitate Lebanese Armed Forces patrols, escorts and explosive ordnance disposal. On 521 occasions, UNIFIL liaised with the parties in connection with UNIFIL force protection and the safety and security of UNIFIL positions and operational activities, including convoys, patrols, technical investigations and medical evacuations.

29. UNIFIL streamlined its guidance with respect to protection of civilians with the humanitarian country team in Lebanon. Lebanese civilians sought shelter at UNIFIL positions on 25 and 29 October, 8 November and 7 January.

30. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv remains pending, notwithstanding the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for such office.

** Circulated in the language of submission only.
UNIFIL decreased its liaison personnel presence south of the Blue Line from four to three persons in December, owing to operational restrictions.

31. No tripartite meetings were held in the reporting period. UNIFIL had proposed that a meeting be held in December, but no response was received from the parties. UNIFIL remains ready to convene a meeting upon request of the parties.

32. Of the 11 quick-impact projects approved by the Mission since 1 January, 9 were in support of post-8 October crisis response efforts, including projects to equip Lebanese civil defence, government hospitals and the Lebanese Red Cross, to address the psychosocial needs of the displaced and for pre-hospitalization training for nurses of Amel Association.

33. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming for 4,921 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, of whom 452 were women, and by supporting the National Commission for Lebanese Women in the implementation of the Lebanese national action plan on resolution 1325 (2000) as well as the gender unit of the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 9 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces Commander approved the gender mainstreaming strategy of the Forces.

C. Disarming armed groups

34. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Since 8 October 2023, Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups have repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities in strikes from southern Lebanon into Israel (see para. 3). Anti-tank guided missiles, artillery, offensive drones, mortars, rockets and surface-to-air missiles have been used in such strikes. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) continues to restrict the State’s ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

35. In his first public speech since 8 October, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated on 3 November, “We entered the battle since 8 October … These operations are an expression of our solidarity with Gaza, its people and its resistance”. On 11 November, Secretary-General Nasrallah stated, “For the first time, we used the offensive drones … as well as … the Burkan [volcano]” rockets against Israel Defense Forces installations. On 26 January, Hizbullah announced the use for the first time of a surface-to-surface Falaq-1 missile against an Israel Defense Forces position. On 4 February, Hizbullah published statistics on its operations since 8 October, claiming 961 strikes against Israel, including 730 strikes on 64 Israel Defense Forces positions and 72 strikes on 22 villages. On 16 February, Nasrallah stated, “the resistance in Lebanon has the precise and great missile and rocket capability that can extend from Qiryat Shmona to Eilat”.

36. Following a meeting in Lebanon on 25 October between Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, and the deputy head of the Political Bureau of Hamas movement, Saleh Al-Arouri, Hizbullah issued a statement that they “discussed what actions should be taken by the resistance axis parties in this sensitive stage to achieve a real victory for the resistance in Gaza and Palestine”.

37. On 2 January, Al-Arouri and two other leaders of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades were killed in an air strike in the southern suburbs of Beirut. In identical letters dated 4 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/708-S/2024/24), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon
to the United Nations stated that “On 2 January 2024 at 1740 hours, Israel carried out
an airstrike, firing six missiles at a residential building in the Madi neighbourhood in
the southern suburbs of Beirut … Two Lebanese and five Palestinians were killed.”
He added, “It constitutes the first escalation of its kind since 2006, inasmuch as this
time it affected a densely populated residential area in the southern suburbs of the
capital of Lebanon, Beirut, in a blatant violation by Israel of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Lebanon and the safety of its citizens and civilian air traffic.”
In an interview on 2 January, Mark Regev, a senior advisor to Prime Minister
Netanyahu, stated, “whoever did it, it must be clear: that this was not an attack on the
Lebanese State … Whoever did this did a surgical strike against the Hamas leadership.”

38. In December, the Hamas movement in Lebanon issued a call in the Palestine
refugee camps to join “Al-Aqsa flood vanguards”, drawing criticism from Lebanese
political leaders. Separately, there is continued presence of armed actors in and
around four of the eight United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools in Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp
(see S/2023/879, para. 45). The security situation in the Palestine refugee camps
remained largely calm during the reporting period, however.

39. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

40. During three counter-terrorism operations between 21 October and 20 February,
Lebanese security forces arrested seven individuals on terrorism-related charges.

41. Numerous personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in nine fatalities,
including of one woman, and at least 51 injuries, mostly in northern Lebanon.

D. Arms embargo and border control

42. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain
of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of
resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex II).*** While it takes allegations of arms transfers
seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

43. On 11 November, Nasrallah stated, “If the resistance in Lebanon or in Palestine
or other resistance movements are strong, this is primarily due to the material, military
and financial support, in addition to political and moral support, from Iran.”

44. In identical letters dated 13 November to the President of the Security Council
and to me (S/2023/867), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations
stated that “These organizations [Hizbullah and other terrorist groups] continue
unabated to strengthen their military presence and capabilities and amass new and
sophisticated weapons with the direct aid, support and guidance of Iran … the Shiite
Iran-backed militia ‘Imam Hussein’, originally deployed in Syria, has been transferred
to south Lebanon in order to support Hezbollah’s campaign against Israel.” In a letter
dated 4 December addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/950),
the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
“categorically reject[ed] the baseless allegations and unwarranted references made
against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the identical letters dated 13 November 2023
from the representative of the Israeli regime”.

45. Reports of Hizbullah’s military engagement in the Syrian Arab Republic
continued.

*** Circulated in the language of submission only.
46. During the reporting period, Lebanese State security forces arrested 38 individuals in at least 22 counter-narcotics operations.

47. Lebanese State security forces apprehended 921 individuals, including 600 Syrian nationals who on 8 November were pushed back at the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and 7 alleged smugglers, to combat the smuggling of people.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

48. The exchanges of fire created new areas of unexploded ordnance contamination, posing a threat to civilians on both sides of the Blue Line and to United Nations and humanitarian personnel. Demining activities by both Lebanese authorities and UNIFIL remain suspended since October. However, UNIFIL deminers conducted 21 activities in which they dealt with fresh instances of explosive ordnance or remnants in UNIFIL positions or along patrol routes, and disposed of two pieces of ordnance.

49. The Mine Action Service of the United Nations provided technical support to humanitarian partners to integrate mine action activities into emergency preparedness and response plans. It also conducted six explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions for 107 military personnel, 12 of whom were women. There was one in-country familiarization training and accreditation package for the new rotation of the military demining contingent, including 12 training support events and 4 accreditation events.

F. Delineation of borders

50. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab’a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab’a Farms area proposed in the report of the Secretary-General of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641, annex).

G. Political and institutional stability

51. The exchanges of fire across the Blue Line between Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces dominated national attention throughout the reporting period. On 1 November, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Mikati, stated, “Enough of wars in Lebanon; we are in favour of peace. The decision for war today lies with Israel.” In identical letters dated 5 December to the Security Council and to me (A/78/688-S/2023/966), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “The repeated threats made by Israeli officials to launch a pre-emptive war against Lebanon and return it to the Stone Age, the ongoing violation by Israel of resolution 1701 (2006) and the sovereignty of Lebanon, and the failure of Israel since 1948 to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions are acts of provocation that fuel the conflict and undermine efforts to establish security and stability.”

52. The caretaker Cabinet of Lebanon approved on 29 November the principle of compensation for those affected financially and materially by the situation in south Lebanon. Hizbullah separately announced that it would compensate residents of south Lebanon directly affected by the clashes with Israel. The caretaker Cabinet, with support from the humanitarian country team, developed an emergency cross-sectoral plan for Lebanon in the event of a conflict triggering a complex emergency.
53. Complementary to the Government-led response, the United Nations and non-governmental partners have responded to the needs of over 88,000 displaced civilians, as well as over 60,000 people who have remained in southern Lebanon. Extensive infrastructural damage, including to civilian infrastructure, residential houses and agricultural lands, has been incurred. Humanitarian access to areas within 15 km of the Blue Line has been restricted due to insecurity.

54. Parliament did not convene to elect a new president and Lebanon remained without an executive authority.

55. Parliament convened, however, on 14–15 December to enact several laws, including legislation to postpone the retirement age of incumbent heads of state security agencies of the rank of general and major general by one year. Consequently, the term of the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, whose term was due to end in January 2024, was extended. After a year-long boycott of legislative sessions, opposition parties, including the Lebanese Forces, the Kata’ib and independent and emerging groups, provided quorum for the extraordinary session. Parliament also adopted legislation to establish a sovereign wealth fund to manage potential revenues from the offshore oil and gas reserves of Lebanon.

56. For the first time in two decades, Parliament adopted the 2024 State budget prior to the constitutional deadline of 31 January, following a session held from 24 to 26 January that was attended by most blocs, including from the opposition parties, independent and emerging groups and the Free Patriotic Movement.

57. The caretaker Prime Minister convened the caretaker Cabinet on seven occasions. The eight ministers affiliated with the Free Patriotic Movement continued to boycott those sessions. The caretaker Cabinet, on 1 November, adopted the National Social Protection Strategy, a milestone for social protection reform. On 8 February, the caretaker Cabinet appointed the new Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

58. Nearly two years since the signing of the staff-level agreement between the International Monetary Fund and Lebanon (see S/2022/556, para. 50), most prerequisite actions for a board-level agreement remain outstanding.

59. In December, the World Bank determined that the spillover effects of the war in Gaza had pushed Lebanon back into a recession, with expectations of economic contraction and decline in real gross domestic product growth of up to 0.9 per cent. According to the Central Administration of Statistics of Lebanon, the average inflation rate for 2023 was 222.42 per cent.

60. The judicial investigation into the Beirut port explosion remains stalled. On 15 January, in response to a lawsuit filed by the former Minister of Public Works, Youssef Fenianos, Judge Sabbouh Suleiman of the Court of Cassation suspended the arrest warrant issued for Fenianos in September 2021 by the lead investigative judge, Tarek Bitar. Representatives of the families of the victims of the Beirut port explosion filed a recusal lawsuit against Judge Suleiman on 23 January.

61. As at 20 February, the prosecution of 68 individuals in the case of the deadly 14 October 2021 Tayyunah clashes (see S/2021/953, para. 57) remains pending. Over three years since the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim (see S/2021/240, para. 46), there has been no progress in the investigation.

62. The National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Lebanon has yet to become fully operational pending the appointment of the outstanding commissioners and an allocation of adequate resources.

63. The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) launched the national-level women’s peacebuilding network in Lebanon, comprising 17 women peacebuilders, on 22 January. Meanwhile, the two-
track inclusive dialogue process between 25 senior women from traditional political parties and emerging groups continued. UN-Women published a Gender Alert focused on the impact of the conflict in south Lebanon on women and girls.

64. As at 31 January, 795,837 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 784,618 Syrian refugees and 11,219 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown. As indicated in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023, the Government estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

65. In 2023, there were 65 verified actual or attempted movements by sea from Lebanon, involving 3,921 passengers, the majority of whom were Syrian. Of these movements, 34 reached Cyprus, with 3 returned to Lebanon. UNHCR is aware of at least 19 deportation incidents involving 932 people related to attempted onward boat movements. UNHCR is also aware of 13,772 individuals deported from Lebanon or pushed back at the border with the Syrian Arab Republic in approximately 300 incidents in 2023 (see para. 47).

66. Following a State visit to Damascus on 23 October, the caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Abdallah Bou Habib, and his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, issued a joint statement noting “the importance of joint cooperation to ensure the dignified return of displaced Syrians to their homeland, and the need for the international community, the United Nations … to shoulder their responsibilities in helping to achieve this goal”.

67. Meanwhile, local authorities in 27 municipalities took measures limiting the ability of Syrian refugees displaced in south Lebanon from finding alternative shelter. To manage any potential further displacement of Palestine refugees, UNRWA began upgrading several schools in the Tyre and Sidon areas that could serve as designated emergency shelters, among other preparedness measures.

68. The United Nations estimated that, in 2023, approximately 3.9 million people in Lebanon, including 2.1 million Lebanese, 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 211,000 Palestine refugees and 81,499 migrants, were in need of humanitarian assistance. Since October, approximately 582,000 Lebanese citizens, 411,000 Syrian refugees and 56,000 Palestine refugees were estimated to be facing acute food insecurity. Funding shortfalls resulted in reduced cash assistance to Syrian refugees as well as to vulnerable Lebanese under the National Poverty Targeting Programme.

69. As at 31 December, overall international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at $1.81 billion, including $1.25 billion disbursed in 2023 and $565.8 million carried over from 2022. Donors reported $794.2 million in commitments for 2024 and beyond. The appeal for the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023 is 37 per cent funded at $1.33 billion of $3.59 billion requested, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting $939.4 million in funds received in 2023 and $397.7 million carried over from 2022. The Emergency Response Plan to provide life-saving humanitarian support to the most vulnerable Lebanese citizens, Palestine refugees and migrants affected by the economic crisis was 22 per cent funded, with $26.7 million received out of $200.2 million requested as at 31 December.

70. The mandate of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ended on 31 December 2023 with the completion of its non-judicial residual functions and liquidation.
III. Security and safety measures

71. The designated officials north and south of the Litani River continued to closely coordinate to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel in Lebanon. On 31 October, the temporary relocation of non-programme critical international and national United Nations personnel from south of the Litani River to Beirut was approved. Flexible working arrangements for civilian personnel were implemented. On 1 December, UNIFIL issued a travel advisory prescribing, when necessary, the use of personal protective equipment, armoured vehicles or military escort for United Nations civilian personnel when travelling within the UNIFIL area of operations.

72. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL registered 64 instances of impacts on United Nations positions near the Blue Line as well as on Mission headquarters. Two peacekeepers were injured. On 12 November, a peacekeeper was seriously injured after multiple gunshots were fired towards a UNIFIL position near Qawzah (Sector West). On 28 October, a peacekeeper sustained a minor injury from the impact of a projectile inside a UNIFIL position near Hula. On 12 and 13 November and 7 December, UNIFIL positions were directly hit, including by white phosphorous ammunition. On 27 January, a UNIFIL position near Marwahin incurred extensive damage following air strikes in the vicinity. A UNIFIL patrol vehicle sustained minor damage following Israel Defense Forces fire near Aytarun (Sector West) on 25 November. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently informed UNIFIL that this incident was unintentional.

73. UNIFIL continued to develop and adapt its security and safety measures, including military contingency plans and force protection measures. The overall threat level throughout the area of operations continued to be “yellow +” with three levels of force protection: normal activities (level 1); stay within United Nations positions (level 2); and shelter (level 3). The footprint of 15 UNIFIL positions close to the Blue Line was reduced by one third in January, with peacekeepers temporarily relocated to other positions while infrastructure reinforcement was conducted.

74. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL. The sole indictee detained with respect to the fatal attack against a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Mazra’at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 was released on bail on 14 November 2023 for medical reasons. He did not attend the trial hearing scheduled for 15 December; the hearing was postponed to 7 June 2024.

75. Hearings related to appeals against the verdict issued on 24 March 2021 in two cases of serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Sidon on 26 July 2011 and Burj al-Shamali on 9 December 2011 were held on 18 December 2023. The next hearings are scheduled for 21 May 2024.

76. The Military Cassation Court held hearings on 30 November 2023 regarding an attempted attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers in 2008 in Tyre. The next hearing is scheduled for 8 October 2024.

77. In the two cases of serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers perpetrated in Qasimiyah on 16 July 2007 and in Rumaylah on 27 May 2011, a hearing was held on 15 November 2023. The next hearing is scheduled for 10 July 2024.

78. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West). The Military Prosecutor has instructed the Lebanese Armed Forces to expand the investigations into the acts of aggression perpetrated against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022.
IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

79. As at 20 February, UNIFIL comprised 10,223 military personnel, including 815 women (8 per cent), from 49 troop-contributing countries, and 794 civilian staff (243 international and 551 national), including 253 women (32 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised five vessels and one helicopter, as well as 674 military personnel, including 48 women (7 per cent). In addition, 53 military observers, including 14 women (26 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of lieutenant colonel. The most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

80. As part of Action for Peacekeeping efforts to support effective performance and accountability, UNIFIL continued to collect data and follow up on the recommendations contained in its most recent Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System evaluation. Given the prevailing situation along the Blue Line, the Mission postponed its next performance assessment from January to April 2024.

81. UNIFIL conducted three evaluations of subordinate units, for logistics, training and operational preparedness, in implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and Security Council resolution 2436 (2018). No shortfalls were identified in the present reporting period.

82. UNIFIL continued the implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see S/2020/473), pursuant to Security Council resolution 2539 (2020).

83. UNIFIL enhanced efforts to address misinformation or disinformation, in line with the Mission’s strategic communications strategy. Through digital and traditional media channels, the Mission amplified its messages and corrected incorrect or misleading narratives. Through interviews in Beirut and Naqurah, UNIFIL underscored that the Mission remained fully operational and committed to the implementation of its mandate under resolution 1701 (2006), refuting allegations that it was withdrawing, and emphasized that contingency planning was standard, prudent practice.

V. Conduct and discipline

84. From 1 October through 31 January, UNIFIL recorded nine allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct. No allegation of sexual exploitation or abuse was reported in either the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon or UNIFIL. Both the Office and UNIFIL remain committed to strict adherence to the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. UNIFIL participated in the protection from sexual exploitation and abuse network crisis meetings, which were also attended by the United Nations and international and national non-governmental organizations, agreeing on steps to respond to allegations in the prevailing circumstances. Induction and targeted awareness training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 17 civilian and 5,179 military personnel of UNIFIL. Additionally, 26 civilian UNIFIL personnel received training on “United to respect”, including prevention of sexual harassment, while 56 civilian personnel of the Office and 8 contractors received training on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and on prohibited conduct.
VI. Observations

85. I am extremely concerned by the continued breaches of the cessation of hostilities across the Blue Line since 8 October. The repeated exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and other non-State armed groups in Lebanon and the Israel Defense Forces profoundly affect the civilian populations on both sides of the Blue Line and pose a grave threat to the stability of Lebanon, Israel and the region. I urge all parties to recommit to a restoration of the cessation of hostilities under the framework of resolution 1701 (2006) and avail of all diplomatic avenues to avoid further escalation. I also call upon all parties to refrain from bellicose rhetoric that further inflames tensions.

86. The current situation has highlighted the dangers that incomplete implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) poses to Lebanon, Israel and the stability of the region at large. A political process to address the root causes of the conflict and ensure long-term stability is long overdue. The parties must recommit to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) as a bulwark against conflict and implement the necessary confidence-building measures to ensure their enduring mutual security.

87. The escalating exchanges of fire along and, increasingly beyond, the Blue Line have been deadly and destructive, with civilian fatalities, damage to civilian infrastructure and the internal displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, on both sides. Residential buildings, agricultural lands and forested areas have been extensively damaged, including from contamination from explosive remnants. I renew my call for all parties to comply fully with international humanitarian law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack, and to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid for civilians in need, as well as movement of humanitarian workers. The protection of civilians must be ensured. Civilians, including children, journalists and medical workers, should never be targeted.

88. I urge the parties to fully utilize UNIFIL liaison and coordination mechanisms and avoid further escalation.

89. I am seriously concerned by the impacts on UNIFIL positions and injuries to peacekeepers. All parties are urged to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and to respect the inviolability of United Nations premises at all times.

90. The exchanges of fire underscore serious concerns regarding the possession of unauthorized weapons outside of the authority of the State in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line by Hezbollah and other non-State armed groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

91. I again call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. I repeat my call to address the outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of the national defence strategy. It remains important that earlier decisions of the National Dialogue are implemented, especially those pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

92. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty from Israel and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I also condemn any violation of the sovereignty of Israel from Lebanon.
93. The continued occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line represents a persistent violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease. I again urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

94. More than a year since the presidency was vacated and with the perpetuation of a caretaker Government with limited authority, having functioning State institutions in place to shepherd the country through crisis is more urgent than ever. I urge the political leaders of Lebanon to take resolute steps towards the election of a president to address pressing political, economic and security exigencies facing the country.

95. I welcome the efforts of the caretaker Government to finalize an emergency preparedness plan. I remain concerned, however, that the capacity of State institutions to provide basic public services continues to erode, compounding the humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people, in particular women and other at-risk groups. Lebanon urgently needs progress on reforms to stabilize the economy and catalyse its recovery. In this regard, I welcome the timely adoption of the 2024 State budget. I encourage the Lebanese authorities to make the necessary arrangements for municipal elections to take place in line with the May 2024 deadline.

96. I regret that there has been no progress made on the issue of the Shab‘a Farms in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my call upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab‘a Farms area as provided in the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641). Meanwhile, and without prejudice to the status of the Shab‘a Farms, all parties should fully respect the Blue Line there, as elsewhere, and act with maximum restraint.

97. The ability of UNIFIL to implement its mandate fully is more critical than ever. Restrictions of the freedom of movement of UNIFIL continue to be of great concern. I reiterate the need for the Government of Lebanon to address any such incidents, and the obligation of the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate access by UNIFIL to all locations of interest requested by the Mission.

98. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL, including those responsible for the killing of a peacekeeper and injuries to three others near Mazra‘at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022, must be held to account. The role of the host Government remains crucial in helping to prevent such incidents in the future, including by helping to dispel misinformation and disinformation regarding the Mission’s mandate.

99. I take note of the Parliament’s legislative action to avert a vacuum at the helm of the Lebanese Armed Forces. A strong and well-resourced Lebanese Armed Forces remains integral to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). I extend appreciation to the Member States whose support has helped sustain the Lebanese Armed Forces. The strengthened presence and capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River, as well as at sea, is an important confidence-building measure in line with resolution 1701 (2006), and I call upon all partners of the Lebanese Armed Forces to increase their support wherever possible. I also welcome efforts to strengthen coordination between UNIFIL and the Government of Lebanon. I note with concern that the Lebanese Armed Forces, which have not engaged in the exchange of fire across the Blue Line, have been impacted by the crossfire.

100. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration (2012), and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).
101. The role of UNRWA in providing stability in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon is more critical than ever. I am deeply concerned that the suspension of funding to UNRWA by some donors could have dire consequences for the Palestine refugees in Lebanon and in the region, as well as for the stability of the country and the region at large. I appeal to the international community to provide the Agency with the necessary resources to ensure continuity of essential services and support to all Palestine refugees in Lebanon, as elsewhere.

102. I appreciate the remarkable hospitality that the Lebanese people have extended to large numbers of refugees for decades. A robust, united and well-funded response to the rising needs of the refugees and their host communities remains vital, as does the consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement, to ensure that the protection space does not contract further.

103. I again call upon the Lebanese authorities to follow through on the conduct of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation into the port of Beirut explosion on 4 August 2020.

104. I express my condolences to all those affected by the breaches of the cessation of hostilities. I express my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I also encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in the Mission, who, together with their male peers, continue to demonstrate professionalism, dedication and courage while serving in these challenging conditions. I extend my appreciation to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, and the staff of her office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.
Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 October 2023 to 20 February 2023

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, were fully respected and unimpeded.

2. In the reporting period, UNIFIL continued its operations, despite the daily exchanges of fire across the Blue Line, which affected patrols and a number of UNIFIL positions close to the Blue Line as personnel sought shelter. Operations in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces also continued, where possible. In close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL increased counter-rocket launching patrols, including in the surroundings of UNIFIL positions, and Blue Line vehicle patrols, while foot patrols, market walks, temporary checkpoints and air operations remained suspended.

3. From 21 October to 20 February, UNIFIL conducted an average of 6,046 monthly vehicle patrols during the day and at night. Of these, an average of 2,052 vehicle patrols were conducted each month along the Blue Line. In addition, the mission conducted an average of 1,097 inspection activities, which included the conduct of permanent checkpoints and counter-rocket-launching patrols each month.

4. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission continued to experience restrictions, as detailed below. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces on incidents in which the Mission’s freedom of movement has been restricted. Follow-up with local civil authorities continued to be difficult owing to displacement of public officials and municipality staff.

Freedom of movement incidents

5. On 22 October, a youth threw a Molotov cocktail towards a UNIFIL vehicle patrol in the vicinity of a United Nations position east of Kibbat Silm (Sector West). There was no significant damage to the vehicle, as the fire self-extinguished.

6. On 28 October, two Observer Group Lebanon patrols faced incidents in Sector West. In the first incident, three men with a pickup truck on the road west of Jumaymah asked what the patrol was doing and asked it to leave the village. The patrol left the village and continued its itinerary. In the second incident, six men with scooters on the road south-east of Tayr Falsay asked a patrol to leave the area. The patrol left the village and continued its itinerary.

7. On 29 October, UNIFIL peacekeepers were stopped by 20 individuals in civilian clothes north-east of Juwayya (Sector West). The individuals behaved in a hostile manner while filming the patrol and denying access to the road. After a discussion with the group, the patrol passed without further incident.

8. On 1 November, eight individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Tiri (Sector West) and told peacekeepers that they were not allowed to proceed without the Lebanese Armed Forces. Upon arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the peacekeepers returned to a United Nations position and then resumed the patrol.

9. On 9 November, around 70 individuals blocked the road with a car in front of a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Ramadiyah (Sector West). The patrol stopped, and the individuals threw stones at the UNIFIL vehicles and tried to open their doors. One
of the individuals also tried to hit a peacekeeper. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and escorted the patrol out of the area. UNIFIL protested the incident with the mayor of Ramadiyah.

10. On 10 November, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was stopped by a group of around 20 individuals north-east of Haris (Sector West). The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and escorted the UNIFIL patrol out of the area.

11. On 10 November, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by around 60 individuals south of Bazuriyah (Sector West). The patrol returned to a United Nations position north-east of Burj Qalawiyah. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

12. On 21 November, around 20 individuals in civilian clothes, one of them carrying a weapon, stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Qantarah (Sector East) and demanded a UNIFIL soldier to hand over a mobile phone to them. Following discussions between the peacekeepers and the individuals, the patrol resumed its planned activities. The phone, however, was not returned. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. UNIFIL have engaged with several mayors in the area to prevent a reoccurrence of such incidents.

13. On 24 November, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was stopped by three individuals in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector West). One of them left the area on a motorbike, while another tried to forcibly open the door of a UNIFIL vehicle. The individual on the motorbike returned and talked to the other individuals, and the UNIFIL patrol was able to continue its movement.

14. On 24 November, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was stopped by an individual in civilian clothes in the vicinity of Arab al-Luwayzah (Sector East). He asked the patrol not to use the road and to leave the area. The UNIFIL patrol left the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

15. On 25 November, a UNIFIL vehicle was fired at by the Israeli Defense Forces in the vicinity of Aytarun (Sector West). The shots hit the left front side tyre and window. No injury was reported. UNIFIL filed a formal letter of protest with the Israel Defense Forces.

16. On 28 November, three individuals in civilian clothes threw a stone towards the gunner of a UNIFIL vehicle in the vicinity of a United Nations position south-west of Kfar Kila (Sector East), hitting his helmet. No injury was reported, and the patrol continued its activities. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

17. On 29 November, a group of seven individuals in civilian clothes blocked the passage of a UNIFIL patrol accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Mays al-Jabal (Sector East). The patrol withdrew after the Lebanese Armed Forces assessed that the road was not accessible, having noted a gathering of people in nearby Blida. The patrol resumed after half an hour, when the Lebanese Armed Forces agreed to accompany the peacekeepers, without further incident.

18. On 1 December, 15 individuals in civilian clothes with four vehicles stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Qantarah (Sector East). Upon arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the patrol resumed its movement and continued its planned activities.

19. On 3 December, a number of individuals in two vehicles stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Jumaymah (Sector West). The patrol turned back. UNIFIL followed up with the Lebanese Armed Forces and with the mayor of Jumaymah on the incident.

20. On 7 December, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was blocked in the vicinity of Ayt al-Jabal (Sector West) while conducting a joint activity with the Lebanese Armed Forces. Around 20 individuals in civilian clothing blocked the road with scooters in
the front and with a vehicle in the back. The patrol observed one individual with a weapon (assault rifle). After the Lebanese Armed Forces spoke with the group, the patrol left the area.

21. On 13 December, five individuals with three vehicles and a scooter stopped a UNIFIL vehicle patrol by blocking the road in the vicinity of Tiri (Sector West). The individuals requested that the patrol be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Briefly thereafter, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and the UNIFIL patrol continued with its scheduled itinerary.

22. On 20 December, 12 to 15 individuals with two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Ayta al-Jabal. Three individuals took videos and photos of the patrol (one of the individuals was observed to make a video call with a mobile phone). Briefly thereafter, Lebanese police arrived and the patrol returned to a point where it met the Lebanese Armed Forces.

23. On 23 December, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was blocked by an individual with a vehicle north-west of Balat (Sector East). The individual asked what the patrol was doing without the Lebanese Armed Forces, advised them not to come without the Lebanese Armed Forces again, and left. The patrol continued with its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

24. On 23 December, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by approximately 10 individuals with three vehicles south-east of Kunin (Sector East). Subsequently, the patrol turned around and left the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

25. On 27 December, in the vicinity of Taybah (Sector East), a UNIFIL patrol vehicle was pelted with stones and hit by unidentified individuals. The vehicle suffered damage to the right window, and one peacekeeper suffered a head injury. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed of both cases. UNIFIL contacted the mayor of Taybah to protest the incident. The mayor informed UNIFIL that the incident was under investigation.

26. On 28 December, an individual with a vehicle blocked a UNIFIL patrol north-west of Kfar Kila (Sector East). The individual blocked the road with his truck, disembarked and hit the first and the last patrol vehicles with a pipe wrench. The patrol then continued with its planned itinerary. No injury to UNIFIL personnel nor damage was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

27. On 28 December, in the vicinity of Burj al-Qibli (Sector West) an individual in civilian clothes threw a stone towards the UNIFIL patrol and ran away. The stone hit the patrol vehicle and caused scratches and a small hole on the bonnet. No injury to personnel was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

28. On 29 December, two peacekeepers were stopped shortly before midnight near Khirbet Basal outside of the UNIFIL area of operations and questioned by individuals who introduced themselves as Hizbullah members. Three mobile phones were taken from the peacekeepers. At 0100 hours on 30 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and assisted in bringing the peacekeepers back to their position. The seized items were later returned to UNIFIL with the assistance of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

29. On 31 December, a man threw a rock at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol in the vicinity of Kafra (Sector West). No injury to personnel was reported, but the rear window of the patrol’s vehicle was broken. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the mayor of Kafra were informed.

30. On 5 January, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped by an armed individual in the vicinity of Marun al-Ra’s (Sector West). The incident occurred when UNIFIL, in a joint patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces, were patrolling and the armed
individual, on a scooter, stopped and asked the patrol not to continue. The patrol later resumed its activity.

31. On 16 January, an individual in civilian clothes threw two stones at a UNIFIL vehicle in the vicinity of Hinniyah (Sector West). While there was no injury to UNIFIL personnel, the vehicle sustained minor damage to the front right window. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

32. On 18 January, two individuals with a motorcycle hit the left side mirror of a UNIFIL patrol vehicle with a baseball bat, in the vicinity of Kafra (Sector West). The patrol was able to continue with its planned itinerary. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

33. On 18 January, an individual in civilian clothes threw a stone towards a UNIFIL vehicle that was carrying out a patrol with the Lebanese Armed Forces in the vicinity of Qana (Sector West). There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel, but the vehicle’s windscreen was damaged. The patrol continued its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

34. On 18 January, an individual in civilian clothes threw a stone towards a UNIFIL vehicle that was returning to a United Nations position in the vicinity of Jibal al-Butm (Sector West). There was no injury to United Nations personnel, but the vehicle’s rear right window was damaged. The patrol continued with its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

35. On 22 January, an individual in civilian clothes threw a stone at an Observer Group Lebanon patrol in Bayyadah (Sector West). While there were no injuries to United Nations personnel, the vehicle’s rear right window was damaged. The patrol could continue its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

36. On 23 January, an individual threw a stone at a UNIFIL vehicle in the vicinity of Bayyadah (Sector West). The individual appears to be the same person responsible for the stone-throwing incident on 22 January. There was no injury to UNIFIL personnel but there was a small scratch on the rear left window of the UNIFIL vehicle. Subsequently, the patrol continued its planned itinerary. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

37. On 23 January, a car blocked the road on which an Observer Group Lebanon patrol was moving in the vicinity of Taybah (Sector East). On the other side of the roadblock, peacekeepers observed a large gathering of individuals, mostly males and in military-style attire. The peacekeepers were unable to determine whether the gathering was a ceremony or a funeral. The patrol looked for an alternative road but could not find one and decided to return to a nearby United Nations position.

38. On 3 February, a UNIFIL patrol encountered a roadblock in Kawkaba (Sector East). The patrol rerouted and continued with its planned itinerary. No injury or damage to UNIFIL personnel was reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed.

39. On 7 February, 10 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Hula (Sector East) and requested it to use an alternative road. A gathering of approximately 40 people was observed in the vicinity. The Lebanese Armed Forces reached the location and spoke with the individuals, following which the UNIFIL patrol continued its itinerary using the alternative road suggested by the individuals. The individuals were calm and not aggressive throughout the event.

40. On 8 February, 30 individuals in civilian clothes and with cars and motorcycles halted a three-vehicle UNIFIL convoy moving from a UNIFIL position in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East). The individuals seized 14 smartphones, two laptops, one GPS device, and four smart watches from the peacekeepers. After three hours, the
Lebanese Armed Forces reached the location and the UNIFIL convoy resumed its movement.

41. On 8 February, nine UNIFIL staff members in three UNIFIL vehicles were stopped by individuals who identified themselves as Hizbullah members in the vicinity of Nabatiyah, outside of the area of operations. The individuals forcefully searched the vehicles and seized official as well as personal items, including eight official mobile phones, two laptops and several personal mobile phones. The individuals refused to allow the UNIFIL personnel to leave the location, stating that they were not allowed to be in the area without the Lebanese Armed Forces present. Approximately one hour later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene and the UNIFIL convoy was able to move on. The seized items were later returned to UNIFIL with the assistance of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

42. On 15 February, a joint patrol of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces was stopped in the vicinity of Majdal Silm (Sector East). Ten individuals approached the Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle and stated that the road was not safe. Following discussion between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the individuals, the patrol diverted. Fifteen minutes later, the area was declared force protection level two and the patrol took shelter at the closest UNIFIL position.

43. On 19 February, a group of individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol with cars and motorbikes in the vicinity of Kunin (Sector West). The individuals climbed on the vehicles and tried, unsuccessfully, to seize weapons from the peacekeepers. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed and, upon reaching the location, de-escalated tensions. The UNIFIL patrol then resumed its itinerary.

**Number of denial of freedom of movement incidents (1 March 2023 to 20 February 2024)**

![Number of incidents](chart.png)

*Source: UNIFIL.*
Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

2. It is stipulated in paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types. During the reporting period, no new information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.

3. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution 1701 (2006) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
Annex III

**Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces**

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 2695 (2023), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution 2591 (2021), in which it urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and all state security institutions, which are the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection and naval capacity.

2. Further to paragraph 10 of resolution 2591 (2021), a ministerial-level international conference hosted by France and co-chaired with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon on 17 June 2021 focused attention on the impact of the economic crisis in Lebanon on the Lebanese Armed Forces. Participants unanimously agreed that support for the Lebanese Armed Forces reflected the international community’s interest in the unity, sovereignty and stability of Lebanon. A follow-up mechanism was subsequently put in place by the Office with the Lebanese Armed Forces to track, for transparency and accountability, the receipt of in-kind bilateral support.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2650 (2022) and in line with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, a livelihood support programme for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces, funded by the United States of America through a financial transfer and accountability mechanism managed by the United Nations Development Programme under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, was launched in the first quarter of 2023 with funding allocated for a six-month period. The sixth monthly disbursement to the Internal Security Forces was issued in September 2023, while the sixth monthly disbursement to the Lebanese Armed Forces was issued in November 2023. As an exception, a supplemental seventh disbursement to the Lebanese Armed Forces was made in January 2024.

4. Financial support from Qatar, which had been suspended pending the completion of the livelihood support programme, resumed in February 2024. As part of the $30 million donation from Qatar to cover fuel costs for the Lebanese Armed Forces, four shipments of fuel arrived in Lebanon in the fourth quarter of 2023. Between November 2023 and January 2024, France provided dozens of armoured vehicles and 18 tons of medical aid. In December, Canada announced the donation of $6.5 million worth of equipment. In January, Germany pledged $15 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In February, the United Nations Office for Project Services, with funding from Japan, launched a project valued at $1 million that will provide medical equipment and renewable energy solutions to strengthen the operational capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

5. In identical letters dated 9 January addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/78/712-S/2024/36), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that “The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)], so that there will be no weapons
without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1701 (2006)."

6. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.