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Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 19 June 2021 to 25 October 2021

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report, dated 13 July 2021 (S/2021/650), including on the provisions of resolution 2591 (2021). Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. Heightened tensions persisted in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in particular along the Blue Line.

3. On 20 July, UNIFIL detected two rockets launched from north-west of Qulay‘ah (Sector West) towards Israel, followed by seven 155 millimetre (mm) artillery rounds fired from south of the Blue Line towards an area north-east of Naqurah (Sector West). Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces confirmed to UNIFIL that two rockets had been launched from Lebanon, one of which had been intercepted by the Iron Dome air defence system, while the second fell in an open area inside Israel, and that the Israel Defense Forces responded with artillery fire towards Lebanon. Later the same day, UNIFIL, with the Lebanese Armed Forces, visited the suspected launch site north-west of Qulay‘ah, where the Lebanese Armed Forces showed UNIFIL one intact rocket.

4. On 4 August, UNIFIL detected two rockets launched from Jarmaq (north of the UNIFIL area of operations) towards Israel. Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces confirmed to UNIFIL that three rockets had been fired from Lebanon, with two of them impacting close to the Qiryat Shemona shopping centre in Israel, and that the Israel Defense Forces responded with artillery fire towards several areas in Lebanon. UNIFIL observed approximately 80 artillery shells impacting close to Sarda, Khiyam, Shab‘a (all Sector East) and Naqurah, including the Wadi Hamul area.



5. Early on 5 August, UNIFIL personnel in Marjayoun (Sector East) heard two explosions. Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces confirmed to UNIFIL that it had conducted air strikes targeting three areas in South Lebanon in the vicinity of the Palestine refugee camp of Rashidiye, south of Tyre (Sector West), Ibil al-Saqi (Sector East) and Mahmudiyah (outside the UNIFIL area of operations). The following day, the Lebanese Armed Forces escorted UNIFIL to the impact sites close to Rashidiye and Ibil al-Saqi, where UNIFIL observed the impact craters.

6. On 6 August, UNIFIL detected rockets fired from Hasbaya (north of the UNIFIL area of operations) towards the Israeli-occupied Golan. Shortly thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that 19 rockets had been fired from Lebanon towards Israel, of which 10 were intercepted by the Iron Dome, 6 fell in open areas in Israel and 3 fell in Lebanon, and that the Israel Defense Forces had responded with artillery fire towards several areas in Lebanon. UNIFIL detected approximately 55 artillery shells fired from south of the Blue Line, impacting close to Kfar Shuba and Bastrah (Sector East), causing a bushfire. UNIFIL detected Israeli fighter aircraft in Lebanese airspace around that time. As the shelling was ongoing, Hizbullah issued a statement claiming responsibility for the rocket fire, stating, “in response to the Israeli airstrikes against open Lebanese lands in Jarmaq and Shawakir on 5 August,” “the Islamic Resistance bombed open areas in Israeli-occupied territories surrounding the Israeli occupied military sites in the Shab‘a Farms area, using dozens of 122 mm missiles”. Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that four individuals, who they alleged were members of Hizbullah, had been arrested in Hasbaya and that the Lebanese Armed Forces had found a multi-barrel rocket launcher used during the incident. Later the same day, Hizbullah issued a second statement affirming that “the resistance fighters had been intercepted by a number of citizens”. The Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces subsequently informed the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon that the four suspects had been released pending trial, following a decision by the Lebanese State General Prosecutor.

7. In identical letters dated 6 August addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2021/710), the Permanent Representative of Israel asserted that “Israel holds the Government of Lebanon responsible for any action originating from within its territory, regardless of the affiliation of the individuals or the terrorist group that carried out the attacks”. The letter further stated that “it is clear that Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations are trying to distract from their active role in bringing Lebanon to its current state of crisis by attacking Israeli civilians”. In identical letters dated 6 August addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (A/75/988-S/2021/711) regarding the Israel Defense Forces’ artillery fire on 4 August and airstrikes on 5 August, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed her Government’s condemnation of “hostile acts and clear violations of Lebanese sovereignty and of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)”. In a letter dated 12 August addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2021/725), the Permanent Representative of Israel expressed “extreme concern regarding the manner in which Lebanese authorities handled the attacks”, “particularly the immediate release by the Government of Lebanon of the four Hezbollah terrorists who perpetrated the rocket attacks”.

8. Throughout these incidents, UNIFIL was in continuous contact with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces to clarify the situation, facilitate a coordinated operational response and prevent further escalation. The parties worked closely with UNIFIL to contain the situation. UNIFIL has launched technical investigations into the incidents of 20 July and those of 4, 5 and 6 August. In a statement on 8 August, I expressed “deep concern about the recent escalation between Lebanon and Israel across the Blue Line, including rocket fire into Israel and return air strikes and artillery fire into Lebanon”.

9. During the reporting period, UNIFIL continued to observe illumination rounds fired by the Israel Defense Forces in response to what the latter asserted were suspicious activities. On seven occasions, illumination rounds impacted north of the Blue Line close to Yarun, Marun al-Ra's and Majidiye (all Sector West) and Sarda, and, on three occasions, close to Ghajar (Sector East). On 10 July, the Israel Defense Forces reported on social media that it had thwarted the "largest smuggling attempt in the last few years" in the area of Ghajar, during which it had seized 43 handguns. Weapon pointing across the Blue Line also continued, requiring UNIFIL to interpose between the parties on 21 July in Mays al-Jabal and on 21 June and 13 August in Udaysah (Sector East). On 13 September and 24 October, UNIFIL observed an Israel Defense Forces soldier throwing a flash grenade towards civilians approaching the Blue Line in the vicinity of Hula (Sector East). UNIFIL also observed the Israel Defense Forces firing in the air close to Hula, Blida and Mays al-Jabal (all Sector East), seemingly to deter civilians from approaching the Blue Line.

10. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. From 19 June to 25 October, UNIFIL recorded 286 airspace violations, totalling 377 hours and 39 minutes in overflight time. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 75 per cent of the violations. The remaining airspace violations involved fighter aircraft or unidentified aircraft. In two separate instances, on 16 July and 30 September, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that one of its unmanned aerial vehicles had crashed in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces repeatedly denied UNIFIL requests to access the suspected crash site from 30 September. The 16 July crash site remains undetermined. On 12 August, the Israel Defence Forces informed UNIFIL that it had shot down a drone, which it claimed belonged to Hizbullah, close to Shetula, in Israel, on 11 August. UNIFIL is following up with the parties regarding the three incidents.

11. From 19 June to 25 October, UNIFIL recorded 318 ground violations by Lebanese civilians crossing south of the Blue Line, including 237 violations by shepherds and farmers, mainly in the Shab'a Farms area, and 45 violations by civilians on their way to the Shu'ayb well near Blida. On 23 July, UNIFIL observed five individuals equipped with night vision equipment crossing south of the Blue Line near Marun al-Ra's, climbing over the Israeli technical fence, then returning north of the Blue Line minutes later. UNIFIL also recorded Israel Defense Forces soldiers crossing north of the Blue Line close to Kfar Shuba (Sector East) on 16 September while chasing livestock that had crossed south of the Blue Line. From 9 October, following a request by the Lebanese Armed Forces and in coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, UNIFIL deployed to Blida and, for the first time, to Mays al-Jabal and Aytarun (Sector West) to facilitate the temporary crossing of the Blue Line of Lebanese farmers for harvest purposes. On 11 October, UNIFIL observed seven unarmed Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers crossing the Blue Line in connection with the olive harvest in Blida.

12. On 22 July, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it had apprehended two Turkish citizens who had crossed south of the Blue Line in the vicinity of Yarun. On 17 September, the International Committee of the Red Cross, in coordination with UNIFIL, facilitated the return of a Lebanese individual who had crossed into Israel the previous day. On 23 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that it had prevented two Sudanese citizens from crossing south of the Blue Line close to Marun al-Ra's. On 1 October, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it had apprehended a Lebanese shepherd who had crossed south of the Blue Line close to Kfar Shuba. The shepherd was returned to Lebanon later that day in coordination with UNIFIL.

13. The occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces continued. While the Government of Lebanon has

welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

14. To assist keeping the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 8 permanent and an average of 122 temporary checkpoints and conducted 325 counter-rocket-launching operations on average each month. UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in the area of operations on 264 occasions. All but the following four incidents involved hunting weapons. On 24 June, a UNIFIL patrol in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces observed two individuals on a road in Siddiqin (Sector West), one of whom carried an assault rifle. On 14 July, UNIFIL observed two individuals on a scooter in the vicinity of Kafr Kila (Sector East), one of whom fired two shots from a pistol towards the Blue Line. On 22 July, UNIFIL observed three individuals armed with assault rifles near the Blue Line in the vicinity of Marun al-Ra's. The individuals fired 54 shots in a southerly direction. In response, UNIFIL deployed a quick reaction team to the location; no further armed activity was observed. On 24 August, UNIFIL observed three individuals, each carrying an automatic rifle, in the vicinity of Burj Qallawiyah (Sector West). As one of the individuals left the area, the remaining two fired long bursts into the ground. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of each of the incidents.

15. Pursuant to resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence throughout the area of operations, conducting on average 14,345 monthly military operational activities, including 6,273 patrols. UNIFIL vehicular, foot and air patrols maintained an operational footprint in municipalities and villages in the area of operations. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas to which ground patrols have limited access, including private property and land contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines, and wadis. Community engagement walks remain suspended owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). UNIFIL conducted a monthly average of 160 trainings for land forces with the Lebanese Armed Forces. Due to Lebanese Armed Forces resource constraints, the number of UNIFIL operations conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces declined to an average of 14.7 per cent, compared with a 16 per cent average during the previous reporting period. UNIFIL consequently increased the number of its independent operational activities.

16. UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several locations of interest, including some Green without Borders sites. On 5 October, UNIFIL sent a letter to the Lebanese Armed Forces requesting access to a number of these sites. Meanwhile, UNIFIL has continued to monitor the perimeter of the locations of interest, including through air and foot patrols. UNIFIL observed works for the reconstruction of towers in the Green without Borders sites in Ramiyah and Ayta al-Sha'b (both Sector West) that had been destroyed by the Israel Defense Forces on 25 August 2020, as detailed in paragraph 3 of my report dated 12 November 2020 ([S/2020/1110](#)). While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the mission did encounter some restrictions to its movements (see annex I). The most serious such incidents occurred on 30 July in Bint Jubayl (Sector West), when several individuals seized weapons and ammunition from a UNIFIL patrol, and on 24 October, when a group of individuals damaged two UNIFIL vehicles in the vicinity of Kunin (Sector West) and took several items, while a peacekeeper sustained minor injuries. UNIFIL has requested the Lebanese Armed Forces to recover the items and bring the perpetrators to justice.

17. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out maritime interdiction operations throughout the maritime area of operations, hailing 2,502 vessels.

Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared all 335 such vessels that UNIFIL referred to them for inspection.

18. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Navy continued preparatory steps for a partial transfer of Maritime Task Force responsibilities, with UNIFIL conducting 537 training sessions and exercises. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Navy jointly practiced common operational standards for commanding, monitoring and hailing activities, including 21 advanced maritime interdiction operation integration trainings for a duration of at least 72 hours. The participation of Lebanese Navy ships fluctuated owing to resource constraints. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Navy also conducted 21 search and rescue exercises, in addition to nine exercises with Lebanese helicopter crews in deck-landing and winching procedures. In-person training at the Jounieh Naval School resumed fully at the beginning of July, respecting COVID-19 precautionary measures.

19. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. Construction works for the model regiment headquarters at Sribbin (Sector West), initiated in March (see [S/2021/650](#), para. 22), continued, with the Lebanese Armed Forces contributing 4,000 litres of diesel fuel to the construction company.

20. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), UNIFIL established a committee to discuss with the Lebanese Armed Forces its requirements in terms of fuel, food, medicine and logistical support for the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain critical operational capacity in the framework of joint activities with UNIFIL. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces are preparing an agreement providing for the modalities and scope of the support, and a monitoring mechanism to ensure strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy. UNIFIL will draw on the expertise of the United Nations country team to provide information sessions and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces. A centralized delivery system is in place, reflecting actual coordinated activities on a monthly basis, to ensure oversight and scrutiny of the end-use of the assistance. As of the drafting of the present report, UNIFIL had made a first delivery of medicines to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

21. UNIFIL convened tripartite meetings on 5 August and 7 October. Through this forum and regular contact with both parties during moments of heightened tensions, as mentioned above, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander urged maximum restraint on both sides and explored preventative measures, including steps to enhance coordinated responses to contain incidents and preserve or restore the cessation of hostilities.

22. Following the progress in the Blue Line marking process made in December 2020 and June 2021 (see [S/2021/650](#), para. 24), UNIFIL launched on 16 August the second campaign of the Blue Line barrels maintenance project. As at 25 October, 64 barrels had been refurbished.

23. Despite the agreement of Israel to the proposal in 2008 for a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, the establishment of the office remains pending.

24. UNIFIL, through quick-impact projects, donations and outreach initiatives, continued to assist local authorities, including through capacity-building for Civil Defense personnel. UNIFIL also launched five quick-impact projects promoting food production and access to clean water. Through civil-military cooperation initiatives, the mission distributed protective and medical equipment to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and enhanced capacities in alternative energy production and waste treatment.

25. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security, including through the training on gender mainstreaming of 2,336 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, including 129 women, during the reporting period.

C. Disarming armed groups

26. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains military capabilities. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) continues to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

27. On 7 August, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah stated, "since 2006, the resistance in Lebanon has grown in numbers, experience, quality, level of trainings, its armament capabilities, its missile capabilities to the point of owning large numbers of precision missiles that the enemy says transforms the threat into an existential threat". On 18 October, in the aftermath of the deadly clashes of 14 October in Beirut, he stated, "when I only talk about Hizbullah's military organization, only about trained, organized, armed and experienced Lebanese men, I am talking about 100,000 fighters".

28. The Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces made at least five terrorism-related arrests from 19 June to 25 October, including of suspected affiliates of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Jabhat al-Nusra).

29. In eastern and northern Lebanon, multiple personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 25 fatalities and 193 injuries. At least seven such disputes involved the use of rocket-propelled grenades.

30. Violent incidents were reported in Palestine refugee camps across Lebanon. In Beddawi camp, near Tripoli, north Lebanon, a Syrian woman and a 13-year-old Palestinian girl were killed on 3 and 17 July, respectively, following personal disputes which escalated into shootings. In Ein el Hilweh, near Sidon, south Lebanon, one person died on 27 August following armed clashes. On 19 September, seven people were injured, including two civilians outside the camp in Sidon, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools were damaged following fighting between Fatah and Jund al-Sham armed factions.

31. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

D. Arms embargo and border control

32. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (see annex II). While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

33. In a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 22 July ([S/2021/712](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed her Government's condemnation of "recent attacks and violations against Lebanon committed by Israel, as Syrian military sites were targeted from Lebanese territories and airspace, affecting Lebanese areas in Lehfed and Majdal and almost leading to loss of life". In identical letters to the President of the Security Council and to myself, dated 19 August

([A/75/1001-S/2021/743](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed that, on 19 August, “Israeli warplanes began carrying out low-altitude flights over Lebanon, in the course of which they blatantly fired missiles from within Lebanese airspace at positions in Syria. That violation caused panic among Lebanese civilians, and it posed a direct and serious threat to Lebanese civil traffic and the safety of civil aviation, because the Israeli aircraft violated airspace adjacent to Beirut airport and operated immediately next to the civil airway.”

34. Reports of Hizbullah’s military engagement in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

35. Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced, on 19 August, that the Islamic Republic of Iran would send at least four ships carrying diesel and gasoline to alleviate fuel and power shortages in Lebanon. On 13 September, he announced that “the fuel would be transferred from Baniyas”, in the Syrian Arab Republic, “to Lebanon through land borders”. On 16 September, media reported the arrival of the first convoy of trucks from the Syrian Arab Republic to Baalbek-Hirmil, Lebanon, through an unofficial border crossing. In a media interview on 17 September, Prime Minister Mikati stated in response to a question on the arrival of trucks carrying Iranian fuel into Lebanon facilitated by Hizbullah that he was “sad because that [demonstrated] a lack of sovereignty of Lebanon”.

36. During anti-smuggling operations along the Lebanese border with the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanese security forces arrested 75 Lebanese, 35 Syrians and five Palestinians. On 13 July, in Shadrah, north Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested three individuals for smuggling 10 Syrian nationals into Lebanon. On 15 July, near Tabarja, Mount Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces prevented the attempted outbound movement by sea of 40 Lebanese, 32 Syrians and one Turkish national.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

37. UNIFIL cleared 12,190 square metres of land in the UNIFIL area of operations, finding and disposing of 1,612 anti-personnel mines. The United Nations Mine Action Service conducted 70 quality assurance and quality control monitoring visits, three accreditation events for UNIFIL demining contingents and four risk awareness briefings to 19 UNIFIL military personnel.

F. Delineation of borders

38. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab’a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab’a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ([S/2007/641](#), annex).

39. No further rounds of negotiations were convened between Lebanon and Israel to delineate their maritime boundary since the fifth meeting, held on 4 May (see [S/2021/650](#), para. 41).

40. In identical letters to the President of the Security Council and to myself dated 18 September ([S/2021/812](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon stated that “Israel has awarded contracts to Halliburton corporation to provide appraisal services for the drilling of offshore gas and oil wells in the so-called Karish field, which is located in the area of the disputed maritime boundary”, noting that her Government

“calls upon the Security Council to ensure that the drilling appraisal work does not occur in the disputed area between Lebanon and Israel, in order to avoid any encroachment on the rights and sovereignty of Lebanon”. In identical letters to the President of the Security Council and to myself, dated 22 September (S/2021/820), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed that, “it is cause for concern that Israel may depart from the negotiation track by drilling in disputed areas without waiting for the outcome of negotiations, in clear violation of international norms”.

G. Political and institutional stability

41. On 15 July, nearly nine months since his designation as Prime Minister, Saad Hariri withdrew from the government formation process. President Aoun subsequently convened binding parliamentary consultations, resulting in the designation of former Prime Minister Najib Mikati on 26 July. Mr. Mikati received the support of 72 of the 118 Members of Parliament (10 of the 128 seats are vacant). On 10 September, President Aoun and Prime Minister Mikati signed the decree establishing a 24-member Government, including one woman.

42. On 20 September, Parliament voted 85 to 15, out of 100 present members, in favour of granting confidence to the new “Together for Rescue” Government. On 22 September, the International Support Group for Lebanon issued a statement urging “Lebanon’s leaders to move quickly to alleviate the burden of socioeconomic hardship on the people of Lebanon and restore basic services” and “to prepare for fair and transparent elections to take place on time in 2022”.

43. During the reporting period, Lebanon suffered worsening shortages of fuel and electricity. State-provided electricity was reduced to one to two hours per day, with nationwide blackouts on several occasions. With illicit market distortions as well as hoarding and smuggling of fuel, there were disruptions to essential services, including hospitals and water distribution facilities, and lengthy queues at fuel stations. Owing to insufficient foreign reserves, the Central Bank reduced subsidies on fuel on 11 August. Fuel prices were raised several times, as import subsidies were phased out completely by the end of September.

44. On 4 September, then-caretaker Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister and acting Foreign Minister Zeina Akar led a Lebanese delegation to Damascus to request Syrian assistance in transferring Egyptian gas and Jordanian electricity through Syrian territory. In follow-up, representatives of Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic met in Amman on 8 September and 6 October to agree on a framework and timeline.

45. Protests and roadblocks continued across Lebanon during the reporting period. On 26 June, five civilians and 10 Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were injured in clashes in Tripoli and Sidon. One person died and 25 were injured following clashes between armed protestors and the Lebanese Armed Forces on 16 July, in Jabal Muhsin, Tripoli. On 26 July, in Tripoli, a man fatally self-immolated.

46. Numerous altercations at fuel stations resulted in seven people killed and nearly 100 injured. From 27 to 29 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces intervened when a dispute at a fuel station escalated into clashes between residents of the Christian-majority village of Maghdushah and the neighbouring Shiite-majority village of Anqun in south Lebanon. On 15 August, near Akkar, north Lebanon, a reservoir containing around 60,000 litres of fuel exploded following an altercation between reservoir workers and local residents, killing 36 and injuring over 80 people. The Higher Defense Council subsequently directed security forces to monitor commercial fuel distribution.

47. On 4 August, France and the United Nations co-chaired a conference in support of the population of Lebanon, at which international donors pledged \$370 million to fund urgent food security, water and sanitation, and health and education needs. In the joint conclusions, conference participants stated that “structural economic and financial assistance will require profound changes expected from Lebanon’s leaders”.
48. In follow-up to the 17 June ministerial conference to mobilize emergency support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon co-chaired with the Lebanese Armed Forces a meeting on 21 September to take stock of contributions and call for increased and expedited assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces and other national security forces.
49. Following approval by Parliament on 30 June, the then-caretaker Government announced on 9 September the launch of a ration card to be made available to some 505,000 vulnerable Lebanese households from October. Implementation of the \$556 million programme remains pending, with programmatic, financing and operational details to be finalized.
50. On 23 August, the World Bank announced that an agreement had been reached with the Lebanese authorities to disburse cash transfers under the Emergency Social Safety Net in dollars. On 17 September, the Finance Ministry confirmed that Lebanon received \$1.139 billion from the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights allocation.
51. According to the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, multidimensional poverty in Lebanon has nearly doubled, from 42 per cent in 2019 to 82 per cent in 2021. The multifaceted socioeconomic crisis, exacerbated by the deepening fuel crisis, is having an adverse impact on all sectors, from health care, to education, to food security, to water and sanitation, with a particular impact on women and marginalized groups. Most hospitals are limiting admissions to life-threatening conditions, while severe shortages in medical supplies, equipment and medications persist. In July, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warned that up to 4 million people could lose access to water. According to the Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics, the consumer price index rose from 251.50 in September 2020 to 613.96 in September 2021 (144 per cent), with the cost of food and transportation quadrupling.
52. The parallel market exchange rate fluctuated significantly over the reporting period, reaching 22,000 Lebanese pounds to the dollar, following Mr. Hariri’s withdrawal from the government formation process on 15 July, and improving to around 14,000 pounds to the dollar following the formation of the Mikati Government. As at 25 October, the unofficial exchange rate was 20,500 Lebanese pounds to the dollar, while the official government rate remained at 1,507.
53. On 7 July, Parliament adopted the public procurement law. With the suspension of the banking secrecy law to expire in December (see [S/2021/240](#), para. 44), the Government of Lebanon signed a new contract with Alvarez and Marsal, on 17 September, for the forensic audit of the Central Bank.
54. The National Anti-Corruption Institution is still not operational, pending the appointment of its commissioners. The National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared in Lebanon and the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, remain inoperative, absent budget allocations. The reporting period was also marked by the ongoing strike of the Beirut Bar Association in protest at perceived interference in the work of the judiciary.
55. More than one year since the Beirut port explosion, the judicial investigation continues, notwithstanding demands from political actors and legal challenges from those called for questioning to have the lead investigative judge removed. The request

of Judge Bitar, submitted to Parliament on 2 July, to lift the immunity of members of Parliament and former ministers was not granted. Parliamentary immunity was subsequently lifted on 20 September, when Parliament granted confidence to the new Government, until the start of Parliament's regular session on 19 October. In September and October, three sitting parliamentarians – all also former ministers – and a fourth former minister filed motions demanding that the lead investigative judge be removed from the case after having been summonsed for questioning. Two of the motions were dismissed, with the other two pending a decision by the Court of Cassation. Judge Bitar has issued arrest warrants for two of the four individuals for failing to appear for questioning. The investigation was raised in a Cabinet session on 12 October, leading to an adjournment and suspension of Cabinet sessions since.

56. Several protests calling for accountability for the Beirut port explosion led to violent confrontations with security forces, including on 12 August, when two journalists were reported to have been beaten by members of the parliamentary police and unidentified men armed with batons.

57. On 14 October, Hizbullah, Amal and Marada Movement supporters protested Judge Bitar's handling of the Beirut port blast investigation, demanding his dismissal. During the march towards the Justice Palace in Beirut, unidentified gunmen opened fire on protesters in the Tayyunah area. Armed clashes, involving the use of automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades, subsequently erupted between the predominantly Shia protesters and affiliates of the majority-Christian adjacent neighbourhood of Ayn al-Rummanah. Seven individuals were killed and approximately 30 injured. The Lebanese Armed Forces, which deployed to prevent further escalation, arrested 19 persons and opened an investigation. President Aoun, Prime Minister Mikati, Hizbullah and Amal all subsequently called for calm, with the President rejecting the use of arms and urging respect for the rule of law and its institutions.

58. As at 25 October, there has still been no progress in the investigation into the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim.

59. In a statement following a meeting with the Special Coordinator on 22 September, President Aoun stressed that "the parliamentary elections will take place on time on May 8 [2022] in a democratic and transparent climate so that Lebanese voters at home and abroad can carry out their duty freely and responsibly." On 19 October, Parliament recommended 27 March as the date for the 2022 parliamentary elections. The United Nations, with the National Commission for Lebanese Women and civil society, continued to roll out a framework of support for aspiring women candidates and to advocate for a gender quota in Lebanon's electoral system. Separately, a national-level dialogue process between women in political parties, hosted by the United Nations, continued.

60. As at 30 September, 866,452 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 851,522 Syrian refugees and 14,930 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. The number of registered Syrian refugees continues to decrease owing to small numbers of returns to the Syrian Arab Republic, resettlement to third countries, deaths, and irregular and onward movements. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government since 2015, the actual number of Syrians in need of international protection in Lebanon is unknown. The Government of Lebanon estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

61. As at 30 September, UNHCR is aware of 27 movements by sea from Lebanon, involving 1,137 individuals, mostly Syrian nationals, in 2021, a significant increase over previous years. From June to August, Cypriot authorities increasingly returned the boats to Lebanon without allowing them ashore. The United Nations continues to

engage with the Cypriot and Lebanese authorities to ensure the protection and rescue of people in distress at sea and respect for the principle of non-refoulement. Meanwhile, deportations by Lebanese authorities of Syrians who entered or re-entered Lebanon irregularly after 24 April 2019 continue, often without the application of legal procedural safeguards.

62. With severe shortages of fuel and electricity in Palestine refugee camps, UNRWA worked to secure water supply and provide additional cash assistance. However, as needs outstripped the Agency's capacity, protests against the Agency continued, including physical attacks on its staff and installations. In Nahr el-Bared camp, near Tripoli, north Lebanon, on 19 September, UNRWA sustained serious damage to its offices and vehicles from a crowd demanding increased assistance.

63. As at 25 October, Lebanon had recorded 637,817 cumulative cases of COVID-19 and 8,453 associated deaths, while nearly 2 million individuals had been partially or fully vaccinated. On 29 September, the Higher Defense Council extended the state of general mobilization until the end of 2021. The intensive care unit occupancy rate increased from 9 per cent in June to 37 per cent in September.

64. The United Nations, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator and together with implementing partners, launched on 4 August an emergency response plan for 12 months in the amount of \$383 million to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to 1.1 million of the most vulnerable Lebanese and migrants. This complements existing humanitarian programmes for Palestine and Syrian refugees, as well as host communities. The Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon also announced a one-off \$6 million allocation from the Lebanon Humanitarian Fund to support critical medical facilities affected by fuel shortages. This complements a \$4 million allocation from the Central Emergency Response Fund in support of water services across Lebanon.

65. As at 30 September, available funding to the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework stands at \$32.8 million of the \$426.3 million required (7.7 per cent).

66. As at 30 September, assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at \$1.66 billion, including \$1.23 billion disbursed in 2021 and \$430 million carried over from 2020. Donors reported \$534 million in outstanding commitments for 2021 and \$382 million in commitments for 2022 and beyond. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2021 is 24 per cent funded, at \$645.5 million, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting \$287.8 million in funds received in 2021 and \$357.7 million carried over from 2020.

67. Owing to funding constraints, in 2021 the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will only be able to continue the prosecution's appeal proceedings against the acquittal of Mr. Merhi and Mr. Oneissi in the main *Ayyash et al.* case, while proceedings in the "connected cases" concerning the attacks against Mr. Hamade, Mr. Hawi and Mr. El-Murr remain stayed by order of Trial Chamber II. For 2022, the budget of \$8.3 million approved by the Tribunal's Management Committee will include funding for the completion of the appeal, drawdown activities and the commencement of the residual phase of the Special Tribunal once the appeal is completed.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

68. The COVID-19 country-wide business contingency plan of Lebanon continued to inform United Nations preparedness measures, in line with World Health Organization guidelines, including quarantine and remote working arrangements, as appropriate.

69. In accordance with the Action for Peacekeeping commitment to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers, UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk prevention and mitigation measures in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by all United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 24 missions to the Arqub area by members of the United Nations country team. UNIFIL also completed the upgrading and enhancing of protection infrastructure in 21 of its positions.

70. On 30 July, a UNIFIL peacekeeper was hospitalized with severe injuries sustained during a demining activity in Mays al-Jabal. UNIFIL evacuated the patient to Jordan for essential treatment on 18 August. The patient was repatriated on 23 September. On 20 July and 4 and 6 August, UNIFIL personnel were instructed to go to the bunkers following reports of incoming artillery fire, in the context of the incidents detailed in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the present report.

71. In accordance with resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#), UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. The United Nations has not been informed of any criminal proceedings to bring to justice the perpetrators of the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West), in which armed individuals attacked a UNIFIL patrol, as described in my report dated 15 November 2018 ([S/2018/1029](#)).

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

72. As at 25 October, UNIFIL comprised 10,351 military personnel, including 678 women (6.5 per cent), from 46 troop-contributing countries; 240 international civilian staff, including 91 women (37.92 per cent); and 555 national civilian staff, including 151 women (27.21 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised five vessels, one helicopter and 683 of the Force's military personnel, including 31 women (4.5 per cent). In addition, 52 military observers, including 6 women (11.5 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of Colonel; the most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

73. UNIFIL continued to collect verified data and produce analysis as part of the mission's Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System.

74. In accordance with the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL finalized the assessment of 19 subordinate military units and one ship for logistics, training and operational preparedness on 30 June. Shortfalls identified within four military units, related to logistics and information technology awareness, have been addressed. A second assessment of 14 additional military units and two ships was completed on 30 September, with minor shortcomings identified within three military units related to emergency stocks and engineering works. In October, the mission initiated the assessment of 17 additional military units and the Maritime Task Force headquarters.

75. UNIFIL continued consultations with the parties on aspects of the implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see [S/2020/473](#)), pursuant to resolution [2539 \(2020\)](#). By 1 July, the mission had implemented all staffing table adjustments in line with the approved mission budget for 2021/22.

V. Conduct and discipline

76. Neither UNIFIL nor the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon received any new allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse during the reporting period. Both missions continued to implement activities related to prevention, enforcement and remedial actions regarding misconduct, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual harassment and fraud, taking into account the increased risks of sexual harassment and domestic violence associated with the impact of the economic crisis, and continued to raise public awareness. All personnel were trained, and military commanders continued to receive briefings on their accountability in respect of conduct and discipline matters.

77. The United Nations country team, with international and national non-governmental organizations, supported the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse network of Lebanon through the development of inter-agency standard operating procedures, an information-sharing protocol on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, awareness-raising materials and technical guidance documents to strengthen prevention and response efforts, in addition to awareness-raising with frontline aid workers and promoting the integration of a prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse approach to the COVID-19 response.

VI. Observations

78. While the formation of the new Government is a welcome step, I urge the new Government to implement a tangible reform agenda that addresses the needs and aspirations of the Lebanese people and that includes the timely holding of legislative elections. The United Nations will work with the Government in that regard. The acute impact of the country's crisis on basic essential services, including health care, food, water and electricity, for a growing majority of the population is deeply concerning. I appeal to the Government to protect the country's most vulnerable, including women. Ensuring the full participation of women across all sectors of Government and in the forthcoming elections will be important.

79. The polarization of political views with respect to the Beirut port explosion investigation, as manifested in deadly clashes in Beirut on 14 October, is deeply concerning. The unauthorized use of weapons outside of State authority is to be condemned, as is political pressure on the judiciary. The country's political leaders are urged to enable the efficient functioning of the State's legislative, executive and judicial institutions without interference and with respect for the rule of law. I commend the contribution of the Lebanese Armed Forces in restoring calm and the critical role it plays in safeguarding the security and stability of Lebanon. I reiterate my calls for the conduct of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation into the devastating port explosion. The Government must also follow through on previously announced investigations into serious violations and abuses of human rights, including in relation to the killing of Lokman Slim.

80. Acknowledging assurances from Lebanese authorities that elections will be held on time in 2022, I underscore the need for the Government and Parliament to prioritize the necessary technical, administrative and legislative preparations. Clarity on the applicable electoral framework and specific measures, including quotas and other temporary special measures, to fast-track the participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities in the political process, are encouraged. I hope the upcoming elections will thus offer an opportunity to increase women's representation in the country's institutions, including in Parliament.

81. The rocket fire from Lebanon towards Israel and the response fire by the Israel Defense Forces represent serious violations of resolution 1701 (2006). I am particularly concerned about the airstrikes by the Israel Defense Forces and the subsequent use of a multi-barrel rocket launcher by Hizbullah. This marked escalation in offensive action poses significant risks to the cessation of hostilities and underlines the urgent need for addressing the outstanding provisions of resolution 1701 (2006). The possession of unauthorized weapons on these occasions are clear violations of resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my appeal to all parties to honour their commitments to fully implement resolution 1701 (2006), to cease these violations and to respect the cessation of hostilities.

82. The importance of the UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces was underlined with the restoration of the cessation of hostilities following the abovementioned incidents. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces are strongly encouraged to remain actively engaged with UNIFIL in this regard.

83. The continued violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft, including allegedly to carry out strikes inside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as of low-flying aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, remain of deep concern. The overflights constitute violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty and cause distress to the Lebanese population. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and call again on the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line equally represents a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease.

84. I urge both parties to do their utmost to prevent violations of the Blue Line, which must be respected in its entirety. It is essential that the parties avoid provocative actions and inflammatory rhetoric, exercise utmost restraint and refrain from hostile activity that could put at risk the cessation of hostilities.

85. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its entire area of operations, including along the full length of the Blue Line, remains critical. I reiterate my call on the Lebanese authorities to investigate the attacks against peacekeepers in Bar'ashit and Blida, on 10 February and 25 May 2020 respectively, and in Majdal Zun on 4 August 2018, as well as acts of harassment and intimidation of UNIFIL personnel. The seizure of weapons and other items from peacekeepers during standoffs with civilians obstructing UNIFIL patrols is also of concern. It is incumbent upon the Lebanese authorities to take appropriate measures to prevent all such incidents, help to recover items taken from peacekeepers and bring the perpetrators to justice. I urge Lebanese authorities to facilitate requests for medical evacuation of UNIFIL personnel to appropriate locations as determined by medical considerations in each case. I also call upon the Lebanese authorities to grant UNIFIL full and timely access to all locations north of the Blue Line as requested in connection with the mission's investigations, including with regard to the recent incidents of rocket fire from Lebanon and retaliatory actions by the Israel Defense Forces, and the tunnels crossing the Blue Line confirmed by UNIFIL in December 2018 and early 2019. I further call upon the Lebanese authorities to ensure full and timely access by UNIFIL for its daily monitoring of the Blue Line, as mandated by resolution 1701 (2006) and recalled in resolution 2591 (2021).

86. I encourage Lebanon and Israel to resume talks regarding their maritime and land boundaries. The United Nations, through its representatives, remains ready to support that process as requested by the parties and within its capacity and mandate.

87. I strongly encourage the parties to engage with UNIFIL to make full use of the tripartite mechanism to reach an agreement on outstanding points of contention along

the Blue Line. I recall that the identification of the Blue Line in 2000 was solely the responsibility of the United Nations for the practical purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanon in compliance with Security Council resolution [425 \(1978\)](#) and without prejudice to future border agreements. Both sides, despite their respective reservations, undertook to respect the Blue Line as identified by the United Nations. Progress on Blue Line marking would mitigate potential friction, strengthen the security infrastructure along the Blue Line and serve as an invaluable confidence-building measure between the parties. Using established channels, the United Nations will continue to support efforts to defuse tensions through dialogue, pursue opportunities for confidence-building and create a conducive environment for resolving underlying disputes in support of efforts towards a permanent ceasefire.

88. I reiterate my appeal to the parties to cooperate with UNIFIL in the implementation of all recommendations of the UNIFIL assessment report, which are intended to optimize the use of UNIFIL resources, including with regards to the use of advanced technology for protective measures. The Secretariat and UNIFIL remain committed to implementing all recommendations in consultation with the parties, members of the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, as appropriate.

89. I am increasingly concerned that the continued socioeconomic deterioration and inability of Lebanese State institutions to deliver basic services, including fuel and electricity, and to exercise control over all of Lebanese territory undermines implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The diminished capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain its operations in the UNIFIL area of operations is of particular concern, as is the impact of the country's financial and fuel crisis on the refurbishment works of the model regiment headquarters and advanced naval training modules required for a partial transfer of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force responsibilities to the Lebanese Navy.

90. It is in this context that support to security institutions, especially the Lebanese Armed Forces as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, is of paramount importance. I welcome the preparation by UNIFIL for the provision of temporary and special measures of support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, pursuant to resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#). I thank all donors who have bolstered their contributions and given emergency assistance to the security institutions of Lebanon and encourage partners to continue that critical support.

91. The continued self-acknowledged maintenance of unauthorized weapons outside of State control by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups represents a persistent, grave violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1680 \(2006\)](#), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. Earlier decisions of the National Dialogue pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada should be implemented.

92. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration (2012) and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese border with the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

93. Lebanon is to be commended for its continued hospitality towards refugees, and I thank donors for their enduring support. While the United Nations and partners continue to work towards creating the conditions for safe, dignified and voluntary

returns, respect for due process of law and enabling refugees to live in dignity remains indispensable. I call upon the international community to continue its support to an integrated humanitarian and resilience response through the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan.

94. I reiterate my call for the international community to uphold its commitments and ensure that UNRWA can continue to provide services to the Palestine refugee community.

95. I reiterate my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon and encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. Recognizing the increasingly difficult operating environment facing United Nations personnel in Lebanon, I thank my Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, and the staff of her office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Stefano Del Col, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.

Annex I

Restriction on the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 19 June 2021 to 25 October 2021

1. In its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations and UNIFIL access to the Blue Line in all its parts are fully respected and unimpeded and called on the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full UNIFIL access to sites requested by the mission for the purpose of swift investigations, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted an average of 6,273 monthly patrols during the day and night, of which 2,161 (34.1 per cent) were foot patrols. The mission conducted an average of 2,313 patrols each month along the Blue Line, both by vehicle and on foot (47.4 and 52.6 per cent, respectively). In addition, the mission conducted an average of 72 helicopter patrols each month and an average of 936 inspection activities, including the operation of temporary and permanent checkpoints, and counter-rocket-launching operations. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, there were instances of restrictions of the freedom of movement.

3. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes that were proposed by UNIFIL in order to expand its presence in areas outside main routes and municipal centres, on the grounds that they were either private roads or involved areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents with the appropriate authorities and continuously engages with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure freedom of movement and unrestricted access to all areas within its area of operations.

Access to all locations along the Blue Line

4. UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several sites of interest, including a number of Green without Borders sites, despite repeated formal requests to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Access to those locations is required both in connection with investigations and as part of the mission's daily monitoring of the Blue Line, as mandated under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and recalled in resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#).

Freedom of movement incidents

5. On 29 July, a UNIFIL patrol was obliged to stop its vehicles because building materials were blocking a dirt road in the vicinity of Aytarun (Sector West). An estimated 13 individuals and two vehicles approached the patrol and started taking photographs and recording the registration plates of the vehicles. Subsequently, others arrived at the scene with vehicles and motorbikes, reaching a total of approximately 20 individuals, seven vehicles and four motorbikes, and surrounded the UNIFIL patrol. Three individuals climbed on top of the UNIFIL vehicles. A short time later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene and addressed the crowd, after which the crowd dispersed and the patrol was able to continue. No harm to UNIFIL personnel, nor damage to UNIFIL vehicles, were reported. The following day, the mayor of Aytarun requested that UNIFIL be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces to avoid similar incidents.

6. On 30 July, a number of individuals in Bint Jubayl (Sector West) blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol by placing vehicles across the road in front of and behind the patrol.

The individuals proceeded to deflate the tires of the UNIFIL vehicles, damaged the electric system of one of them, opened the rear door of a UNIFIL vehicle and seized one assault rifle, a scope, two magazines and one body armour vest. About an hour later, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene, whereafter all individuals left the incident site, taking with them the equipment which they had seized. All UNIFIL personnel and vehicles departed towards a nearby United Nations position. No UNIFIL personnel was harmed during the incident, but the vehicles sustained extensive damage. UNIFIL is in contact with the Lebanese Armed Forces, who are trying to retrieve the stolen equipment. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

7. On 17 August, several individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL convoy in Bint Jubayl by placing vehicles and a motorcycle across the road in front of and behind the convoy. Through a UNIFIL interpreter, the individuals complained about the UNIFIL convoy using a secondary road through the village and claimed that UNIFIL personnel had been taking photographs of the area. Soon thereafter, more civilians joined the scene. After receiving information from UNIFIL about the incident, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene, persuaded the civilians to remove their vehicles and escorted the patrol out of the village.

8. On 21 August, while moving from Naqurah to Dayr Kifa (both Sector West), a UNIFIL convoy inadvertently deviated from its intended route in Majdal Silm (Sector East) and was surrounded by approximately 30 individuals in civilian clothes. Some of the civilians enquired as to why the convoy was passing through their village, arguing that it was not a place where UNIFIL was supposed to be, while others stated that the UNIFIL peacekeepers should have been accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. After receiving information from UNIFIL about the incident, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and facilitated the resumption of the convoy's movement. The following day, UNIFIL contacted the mayor of Majdal Silm, who explained that the patrol had been stopped as it had entered a narrow road and that the residents were concerned about potential damage to the road and nearby walls.

9. On 29 August, a UNIFIL convoy and a patrol moving through Majdal Silm towards Naqurah was stopped by an individual in civilian clothes who told the UNIFIL personnel not to proceed on the road, as it was too narrow for the convoy vehicles. Subsequently, more people arrived at the scene, surrounding the vehicles and making it impossible for the convoy to continue its movements. Shortly thereafter, a second UNIFIL patrol reached the location and was forced to stop behind the convoy. The size of the crowd gradually increased to approximately 20 individuals, who behaved in an overall calm manner. Four of the individuals took photos of the UNIFIL vehicles with mobile phones and one recorded the plate numbers of the UNIFIL vehicles. After being contacted by UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the scene and facilitated the resumption of the convoy's movement. The same day, UNIFIL contacted the mayor, who explained that incident was due to a misunderstanding.

10. On 24 October, a group of 17 to 20 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol, consisting of two soft-skin vehicles, in the vicinity of Kunin (Sector West) by placing several vehicles across the road. The crowd surrounded the vehicles, demanding the peacekeepers hand over their electronic devices, including a camera and Global Positioning System (GPS). When the patrol refused, the crowd damaged the vehicles, including the windshield, flagpole, tyres, side mirrors and registration plates. Approximately 30 minutes later, several Lebanese Armed Forces personnel arrived, whereafter the crowd dispersed. The damaged United Nations vehicles were recovered by UNIFIL, and the peacekeepers returned to Bint Jubayl (Sector West). A tyre pump, flashlight, notebook and GPS watch remain missing. One of the UNIFIL peacekeepers sustained minor injuries due to broken glass. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 21 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
2. No response was received during the reporting period to my letter dated 22 October 2019 addressed to the President of Lebanon, in which I reiterated my request that the Government of Lebanon share with the Secretariat any pertinent information or developments related to the arms embargo.
3. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) stipulates that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types. During the reporting period, no new information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.
4. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).