



# Security Council

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 26 October 2021 to 18 February 2022

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report, issued on 16 November 2021 (S/2021/953), including on the provisions of resolution 2591 (2021). Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.

2. I witnessed the impact of the severe economic and financial crisis on the Lebanese people during my State visit to the country from 19 to 22 December 2021, where I met with a wide range of political, military, religious and civil society leaders, including women and young people. In addition to Beirut, I visited Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, and the south, where the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is deployed. In my meetings with political leaders, I urged them to adopt and implement reforms that responded to the demands of the Lebanese people for greater accountability and transparency, and I emphasized the need to start swiftly formal negotiations on an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). I reiterated the importance of free, fair and inclusive parliamentary elections, to be held in a timely manner in 2022, as an essential opportunity for the people to make their voices heard. In my meeting with the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, I emphasized the support of the United Nations for the Lebanese Armed Forces as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon and as a partner to UNIFIL. My visit to the Beirut port to commemorate the victims of the explosion of 4 August 2020 served as an important reminder of the need for an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation. Throughout the country, I saw increased humanitarian needs that required structural, sustainable and Lebanese-led solutions.

#### II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

##### A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

3. Tensions persisted along the Blue Line. UNIFIL also experienced an increase in incidents restricting its freedom of movement and observed the presence of unauthorized weapons south of the Litani River.



4. UNIFIL observed illumination rounds fired by the Israel Defense Forces that fell north of the Blue Line on five occasions, that is, close to Sarda (Sector East) on 29 October 2021, close to Aytarun (Sector West) on 3 February 2022 and close to Ghajar (Sector East) on 24 November and 21 December 2021 and on 9 February 2022.

5. Instances of weapon pointing across the Blue Line also continued, requiring UNIFIL to interpose between the parties on 1 November in Mays al-Jabal and on 2 and 3 November near Udaysah (both Sector East), in connection with engineering works by the Israel Defense Forces in the area. On 28 October 2021, UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces firing into the air close to Mays al-Jabal after a Lebanese tractor had crossed the Blue Line.

6. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of Lebanese sovereignty. During the reporting period, UNIFIL recorded 131 airspace violations, totalling 197 hours and 45 minutes in overflight time. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 80 per cent of the violations. The remaining airspace violations involved fighter aircraft or unidentified aircraft. On 17 February 2022, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they had shot down a drone that had crossed south of the Blue Line, close to Aytarun. On 18 February, they also informed UNIFIL that they had observed another drone crossing south of the Blue Line, for which Hizbullah publicly claimed responsibility. Media reports indicated that Israeli fighter aircraft had flown over Beirut at low altitude later that day. UNIFIL did not observe those incidents.

7. During the reporting period, UNIFIL recorded 298 ground violations by Lebanese civilians crossing south of the Blue Line, including 233 violations by shepherds and farmers, mainly in the Shab'a Farms area, 19 violations by civilians on their way to the Shu'ayb well, near Blida, and 45 violations by other individuals in civilian clothes. On 26 October 2021, three Israel Defense Forces soldiers crossed north of the Blue Line close to Kfar Shuba (Sector East) in connection with groundwork conducted south of the Blue Line. In identical letters dated 30 November 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/76/582-S/2021/993](#)), in response to the identical letters dated 9 July 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/644](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that the Israeli side claimed that all civilians anywhere near the Blue Line were terrorist operatives, thereby trying to create the impression that Lebanon was not in compliance with relevant international resolutions on the southern border, and that it was the opposite of the true situation.

8. On 27 October 2021, the Israel Defense Forces apprehended a 15-year-old Lebanese shepherd who had crossed south of the Blue Line close to Kfar Shuba (Sector East). The minor returned north of the Blue Line the same day, following the intervention of UNIFIL. After UNIFIL observed two individuals throwing a backpack over the Israeli technical fence in the vicinity of Ghajar (Sector East) on 20 December, the Israel Defense Forces informed the mission that they had prevented a smuggling attempt from Lebanon into Israel. On 31 December 2021 and 10 February 2022, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they had apprehended three Sudanese nationals who had crossed south of the Blue Line close to Hula (Sector East) and Rumaysh (Sector West), respectively.

9. The occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces continued. While the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the proposal made by UNIFIL in 2011 to facilitate the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

10. To help to keep the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent checkpoints and an average of 122 temporary checkpoints and conducted 298 counter-rocket-launching operations on average each month. UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in the area of operations on 309 occasions. All but the following three incidents involved hunting weapons. On 23 November 2021, UNIFIL observed one individual with a pistol and professional camera walking along the Israeli technical fence in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector West). On 6 December, UNIFIL peacekeepers observed a group of seven individuals, one of whom had a pistol, in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha‘b (Sector West). On 2 February 2022, UNIFIL observed two individuals each carrying a pistol and a knife close to the Blue Line in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha‘b. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of the incidents.

11. Pursuant to resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence throughout the area of operations, conducting on average 14,204 monthly military operational activities, including 5,962 vehicular, air or foot patrols. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas where ground patrols have limited access, including private property, land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines and wadis. Community engagement walks, which had been suspended because of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, resumed in December 2021.

12. Despite repeated requests, UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several locations of interest, including several Green without Borders sites. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission faced an increasing number of restrictions to its movements and an increasing level of aggressive behaviour and confrontation (see annex I). The most serious incident took place in Ramiyah, on 25 January 2022, with an altercation with individuals who had halted the patrol that resulted in the hospitalization of one peacekeeper. In Shaqra, on 22 December 2021, stones were thrown at UNIFIL vehicles, causing damage, while in Bint Jubayl, on 4 January 2022, the tires of two UNIFIL vehicles were slashed. On 13 January, 20 civilians, of whom 6 were armed with assault rifles, 4 with machetes and 1 with a metal rod, approached a UNIFIL patrol in Ayta al-Sha‘b and demanded that it leaves the area. UNIFIL also encountered a restriction of its movement outside its area of operations on 24 January, when a logistical convoy on its way to the Beirut airport was stopped by a group of individuals in civilian clothes, who self-identified as members of Hizbullah and forced the peacekeepers to hand over equipment. All items were subsequently returned to UNIFIL.

13. On 26 January 2022, the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, condemned any attack against United Nations peacekeepers, noting that an investigation into the attack on the UNIFIL patrol in the town of Ramiyah had been opened. The same day, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities, Bassam Mawlawi, informed local media that he had instructed the security agencies to open an investigation and called upon local authorities in the south to assist UNIFIL in its work, noting that such incidents violated the work of the peacekeepers of securing stability in the south and implementing Security Council resolutions. In identical letters dated 24 November 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2021/976](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the obstruction of UNIFIL movement in essence allowed Hizbullah to continue its military build-up in southern Lebanon unencumbered, threatening the safety and security of both Israelis and Lebanese civilians. He also stated that the recurring violent assaults against UNIFIL forces and their restriction of movement were not random or isolated episodes but deliberate attacks that were part of a broader strategy designed to limit the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping troops in the area.

14. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out interdiction operations throughout the maritime area of operations, hailing 2,021 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared 354 of the 365 vessels that UNIFIL had referred for inspection. The Lebanese Armed Forces cancelled nine inspection requests, owing to internal communication delays, while two requests remained pending.

15. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Navy continued preparatory steps for a partial transfer of Maritime Task Force responsibilities by conducting 447 training sessions and exercises and jointly practising common operational standards for commanding, monitoring and hailing activities. Twenty advanced maritime interdiction operation integration training sessions, increasing in duration from 72 to 96 hours, were held. The participation of Lebanese Navy vessels fluctuated, owing to resource constraints. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and the Lebanese Armed Forces also conducted 11 search and rescue exercises, including 4 with the Lebanese Air Force, and six helicopter deck landing exercises. The Maritime Task Force provided nine train-the-trainer courses at the Jounieh Naval School and participated in a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Maritime Crime Programme exercise with the Lebanese Navy and other governmental agencies on 1 and 2 December 2021.

16. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. In a meeting co-chaired with UNIFIL held on 14 December 2021, the Lebanese Armed Forces briefed international partners on the ongoing construction of the model regiment headquarters in Sribbin (Sector West) and ongoing bilateral projects in support of the Lebanese Navy. With the model regiment headquarters expected to be completed in early 2022, donors recommended the deployment of a first company to be drawn from existing Lebanese Armed Forces troops, with additional units to be deployed when resources allowed.

17. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), UNIFIL and the Government of Lebanon signed a memorandum of understanding on 10 December 2021 regarding the provision by UNIFIL of additional non-lethal support to the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain critical operational capacity in the framework of joint activities. The memorandum outlines a mechanism to ensure oversight of the end use of the assistance of and compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces. UNIFIL has provided 210,000 litres of diesel fuel, food items for 162,000 meals, medicines, medical equipment and personal protective equipment. The percentage of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces increased from 13.8 per cent of all operations that could be conducted in close coordination in July 2021 to an average of 15.3 per cent during the reporting period. This remains below the 22 per cent of operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces at the end of 2019, before the onset of the economic crisis.

## **B. Security and liaison arrangements**

18. UNIFIL convened tripartite meetings on 13 December 2021 and 11 February 2022, in a curtailed format and with fewer participants, owing to COVID-19-related restrictions. UNIFIL and the parties reiterated their shared commitment to stability and discussed measures to address sources of friction along the Blue Line, including the occupation of Ghajar by the Israel Defense Forces. The parties did not make any progress towards finding a common understanding regarding outstanding contentious points along the Blue Line.

19. Despite the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, the establishment of the office remains pending.

20. Through quick impact projects, donations and outreach initiatives, UNIFIL continued to assist local authorities, including to support the establishment of a regional training centre in the south for civil defence firefighters. Sixteen such projects assist municipalities with coping with the economic and financial crisis through the delivery to the local population of basic services, including water and sanitation, power and health care, as well as support for food production by local farmers. Over 15 per cent of the UNIFIL budget for quick impact projects was dedicated to projects directly benefiting women and girls.

21. Through civil-military cooperation initiatives by UNIFIL contingents, the mission supported alternative energy production in municipalities and donated computers, medical equipment and supplies to local clinics, schools and women's associations.

22. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, including through the training on gender mainstreaming of 3,863 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel. The mission also undertook three capacity-building interventions to help women to enhance their labour skills, improve the production of local goods and mitigate the impact of the economic crisis on the local population.

### C. Disarming armed groups

23. No progress was achieved with regard to the disarmament of armed groups. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintained military capabilities. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) continued to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

24. On 27 December 2021, in a televised address, the President of Lebanon called for a national dialogue on "expanded administrative and financial decentralization, a defence strategy to protect Lebanon and a financial and economic recovery plan, including the necessary reforms and the fair distribution of losses". While acknowledging the role of "the army, the people and the resistance", he underlined the State's primary responsibility in defending the nation and stated that only the State defined the defence strategy and ensured its implementation. After meeting with the President, the Member of Parliament and Head of the Hizbullah parliamentary bloc, Mohammad Raad, stated that the dialogue was more than necessary and called upon "our partners in the country to show reason and wisdom".

25. On 16 February 2022, in a televised speech, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, said that, "in cooperation with experts from Iran, we now have the ability to transform the thousands of missiles that we have into precision missiles" and that "for a long time we have started manufacturing drones".

26. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces made eight terrorism-related arrests during the reporting period, including those of suspected affiliates of Da'esh and Jabhat Fath al-Sham.

27. In eastern and northern Lebanon, multiple personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 24 fatalities and 93 injured people.

28. On 10 December 2021, a fire followed by explosions occurred in a building belonging to Hamas in the Burj Shemali camp for Palestine refugees, in southern Lebanon. One Hamas member was killed. At his funeral, the following day, three men were killed and several injured when armed elements opened fire. Lebanese authorities have opened investigations into the incidents.

29. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

#### **D. Arms embargo and border control**

30. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remained of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex II). While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

31. Reports of the military engagement of Hizbullah in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

32. On 26 November 2021, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah announced that Hizbullah had so far imported four shipments of fuel from the Islamic Republic of Iran and that, to avoid “embarrassing the State”, it had communicated with the Syrian authorities to facilitate the transfer of the fuel from Baniyas, in the Syrian Arab Republic, to Baalbek, in eastern Lebanon. He also noted that another shipment of diesel fuel was reserved in the Syrian Arab Republic and needed to be transported and that another shipment would be unloaded.

33. In the context of at least 28 operations to counter the smuggling of drugs, fuel, weapons and other goods, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested nine Lebanese citizens, 12 Syrians, one Egyptian and 16 individuals of unspecified nationality. On 8 and 29 December 2021, in Beirut, the Internal Security Forces and Customs, respectively, confiscated 13 million “captagon” pills allegedly destined for the Gulf region. On 25 January 2022, another cache was seized, allegedly destined for Africa. On 10 November 2021, in Hirmil, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested two Lebanese men for killing a soldier during a previous operation, confiscating drugs during their arrest. On 17 December, in Baalbek, Baalbek-Hirmil Governorate, a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier died from a bullet wound sustained during a previous operation.

34. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces conducted 17 operations to counter trafficking in persons, arresting 276 Syrians, mostly in the border town of Wadi Khalid, northern Lebanon, and six Lebanese citizens. On 26 October 2021, two traffickers died during an exchange of gunfire with the Lebanese Armed Forces in Muqaybilah in Wadi Khaled, Akkar Governorate. On 20 November, off the coast of Qalamun, northern Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces prevented 91 individuals, including Syrian and Palestine refugees, from departing Lebanon illegally by sea. On 18 November, also in the Qalamun area, the Internal Security Forces arrested 82 individuals on illegal immigration charges and one person on charges of trafficking in persons.

#### **E. Landmines and cluster bombs**

35. UNIFIL cleared 6,734 m<sup>2</sup> of land in its area of operations, finding and disposing of 1,202 anti-personnel mines. UNIFIL conducted 79 demining quality assurance and quality control monitoring visits, an accreditation event for a demining contingent and 12 risk awareness briefings to 160 UNIFIL military personnel and 31 civilian United Nations personnel.

#### **F. Delineation of borders**

36. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress either in

relation to the issue of the Shab‘a Farms area. Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab‘a Farms area proposed in the report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) issued on 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641, annex).

37. Since 4 May 2021, no further rounds of negotiations have been convened between Israel and Lebanon to delineate their maritime boundary.

38. In identical letters dated 23 November 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2021/969), the Permanent Representative of Israel submitted the rejection by Israel of the “claims raised in [the identical letters dated 18 September 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (A/76/351-S/2021/812) and 22 September 2021 (A/76/344-S/2021/820)]” regarding the maritime boundary negotiations between the two countries. He added that there was no doubt that the Karish reservoir was located in its entirety within the exclusive economic zone of Israel and that “efforts should be focused on the measures necessary ... to renew and advance the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon for the delimitation of their maritime boundary with the aim of reaching an agreed resolution, in a manner that would provide stability and economic benefit for both States”. In identical letters dated 23 December 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2021/1085), the Permanent Representative of Israel submitted the formal objection of his country to “any non-consensual Lebanese activity in Israeli maritime areas”. In response, in identical letters dated 28 January 2022 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/76/675-S/2022/84), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that Lebanon asserted that all the work referred to was being carried out “within its exclusive and non-negotiable economic zone” and called upon Israel to “refrain from engaging in any activity in the disputed areas”. She added that if indirect negotiations failed to produce a negotiated settlement, Lebanon reserved “its full right to submit any subsequent demands and review the limits of its exclusive economic zone”.

## **G. Political and institutional stability**

39. From 12 October 2021 to 23 January 2022, the Cabinet did not meet owing to the refusal of ministers from Hizbullah and the Amal Movement to attend, citing discontent over the handling of the Beirut port explosion investigation. On 24 January, the Cabinet resumed its meetings to review the State budget for 2022. The Cabinet endorsed the draft budget on 10 February; however, as at 18 February, it had not submitted it to Parliament. Meanwhile, Parliament convened an extraordinary session starting on 10 January and scheduled to end on 21 March 2022.

40. On 29 October 2021, Saudi Arabia, followed by Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, took diplomatic and economic measures against Lebanon over comments on Yemen by the then Minister of Information of Lebanon, George Kordahi. Mr. Kordahi stepped down on 3 December. On 23 January 2022, during a visit to Lebanon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmad Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Sabah, presented the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament with a 12-point proposal regarding relations between Lebanon and the Gulf countries. On 29 January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Abdallah Bouhabib, delivered an official response to his counterpart on the margins of a meeting of Arab ministers for foreign affairs held in Kuwait.

41. On 28 October 2021, Parliament endorsed several amendments to law No. 44 on the election of the members of Parliament of 17 June 2017 and set 27 March 2022 as the date for legislative elections. On 17 November, the Free Patriotic Movement

filed an appeal before the Constitutional Council; on 21 December, the Constitutional Council stated that it was unable to reach a decision on the appeal. On 27 and 29 December, respectively, the Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, and the President signed the decree setting 15 May 2022 as the parliamentary polling date. No date was set for municipal elections. Out-of-country voting was scheduled for 6 and 8 May. Between 1 October and 20 November 2021, a total of 225,114 people registered for out-of-country voting, compared with 82,965 in 2018. Candidate registration opened on 10 January 2022. As at 18 February, budgetary funding for elections had not yet been approved in full.

42. On 8 November 2021 and 15 February 2022, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities and the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, co-chaired the Elections Forum, which brought together national stakeholders, including from civil society, and the international community to discuss preparations for elections. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) and the United Nations country team continued to support national stakeholders on electoral processes, including voter and candidate registration, voter education, the procurement of electoral materials and women's political empowerment. While proposals for a women's quota were not adopted by Parliament, the United Nations continued to coordinate with Member States, political actors and civil society to call for the adoption of temporary special measures and support the adoption of quotas within political parties and political lists.

43. On 19 January 2022, the International Support Group for Lebanon issued a statement in Beirut in which it urged the adoption of "expeditious and effective government decisions to initiate the direly needed reforms" and of "measures, among which the swift adoption of a budget for 2022, that would enable an agreement with IMF to support a way out of the macroeconomic and fiscal crises". On 11 February, the Group noted in another statement that the elections were "first and foremost a right and expectation of the people of Lebanon and a sovereign responsibility which [was] incumbent on the authorities to deliver on" and it called upon the authorities to "promptly make available all the necessary resources and intensify technical and administrative preparations to ensure the timeliness and integrity of the electoral process".

44. The parallel market exchange rate reached a record low of 33,700 Lebanese pounds to the United States dollar on 11 January 2022, compared with the official peg of 1,500 pounds to the dollar. This drop followed the decision by the Central Bank to increase the withdrawal exchange rate of pre-crisis deposits in United States dollars at commercial banks from 3,900 to 8,000 Lebanese pounds on 9 December 2021. Following a dollar injection by the Central Bank through commercial banks, the Lebanese currency appreciated to 20,900 pounds to the dollar on 18 February.

45. In December 2021, the Deputy Prime Minister, Saade Chami, stated that the financial losses amounted to between \$68 billion and \$69 billion, while noting that the distribution of losses was still being studied. On 24 January 2022, the Lebanese authorities commenced initial technical discussions with IMF. On 11 February, IMF underlined the need for a comprehensive economic and financial reform programme, adding that more work was needed to translate the discussions into concrete policies.

46. On 29 December 2021, the law lifting bank secrecy for 12 months expired, with the forensic audit into the Central Bank yet to be completed.

47. In November 2021, judicial authorities in Liechtenstein and Luxembourg opened criminal investigations into the Governor of the Central Bank, Riad Salameh. On 5 February 2022, the authorities of France and Luxembourg were reported to have each requested financial information regarding the Governor in connection with the

ongoing investigations. The domestic investigation into the Governor meanwhile continued.

48. On 26 January 2022, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic signed an agreement under which Lebanon would, subject to financing, import 250 megawatts of electricity from Jordan through the Syrian Arab Republic. The energy crisis in Lebanon continued to jeopardize basic health and water services and caused widespread telecommunications outages, including across Beirut on 15 and 16 January.

49. Demonstrations and roadblocks continued throughout the country in protest against the deteriorating economic conditions, inflation, the currency depreciation and power shortages. On 13 December 2021, a man set himself on fire in protest in Bidnayil, Baalbek-Hirmil Governorate, and was hospitalized. On 16 December, in Baalbek, a man died after having set himself on fire in protest two days earlier. Inflammatory political rhetoric and anti-refugee sentiments were also exhibited in traditional and social media. On 13 January and 2 February 2022, transport sector unions blocked roads throughout the country.

50. The Central Administration of Statistics of Lebanon reported triple digit annual inflation rates for the eighteenth consecutive month in December 2021, with annual inflation reaching a record 224 per cent compared with December 2020. In a statement issued on 25 January 2022, the World Bank estimated that the gross domestic product of Lebanon had contracted by 10.5 per cent in 2021 and 58.1 per cent since 2019.<sup>1</sup> In the related report,<sup>2</sup> it expressed concern that key public and private actors continued to resist the recognition of those losses, thereby incurring unnecessary social pain.

51. In December 2021 and January 2022, 582,825 applications on behalf of 1.43 million household members were filed with the World Bank-financed Emergency Social Safety Net Project and the government ration card programme, funding for which remained unsecured. The verification of applications for the Project commenced in mid-February, with cash disbursement in dollars expected to begin in March.

52. On 12 November 2021, the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Olivier De Schutter, presented the preliminary findings of his visit to Lebanon, stating that “the dereliction of responsibility at top levels of political leadership was astonishing” and that he “was shocked by the disconnect between the political establishment and the reality of those in poverty on the ground”.

53. The Independent National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared in Lebanon and the National Human Rights Commission, including its Committee for the Prevention of Torture, remained inoperative in the absence of budget allocations.

54. During the reporting period, legal proceedings were initiated against two journalists, two comedians and a theatre director on charges related to criticism of public officials and institutions.

55. On 26 October 2021, the Government released the first progress report on the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy since its adoption in May 2020. On 24 January 2022, the Cabinet appointed the six commissioners of the National Anti-Corruption Institution. Funding, premises and internal and financial regulations remained to be finalized for the Commission to become operational.

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank, “Lebanon’s crisis: great denial in the deliberate depression”, 25 January 2022. Available at [www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/01/24/lebanon-s-crisis-great-denial-in-the-deliberate-depression](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/01/24/lebanon-s-crisis-great-denial-in-the-deliberate-depression).

<sup>2</sup> World Bank Group, *Lebanon Economic Monitor: the Great Denial*, 2021.

56. Political and legal challenges continued to delay the investigation into the Beirut port explosion. Following the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of lawsuits to remove the lead investigative judge filed by three members of parliament and one former minister summonsed for questioning, the investigation resumed on 8 December 2021 only to be suspended on 23 December for the fourth time, following the submission of lawsuits by the same four persons. On 13 January 2022, the Supreme Court of Lebanon lost its quorum with the retirement of one of its members and cannot consider the lawsuits until a replacement is appointed. With the start of the extraordinary session on 10 January, the three aforementioned parliamentarians regained parliamentary immunity.

57. On 24 October 2021, the Lebanese Armed Forces referred their investigation into the deadly clashes that had occurred in the Tayyunah suburb in Beirut on 14 October (see [S/2021/953](#), para. 57) to the Office of the Military Prosecutor. The Military Court pressed charges against 68 individuals, including for murder, attempted murder, instigation of sectarian strife, unauthorized possession of firearms and destruction of public and private property. The Military Court summoned the leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, to testify on 27 October, but he refused to appear.

58. As at 18 February 2022, there had still been no progress in the investigation into the killing of Lokman Slim on 4 February 2021.

59. At the annual meeting of the steering committee on the national action plan on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), on women and peace and security, on 16 December 2021, participants affirmed the need to increase women's participation in peacebuilding, economic relief and recovery, and protection issues. The United Nations continued to support women's mediation networks at the national and governorate levels and a dialogue process with women from traditional and emerging political parties.

60. As at 31 January, 853,503 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, comprising 839,788 Syrian refugees and 13,715 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. UNHCR verified the return of 1,367 Syrian refugees during the reporting period, down from 2,152 one year ago. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government since 2015, the actual number of Syrians in need of international protection in Lebanon is unknown. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

61. UNHCR is aware of 38 movements by sea from Lebanon, involving 1,570 individuals, mostly Syrian nationals, in 2021, with 11 boats having departed or attempted to depart in October and November. In addition to sea movements towards Cyprus, Greece and Italy, UNHCR received reports of individuals travelling by air to Belarus, Egypt and Libya before attempting to travel onward irregularly to western European countries. On 17 November, Lebanon imposed travel restrictions on flights to Belarus. The United Nations continued to engage with relevant authorities to ensure the protection and rescue of people in distress at sea and respect for the principle of non-refoulement. Deportations by Lebanese authorities of Syrians who had entered or re-entered Lebanon irregularly after 24 April 2019 continued, often without the application of legal procedural safeguards.

62. Palestine refugees in Lebanon, including those from Syrian Arab Republic, protested against the level of service provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA staff protested delays in salary payments at the end of 2021, which had been caused by the funding crisis of the Agency. UNRWA also reported increased instances of theft in its schools and vandalism of its facilities.

63. As of December 2021, under the 12-month emergency response plan launched on 4 August 2021, the United Nations had provided life-saving humanitarian support to 300,000 of the most vulnerable Lebanese and migrants of the 1.1 million targeted. By 15 February 2022, the plan was 20.5 per cent funded, with \$78.4 million of the required \$383 million. With \$8.5 million in resources mobilized through the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund and the Central Emergency Response Fund, 7.7 million litres of fuel were provided from September to December 2021 to 1,176 health and water facilities, while humanitarian actors engaged in life-saving programmes. The countrywide multisectoral needs assessment of Lebanese people, migrants and Palestine refugees in Lebanon found that half of those surveyed had a poor food consumption score and that two thirds often had no food at all. Three quarters of the Lebanese nationals and migrants and two thirds of the Palestine refugees could not afford the cost of medical treatment. Approximately 14 per cent of Lebanese children, 4 per cent of Palestine refugee children and 1 per cent of migrant children dropped out of school during the 2020/21 school year, owing to the lack of Internet, electricity or equipment for online learning. Approximately two thirds of the Lebanese people and Palestine refugees and over one third of migrants struggled to afford basic needs. A considerable number of migrant workers, predominantly female, had lost their employment and had been unable to leave the country.

64. On 16 November 2021, the Consultative Group for the strategic framework for the Lebanon Reform Recovery and Reconstruction Framework noted the importance of advancing reforms and repeated its call for justice and accountability through a transparent, independent and credible investigation into the Beirut port explosion. The Group also reiterated the call for free and fair elections. As at 31 December, the recovery track of the strategic framework was 26 per cent funded, with \$111 million available of the required \$426.3 million, including \$107 million received in 2021 and \$3.3 million carried over from 2020. The Framework pooled fund, the Lebanon Financing Facility, managed by the World Bank, reported \$73.9 million of commitments and pledges by donors, with \$58 million paid as at 31 December 2021.

65. As at 31 December 2021, overall international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at some \$1.75 billion, comprising \$1.325 billion disbursed in 2021 and \$423.4 million carried over from 2020. Donors reported \$470 million in commitments for 2022 and beyond. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2021 was 56 per cent funded, at \$1.53 billion, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting \$1.18 billion in funds received in 2021 and \$344.8 million carried over from 2020.

66. As at 14 February 2022, Lebanon had recorded 1,016,487 cumulative cases of COVID-19 and 9,840 associated deaths. On 22 December 2021, the Higher Defence Council extended the state of general mobilization until 31 March 2022. Intensive care unit occupancy rates averaged 70 per cent from December 2021 to February 2022. As at 14 February 2022, a total of 2,617,585 individuals, including Syrian and Palestine refugees and migrant workers, had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.

67. At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the appeal proceedings of the prosecution against the acquittal of Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi in the main *Ayyash et al.* case continued.

### **III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

68. The COVID-19 countrywide business continuity plan of Lebanon continued to inform United Nations preparedness measures, in line with World Health Organization guidelines, including quarantine and remote working arrangements, as appropriate.

69. In accordance with the Action for Peacekeeping commitment to improving the safety and security of peacekeepers, UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk prevention and mitigation measures in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by all United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 21 missions to the Arqub area by members of the United Nations country team.

70. In accordance with resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#), UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. Hearings related to appeals submitted against the verdict issued on 24 March 2021 in two cases of serious attacks perpetrated against UNIFIL on 26 July and 9 December 2011 that had caused injuries to UNIFIL peacekeepers were held on 30 November 2021. The next hearings are scheduled for 21 April 2022. The Permanent Military Court held hearings on 30 November 2021 and 15 February 2022 regarding the attack perpetrated in 2007 against UNIFIL peacekeepers and the case of terrorist intent opened in January 2014. In the two cases of the serious attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers perpetrated in Qasmiyah on 16 July 2007 and in Rumaylah on 27 May 2011, a hearing was held on 15 February 2022. The next hearings are scheduled for 23 September 2022. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West), when armed individuals attacked a UNIFIL patrol, as described in the report issued on 15 November 2018 ([S/2018/1029](#)). The Military Prosecutor has instructed the Internal Security Forces to conduct preliminary investigations into the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January, as detailed in annex I.

#### **IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**

71. As at 18 February, UNIFIL comprised 10,422 military personnel, including 732 women (or 7 per cent), from 46 troop-contributing countries; 243 international civilian staff, including 94 women (or 38.6 per cent); and 554 national civilian staff, including 152 women (or 27.4 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised five vessels, one helicopter and 610 of the military personnel of the Force, including 29 women (or 4.7 per cent). In addition, 52 military observers, including 12 women (or 23.1 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization served with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women served at the rank of colonel, while the most senior civilian woman served at the D-2 level.

72. As part of the Action for Peacekeeping efforts by UNIFIL to support effective performance and accountability, UNIFIL implemented the quarterly Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System evaluation, confirming the effectiveness of mission operations.

73. In accordance with the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL finalized the assessment of 17 subordinate military units and the Maritime Task Force headquarters for logistics, training and operational preparedness on 31 December 2021. Shortfalls identified within six units relating to training and personnel are being addressed. In January 2022, UNIFIL initiated the assessment of 12 additional military units and three Maritime Task Force ships.

74. As detailed in paragraph 75 of the report issued on 16 November 2021 (S/2021/953), UNIFIL continued its consultations with the parties on aspects of the implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see S/2020/473), pursuant to resolution 2539 (2020). The Secretariat has also continued consultations with troop-contributing countries for the deployment of recommended capabilities for increased mobility. UNIFIL has initiated the process to deploy a second land-based radar with air surveillance capacity that will cover the eastern part of the area of operations.

## V. Conduct and discipline

75. No new allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse were recorded by UNIFIL or UNSCOL during the reporting period. Both missions remain committed to a strict adherence to the United Nations policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse. Both missions continued to implement activities related to prevention, enforcement and remedial actions regarding misconduct, as well as increased efforts targeted at sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual harassment and fraud or presumptive fraud. Considering the potential for the increased risk of commission of sexual harassment and domestic violence stemming from the implementation of COVID-19-related measures in the area of operations, both entities continued ongoing efforts to raise awareness among mission personnel. All newly deployed personnel were trained and all military commanders were briefed on their accountability regarding conduct and discipline matters.

## VI. Observations

76. Responsible, unified leadership and the efficient, uninterrupted functioning of the State legislative, executive and judicial institutions are crucial to overcome the immense challenges that Lebanon faces. The reactivation of the Cabinet, while positive, represents only a first step towards the implementation of the manifold reforms that the country needs. I remain gravely concerned about the continued economic decline and urge the political leadership to adopt without delay the State budget for 2022, as well as a comprehensive macroeconomic and financial stabilization strategy to facilitate formal negotiations and an agreement with IMF. As I stated during my visit, people expect their political leaders to listen to their needs and to restore the economy, including through a functioning Government and State institutions, and by fighting corruption effectively.

77. The announcement that parliamentary elections will be held on 15 May 2022, in line with the Constitution and legal deadlines, is welcome. I count on the Lebanese authorities to make available the necessary financial resources and continue technical and administrative preparations to ensure the integrity of the elections, including to enable the Supervisory Commission for Elections to carry out its mandate, and grant Lebanese voters at home and abroad their right to participate in the process. While efforts to adopt temporary special measures were again unsuccessful, I encourage all political stakeholders to include women candidates on their electoral lists and I call upon the authorities to prevent violence against women in politics. Political actors are also urged to commit to peaceful elections and freedom of expression, to work to calm tensions and to refrain from sectarian incitement and hate speech.

78. I am concerned by the continued incidents of weapon pointing across the Blue Line. Each of those incidents has the potential to lead to escalation with serious consequences. The Blue Line remains a potential flashpoint, and even a minor incident or instance of miscalculation by one of the parties may lead to a new

conflagration, with disastrous consequences for Israel and Lebanon, or the wider region.

79. The continued violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and drones, including allegedly to carry out strikes inside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as of low-flying aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, remain of deep concern. The overflights constitute violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and of Lebanese sovereignty and cause distress to the Lebanese population. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and call again upon the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line also represents a continuing violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and must cease.

80. The number of incidents affecting the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is increasing, as are related incidents of violence and seizure of peacekeepers' property, in violation of the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon. I condemn this negative trend. These incidents seem to be prompted by the erroneous perception that UNIFIL troops need to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces at all times. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its entire area of operations, including along the full length of the Blue Line, remains critical. The mission's ability to conduct patrols and activities independently must be maintained, in accordance with its mandate. I reiterate my call upon the Lebanese authorities to address any misinterpretation of the UNIFIL mandate, including by raising awareness among local communities of the mission's independent freedom of movement. I also reiterate my call upon the Government of Lebanon to investigate any restrictions of the movement of UNIFIL and to fulfil its obligations to ensure the safety of UNIFIL personnel and hold those who attack peacekeepers accountable. I also call upon the Lebanese authorities to enhance their cooperation with UNIFIL with regard to its technical investigations into security incidents, by ensuring access by UNIFIL to sites of interest.

81. I look forward to the outcome of the investigations by the Lebanese authorities into the incident of 10 December 2021 in Burj Shemali camp and the subsequent shootings on 11 December. I note that the incident of 13 January 2022 of aggressive behaviour against UNIFIL peacekeepers, in which weapons were used, demonstrates the continued presence of illegal weapons in southern Lebanon in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I reiterate my call upon the Lebanese authorities to address that issue.

82. The continued self-acknowledged maintenance of unauthorized weapons outside of State control by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups represents a persistent, grave violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1680 \(2006\)](#), in which the Council called for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. I note the call by the President of Lebanon for a national dialogue. While outstanding elements of the resolution and the issue of the national defence strategy are to be addressed through a national dialogue, it is important that earlier decisions stemming from the national dialogue also be implemented, specifically those relating to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

83. I urge the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces to continue to make full use of the liaison and coordination mechanisms of UNIFIL. The latest

incidents and related tension between the parties continue to illustrate the importance of those arrangements, including the tripartite forum.

84. I reiterate my call upon Israel and Lebanon to revive their engagement with the UNIFIL Blue Line marking process and find a mutual understanding with regard to the points that have not yet been marked. The marking process significantly benefits peace and stability along the Blue Line, as it provides clarity on the ground, prevents incidents and contributes to building confidence between the parties.

85. While the number of UNIFIL activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces has increased compared with the previous reporting period, it remains below the level of joint operations reached before the onset of the economic crisis. The ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to continue to perform operations in the south and work alongside UNIFIL remains critical, including for the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and for the ability of UNIFIL to carry out its mandated activities unhindered, which is the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities. Mindful that the measures pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2591 (2021) were temporary in nature, it is clear that the Lebanese Armed Forces require additional urgent support to increase their capacity to undertake joint operations with UNIFIL, as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006). Given those considerations, as well as the continued impact of the country's economic crisis on the security institutions of Lebanon and the risk that non-State armed groups could exploit any security vacuum, the extension of the UNIFIL temporary and special measures in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces could help to address those challenges.

86. I welcome the support that Member States have provided to date to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces. Recalling the call for emergency support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces made at the conference held in Paris on 17 June 2021, I encourage Member States to extend their support to all State security institutions, noting in particular that they will be called upon to provide security and stability during the forthcoming electoral period. In anticipation of the completion of the model regiment headquarters in the spring, I urge the Lebanese Armed Forces to ensure the swift deployment and training of model regiment troops. In line with the UNIFIL assessment report (S/2020/473), I call upon the parties to facilitate the efforts of UNIFIL to implement the recommendations contained in the report, including those related to the use of advanced technology for protective measures.

87. An impartial, thorough and transparent investigation into the Beirut port explosion of 4 August 2020 is imperative to achieve truth and justice for the victims. The still unresolved case of the murder of Mr. Slim, one year on, represents another example of the intolerable delays in serving justice. The independence of the judiciary must be respected.

88. I encourage Israel and Lebanon to resume talks regarding their maritime and land boundaries. The United Nations, through its representatives, remains ready to support that process as requested by the parties and within its capacity and mandate.

89. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration of 2012, and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese border with the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

90. The economic and financial crisis in Lebanon jeopardizes the ability of the State to provide essential services to the population, consolidate its authority across the Lebanese territory and deliver on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). It has also precipitated an increasingly worrying humanitarian situation. In addition to

tackling the root causes of the crisis and putting the country back on a sustainable development path, the need for critical, life-saving assistance to the most vulnerable cannot be ignored. I reiterate my call upon the international community to support Lebanon in the implementation of reforms to stabilize the economy, as well as in emergency response to the acute needs of the Lebanese people.

91. I commend Lebanon for its continued hospitality towards refugees, and I thank donors for their ongoing support. While the United Nations and partners continue to work towards creating the conditions for safe, dignified and voluntary returns, respect for the due process of law and enabling refugees to live in dignity remain indispensable. I urge the international community to mobilize more support for an integrated humanitarian and resilience response through the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan.

92. The dire situation of the Palestine refugees and the protests in the camps underline the urgent necessity to provide adequate and predictable funding to UNRWA. I urge the international community to step up their efforts to support the Agency so that it may continue to provide vital services to the Palestine refugee community.

93. I reiterate my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon, as well as my call upon them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. I extend my appreciation to the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the staff of her Office. I commend and thank the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General Stefano Del Col, upon the completion of his tour of duty, for his strong commitment to the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and his exemplary leadership of the mission in challenging circumstances. I welcome the incoming Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, and I thank the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL and the members of the United Nations country team.

## Annex I

### **Restriction on the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 26 October 2021 to 18 February 2022**

1. In its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council urged all parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations and access by UNIFIL to the Blue Line in all its parts are fully respected and unimpeded, and it called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate the prompt and full access by UNIFIL to sites requested by the mission for the purpose of swift investigations, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted an average of 5,962 monthly patrols during the day and night, of which 2,076 (47 per cent) were foot patrols. The mission conducted an average per month of 2,182 patrols along the Blue Line, both by vehicle and on foot (49.6 and 50.4 per cent, respectively). In addition, the mission conducted an average per month of 54 helicopter patrols, as well as an average of 908 inspection activities, including the operation of temporary and permanent checkpoints, and counter-rocket-launching operations. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, there was an increase in the number and severity of instances of restriction on that freedom, including by using or threatening violence against UNIFIL peacekeepers.
3. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes that were proposed by UNIFIL in order to expand its presence in areas outside main routes and municipal centres, on the grounds that they were either private roads or involved areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents with the appropriate authorities and continuously engages with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure freedom of movement and unrestricted access to all areas within its area of operations.

#### **Access to all locations along the Blue Line**

4. UNIFIL is yet to gain full access to several sites of interest, including a number of Green without Borders sites, despite repeated formal requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Access to those locations is required both in connection with investigations and as part of the mission's daily monitoring of the Blue Line, as mandated under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and recalled in resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#).

#### **Freedom of movement incidents**

5. On 9 November 2021, a UNIFIL patrol consisting of two vehicles encountered a civilian car in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West). After the patrol stopped, the car stopped between the two UNIFIL vehicles, blocking the road in front of one of them. UNIFIL personnel approached the driver and asked him whether his car had a mechanical problem. At that point, another individual arrived on a motorbike and stated that the road was private and that UNIFIL must be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces to drive there. After being contacted by UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and enabled the UNIFIL patrol to resume its movement.
6. On 9 November, a UNIFIL convoy, consisting of two vehicles, stopped after encountering a vehicle and a scooter being placed across the road in front of them in the vicinity of Kunin (Sector West). Shortly thereafter, a second civilian vehicle stopped behind the convoy and several civilians gathered around the UNIFIL

vehicles. After being contacted by UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and enabled the UNIFIL patrol to continue its movement. UNIFIL followed up on the incident with the mayor of Kunin, who stated that the patrol had deviated from the usual UNIFIL routes, which might have created suspicion among some local citizens.

7. On 20 November, a UNIFIL patrol close to Ayta al-Sha‘b (Sector West) was stopped by a vehicle being placed across the road. The UNIFIL patrol leader stepped out of the vehicle to talk to the individuals blocking the road. As the individuals appeared agitated, the patrol leader returned to the patrol vehicle. Shortly thereafter, two additional vehicles arrived at the scene and were also placed across the road. A group of approximately 15 individuals in civilian clothes also gathered at the site, shouting in Arabic and demanding that the patrol open the doors of the vehicle. To reduce tension, the patrol leader obliged, whereupon the individuals started searching the vehicles and asking for maps. During the event, five Motorola handheld radios and two jammers were taken from the patrol vehicles. About 30 minutes later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, whereafter the individuals left the location and UNIFIL resumed its movement. The seized items are still missing. There were no injuries to UNIFIL peacekeepers nor damage to the vehicle.

8. On 21 November, a UNIFIL patrol was conducting a patrol close to a Green without Borders site in Aytarun (Sector West), when two vehicles stopped in front of the patrol and seven individuals in military style attire got out of the vehicles. The UNIFIL patrol then took a secondary road going north towards Aytarun to leave the area and was pursued by the two civilian vehicles. As the UNIFIL patrol arrived in Aytarun, the civilian vehicles were no longer in pursuit and the patrol made its way back to its United Nations position.

9. On 11 December, a UNIFIL patrol consisting of three vehicles entered Kunin (Sector West) and was immediately followed by a sport utility vehicle driven by a man, while several young people on scooters were throwing stones at the patrol. As the patrol tried to leave the area, it entered a small road and was unable to continue its movement. At this point, the vehicle overtook the patrol and stopped in front of the patrol vehicles. A dozen individuals (six adults and six children) gathered at the location. The peacekeepers got out of their vehicles and tried to talk with the civilians, who threatened to burn the patrol vehicles unless UNIFIL would open the doors of the vehicles to let them look inside. The UNIFIL patrol leader refused to open the doors and contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and helped the patrol to leave the area and return to its position. On 13 December, the mayor of Kunin informed UNIFIL that, in his view, the incident might have been prompted by the UNIFIL patrol entering a narrow residential road. He also requested that UNIFIL avoid entering residential areas.

10. On 22 December, a UNIFIL patrol consisting of three soft-skinned vehicles stopped momentarily in Shaqra (Sector East). As the patrol resumed its movement, it was surrounded by approximately 10 vehicles and 50 civilians. Following a UNIFIL request for intervention, Lebanese Armed Forces personnel arrived at the location about 15 minutes later. Despite the Lebanese Armed Forces presence, the crowd increased to approximately 200 people, some of whom demanded that the patrol hand over their maps and Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. The patrol refused to do so. Several people in the crowd acted aggressively, including by hitting the peacekeepers and throwing stones at the patrol vehicles. Approximately 45 minutes after its arrival, the Lebanese Armed Forces managed to take control of the situation and the patrol was able to leave the area without any further incident. As a result of the incident, five UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained minor injuries and three UNIFIL vehicles were severely damaged. In a letter to the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL requested an urgent

investigation into the incident. The mission also followed up with the mayor of Shaqra on 7 January 2022, who said that the incident might have been due to the fact that the patrol belonged to a contingent that was not often present in Shaqra.

11. On 22 December, UNIFIL peacekeepers, while conducting a patrol in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector West) to monitor a planned Israel Defense Forces activity, was asked by four individuals in civilian clothes to leave the area immediately. The patrol moved to another location and resumed its planned activity. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of the incident.

12. On 23 December, a UNIFIL patrol was overtaken by a vehicle and followed by another vehicle in the vicinity of Batuliyah (Sector West), with the individuals in the vehicles making unfriendly gestures towards the patrol. When the patrol halted at the point where it was supposed to meet up with the Lebanese Armed Forces, the other two vehicles stopped, and the passengers approached the patrol. After the peacekeepers explained to the civilians that they were waiting for the Lebanese Armed Forces to conduct a market walk in the village, they ceased their unfriendly behaviour. Following the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the civilians left the location, and the patrol successfully conducted the market walk in Batuliyah.

13. On 1 January 2022, in the vicinity of Suwwanan (Sector East), a group of 21 individuals in civilian clothes with four vehicles stopped a UNIFIL patrol of three vehicles that was on its way to meet the Lebanese Armed Forces to conduct a patrol in close coordination with them. The group first placed a garbage can on the road in front of the patrol, whereafter it positioned the four vehicles across the road. The group remained calm while asking the patrol not to move without the Lebanese Armed Forces. After the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, the UNIFIL patrol resumed its movement. There were no injuries to personnel nor damage to UNIFIL property. While this incident was not violent, it occurred against the backdrop of the erroneous perception among some local residents that UNIFIL must be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces for all patrols. Following the incident, the mayor of Suwwanan said that the incident could have been caused by the patrol deviating from its intended route.

14. On 4 January, a UNIFIL patrol in two vehicles, on its way to link up with the Lebanese Armed Forces to conduct a joint patrol, was stopped and surrounded by about 30 people with seven cars and a scooter in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl (Sector West). The individuals asked the peacekeepers for the reason of their presence in the village and demanded that they surrender some of their equipment. Following the peacekeepers' refusal to comply with their demand, the individuals slashed the tires of the vehicles, broke several vehicle windows and the patrol flags, and contaminated the fuel tank of one of the patrol cars with water. They seized three pieces of body armour, three helmets, three gas masks, three rifle magazines and medical equipment from a patrol car boot. At the request of UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location and engaged with the civilians to deescalate the situation. Thereafter, the civilians left the area. The peacekeepers and their vehicles were transported to a United Nations position. No injury to UNIFIL personnel was reported. After the incident, some local media published reports misrepresenting the actions of the peacekeepers, including incorrectly alleging that the peacekeepers had been taking photos or entering private property. The mission subsequently released a media statement to refute those misleading media reports.

15. On 13 January, UNIFIL peacekeepers establishing a temporary observation post consisting of soft-skinned vehicles in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West) were approached by seven individuals in civilian clothes in three vehicles, who told the peacekeepers to leave the area. After the peacekeepers refused to comply, the civilians shouted insults and made threatening gestures. The peacekeepers subsequently

withdrew and then returned with an armoured personnel carrier. Soon thereafter, approximately 20 individuals in civilian attire, armed with six assault rifles, four machetes and metal rods, arrived in four vehicles. The individuals threw stones at the armoured personnel carriers while shouting at the peacekeepers to leave the area and Ayta al-Sha‘b. The peacekeepers subsequently departed from the area. There was no injury to the peacekeepers, nor damage to the UNIFIL vehicles. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed of the incident. UNIFIL also contacted the mayor of Ayta al-Sha‘b to protest against the incident. The mayor informed UNIFIL that the locals had prevented UNIFIL from gaining access to an area where Green without Borders were conducting a reforestation campaign.

16. On 23 January, 11 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol by placing several vehicles without number plates across the road in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector West). The individuals demanded that the patrol hand over their mobile phones and one of them tried unsuccessfully to grab the patrol leader’s handheld radio. Following this, the peacekeepers engaged the civilians in a conversation and convinced them to unblock the road, which allowed them to continue their movement as planned. However, prior to the peacekeepers’ departure, one of the individuals told them not to return to the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces was informed of the incident.

17. On 25 January, 11 civilians with five vehicles stopped a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Ramiyah (Sector East) and requested the patrol to wait at the location until the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Immediately thereafter, UNIFIL requested Lebanese Armed Forces assistance and dispatched UNIFIL reinforcements, which linked up with the Lebanese Armed Forces on the way to the incident site. Meanwhile, the number of individuals increased to around 30 people, some of whom became agitated. Despite the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the situation continued to deteriorate and led to an altercation, resulting in injuries to one of the peacekeepers, who had to be evacuated to a UNIFIL level 1 hospital in Naqurah. The civilians also broke several windows of two UNIFIL vehicles and seized equipment, including radios, jammers, a GPS receiver and a personal mobile phone. Only following the arrival of another Lebanese Armed Forces unit did the assailants stand down. The Lebanese Armed Forces then escorted the peacekeepers from the area.

18. On 6 February, a civilian vehicle stopped in front of a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of Suwwanan (Sector East) blocking the road in front of the patrol. When the patrol tried to reverse, three additional vehicles stopped behind the patrol. Subsequently, a crowd consisting of approximately 30 individuals gathered around the patrol. An individual, who introduced himself as the mayor of Suwwanan, approached the peacekeepers and informed them that the roads of the village were too narrow for the patrol vehicles. Following this, the civilians allowed the patrol to reverse and leave the area. The peacekeepers continued their patrol using an alternative route, bypassing the village. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces, which arrived at the village after the departure of the peacekeepers.

19. On 13 February, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol stopped in the vicinity of Tiri (Sector West) for observations. Shortly thereafter, a vehicle with two individuals in civilian clothes stopped near the patrol and asked the peacekeepers why they were at the location and told them that they were not allowed to be there. To avoid escalation, the patrol left the area. The civilian vehicle followed the patrol. Eventually, the patrol arrived at a UNIFIL position. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of the incident.

## Annex II

### Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), according to which all States must take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. No response was received during the reporting period to my letter dated 22 October 2019 addressed to the President of Lebanon, in which I reiterated my request that the Government of Lebanon share with the Secretariat any pertinent information or developments related to the arms embargo. In a letter dated 15 February 2022 addressed to the Permanent Representative of Lebanon, the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reiterated that request.

3. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) stipulates that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related material of all types. During the reporting period, no new information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.

4. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).