



Security Council

Distr.: General
11 July 2025

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution **1701 (2006)** during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution **1701 (2006)** since the previous report issued on 12 March 2025 ([S/2025/153](#)) and highlights continuing progress, as well as areas of prevailing concern. While the cessation of hostilities, albeit fragile, continued to hold and the parties reiterated their commitment to the full implementation of resolution **1701 (2006)**, violations of the resolution persisted.

2. There was no progress with respect to the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanese territory pursuant to the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities agreement. The Israel Defense Forces retained a presence at five positions and two so-called buffer zones north of the Blue Line ([S/2025/153](#), para. 1). The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) detected or observed several trajectories of projectiles fired from north of the Blue Line towards south of the Blue Line, and unauthorized weapons were identified in the UNIFIL area of operations for follow-up action by the Lebanese Armed Forces on multiple occasions, while the Israel Defense Forces repeatedly struck targets inside Lebanon.

3. The reporting period was also characterized by the concerted effort of the Lebanese authorities, led by the President, Joseph Aoun, and a newly formed Government under the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, to assert and extend the authority of the State throughout Lebanon. The new Government took steps towards the extension of State authority in line with its ministerial statement, including across security, economic and judicial sectors, as well as through the conduct of municipal elections. The period witnessed the ongoing deployment and strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River where, including with support from UNIFIL, it made progress in dismantling unauthorized non-State military infrastructure and seizing unauthorized weapons. Lebanese leaders stated their commitment to enforcing the State's monopoly on arms across the country, including in Palestine refugee camps.




II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Cessation of hostilities


4. During the reporting period, UNIFIL radars detected 220 trajectories of projectiles fired from south to north of the Blue Line and 1 trajectory of a projectile fired from north to south of the Blue Line. UNIFIL radars also detected seven trajectories of projectiles, and peacekeepers observed eight trajectories of projectiles, fired from north to south, that did not cross the Blue Line. Each trajectory may represent multiple projectiles. Almost all trajectories recorded were of rockets, mortar and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or those fired from light weapons. UNIFIL detected 67 air strikes by the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line. In addition, UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces shelling areas north of the Blue Line on 118 occasions and opening fire from south to north of the Blue Line on 22 occasions.

Figure I
Trajectories of projectiles detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 February to 20 June 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

Figure II
Weekly air attacks observed by UNIFIL, 21 February to 20 June 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

5. Recurring strikes by the Israel Defense Forces on alleged Hizbullah targets both south and north of the Litani River, including in the eastern Bīqā' and near population centres such as the southern suburbs of Beirut, Nabatīyah, Sidon and Tyre, continued through the reporting period, causing casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Since 27 November 2024, at least 79 Lebanese civilians have been killed by Israeli military operations, including 15 women and 10 children, with no reported Israeli casualties. Thousands of Israelis remain displaced from northern Israel.

6. The most significant exchanges of fire since the cessation of hostilities came into effect occurred in March. On 22 March, UNIFIL detected three trajectories of projectiles launched from Kafr Tibnit, north of the Litani River, which landed north of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces announced that three projectiles had "crossed into Israel from Lebanon and were intercepted in ... Metulla". Later the same day, UNIFIL observed 12 Israel Defense Forces air strikes in the UNIFIL area of operations, including a strike in central Tyre (Sector West). The Israel Defense Forces stated that it had struck "dozens of rocket launchers and a command center from which Hizbullah terrorists operated in Lebanon".

7. On 28 March, UNIFIL observed five trajectories of projectiles launched from Adshit al-Qusayr and three from Qantarāh (both Sector East) towards south of the Blue Line. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that "two projectiles had been launched from Lebanon; one intercepted and the other falling within Lebanon". Later the same day, UNIFIL observed 14 Israel Defense Forces air strikes in the UNIFIL area of operations, as well as indirect fire towards Arnun, Kafr Kila, Khiyam and Taybah (all Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces subsequently conducted its first raid on Beirut's southern suburbs since 27 November, stating that it targeted "Hezbollah infrastructure used to store UAVs [uncrewed aerial vehicles]". On 28 March, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated, "We will continue to strongly enforce the ceasefire. We will attack anywhere in Lebanon against any threat to the State of Israel".

8. Following strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs on 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had targeted "a Hizbullah terrorist who had recently directed Hamas operatives and assisted them in planning a significant and imminent terror attack against Israeli civilians". The Israel Defense Forces again struck Beirut's southern suburbs on 27 April, stating that it targeted a "terrorist infrastructure site containing precision Hizbullah missiles". The same day, Mr. Netanyahu and the Minister of Defence of Israel, Israel Katz, issued a joint statement, as follows: "Israel will not allow Hizbullah to grow stronger and pose any threat to it – anywhere in Lebanon".

9. On 5 June, following air strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs, Mr. Katz stated, "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and I have instructed the IDF to ... destroy buildings used to manufacture and store drones by the terrorist organization Hezbollah". On 6 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that "immediately after the Israeli enemy announced its threats, it began coordinating with the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism to prevent an attack. Patrols also headed to a number of sites to inspect them, despite the enemy's rejection of the proposal [...]" and that "the Israeli enemy's persistent violation of the agreement and its refusal to cooperate with the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism only weakens the role of the Committee and the Army and could lead the military establishment to freeze cooperation with the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism regarding site inspections".

10. UNIFIL observed several drone strikes by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Litani River, including on vehicles in Naqurah on 5 March, on the Bint Jubayl-Yarun road on 3 April and on the Tyre-Abbasiyah road on 20 June, as well as on a motorbike in Yatar on 27 May (all Sector West). From April, the mission observed strikes on prefabricated structures near the Blue Line, including in Naqurah on 3 and 6 April and in Shama on 23 May (both Sector West). The Israel Defense Forces stated that those strikes targeted "military sites ... belonging to Hizbullah", while Lebanese officials stated the prefabricated buildings were used to house municipal services pending the reconstruction of civilian infrastructure. UNIFIL also heard or detected explosions on 28 occasions, consistent with media reports of strikes on prefabricated buildings or vehicles.

11. In identical letters dated 29 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2025/337](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations reported "250 additional violations by Hezbollah ... both south and north of the Litani River. The violations include, inter alia, military activities of operatives and senior members of Hezbollah in South Lebanon, the launch of drones and uncrewed aerial vehicles towards Israeli territory, and the existence of military infrastructure, on the ground and underground, such as rocket launchers, tunnel shafts and weapons storage facilities." He further stated, "Although there are encouraging signs that the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces are attempting to fulfil their obligations under the Ceasefire Understandings, their efforts thus far have been limited [...]" and that "the Lebanese authorities have faced significant challenges in addressing the full scope of violations, in a timely and effective manner, throughout Lebanon. As a result, Israel has, in many instances, been compelled to take action against immediate military threats."

12. On several occasions, Israel Defense Forces vessels crossed the unilaterally installed Israel Defense Forces line of buoys and fired at Lebanese fishing boats.

B. Respect for the Blue Line

13. As at 20 June, the Israel Defense Forces remained present in five positions and two so-called buffer zones north of the Blue Line. On at least 98 occasions, UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces personnel outside those positions north of the Blue Line, including in the areas of Arab al-Luwayzah, Ghajar and Markaba (Sector East) and Aytā al-Sha‘b, Labbunah, Marwahin, Rumaysh and Ramiyah (Sector West), often engaged in earthworks or the installation of concertina wire. On 23 February, Mr. Netanyahu stated that the Israel Defense Forces would maintain a presence in the designated positions “until the Lebanese Army and Lebanese Government fulfil all their obligations under the agreement”. On 11 March, Mr. Aoun appealed to the head of the mechanism established pursuant to the cessation of hostilities to pressure Israel to “implement the agreement, withdraw from the five hills [positions], and return the Lebanese prisoners”.

14. UNIFIL also observed the Israel Defense Forces firing at vehicles passing near those positions on three occasions and heard gunfire on another eight occasions. On 9 March, UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces firing at individuals, including children, near the Israel Defense Forces position near Kafr Kila, killing an off-duty Lebanese Armed Forces soldier and injuring three others, including a woman and a second off-duty Lebanese Armed Forces soldier. The injured Lebanese Armed Forces soldier was subsequently apprehended by the Israel Defense Forces (see para. 63 below). On 22 March, UNIFIL observed an Israel Defense Forces soldier north-east of Kafr Kila firing towards a Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle, with the Lebanese Armed Forces soldier in the vehicle returning fire. Later the same day, UNIFIL observed an Israel Defense Forces soldier firing towards a Lebanese soldier who was arriving at a Lebanese Armed Forces position on the Bayt Yahun-Bint Jubayl road in a civilian vehicle. Separately, on 18 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed that a soldier was injured after the Israel Defense Forces had “targeted a Lebanese Armed Forces vehicle at the Bayt Yahun-Bint Jubayl checkpoint”.

15. On 7 March, UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces moving the fence across the tomb of Shaykh Abbad/the site of Rav Ashi, located directly on the Blue Line near Hula (Sector East), preventing access from the north while facilitating dozens of visitors from the south. The Lebanese Armed Forces stated that “the entry of settlers from Israel into Lebanese territory is one aspect of the enemy’s persistence in violating international laws ... resolution 1701 (2006) and the ceasefire agreement”. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it subsequently took action to prevent Israeli civilians from gaining access to the area. On 17 and 20 June, north-east of Arab al-Luwayzah, UNIFIL observed six individuals who said that they were Israeli civilian workers with authorization to repair a water pump belonging to Ghajar municipality. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that it had no knowledge of the activity.

16. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, while the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

17. During the reporting period, UNIFIL detected 2,318 violations of Lebanese airspace, with a total overflight time of 4,294 hours and 31 minutes. Drones accounted for 88 per cent of the violations, fighter aircraft 8 per cent, and helicopters and unidentified aircraft 4 per cent. The highest number of daily air violations, 36, was detected on 28 March.

C. Lebanese Armed Forces deployment

18. On 13 March, the Cabinet of Lebanon authorized the enlistment of 4,500 additional soldiers over three phases to reinforce the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon. Recruitment of the first tranche of 1,500 personnel commenced in April. Of the 1,500 Lebanese Armed Forces recruits who had begun their training in January (S/2025/153, para. 51), 1,341 completed their training in May and were deployed south of the Litani River. As at 20 June, 7,522 Lebanese Armed Forces personnel had been deployed to 116 positions south of the Litani River.

19. The Lebanese Armed Forces established 5 checkpoints and 17 observation points along the Litani River and blocked off 8 river crossing points. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted several operations in close coordination along the Litani River in May and June to prevent the potential entry of unauthorized weapons.

20. The Lebanese Armed Forces undertook numerous operations to facilitate the return of local communities to the south. Five Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were killed and six injured during the reporting period (see para. 14 above and para. 39 below). There were no reported Israel Defense Forces casualties.

21. The percentage of the operational activities of UNIFIL that were conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces increased from 12 to 23 per cent. The support of UNIFIL for the Lebanese Armed Forces evolved significantly pursuant to the mission's new operations-led approach (see para. 53 below), which has strengthened interoperability with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces liaison office reopened in Naqurah in March.

22. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force provided project-based training to the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy while Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy units continued to integrate into the Maritime Task Force to enhance expertise and interoperability.


23. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL also continued to engage within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. Greater detail regarding support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, including through the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, is provided in annex III to the present report.

D. Disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, including the presence of unauthorized personnel, assets and weapons south of the Litani River

24. On 14 April, President Aoun stated "The Army is doing its duty south of the Litani River, dismantling tunnels and confiscating weapons without objection from Hizbullah". On 5 June, Prime Minister Salam stated, "The State continues to fulfil its duties in accordance with the Taif Agreement ... to extend its authority over all its territory through its own forces and to ensure that all arms are under the State's exclusive control" and that the Army "has dismantled over 500 military sites and weapons depots south of the Litani River".

25. UNIFIL identified unauthorized weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River on 150 occasions, including rockets fired from the UNIFIL area of operations (see para. 4 above). Of 113 caches of arms and ammunition found, the Lebanese Armed Forces removed 90. The caches included rocket-launching platforms and rockets, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, mortar shells and small-calibre ammunition. Separately, UNIFIL removed two caches of weapons that belonged to the Israel Defense Forces. In addition, UNIFIL observed hunters carrying hunting weapons on 30 occasions.

Figure III
Caches of weapons identified by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and removed by the Lebanese Armed Forces, 21 February to 20 June 2025



Source: UNIFIL.

26. UNIFIL identified 37 locations of interest and, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, visited 16. A 122-mm rocket was found near Rabb al-Thalathin (Sector East) and the remains of one 107-mm and one 122-mm rocket were found near Tallusah (Sector East). UNIFIL discovered 67 tunnels or underground structures. The Lebanese Armed Forces also continued to conduct independent operations to find and remove unauthorized weapons.

27. At the funeral of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on 23 February, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, announced, “The most important step we took was for the State to assume its responsibility after the resistance prevented the enemy from invading or from achieving its objectives”. On 29 March, he stated, “If Israel’s attacks on Lebanon continue and the Lebanese State does not act to stop them, the group will eventually resort to other alternatives”.

28. President Aoun stated on 14 April that “the dialogue regarding the arms monopoly will be bilateral between the presidency and Hizbullah”. On 11 May, he stated that “the decision to restrict the possession of weapons to the State has been taken ... The solution lies in dialogue, even with the Palestinian Authority”. On 19 June, Mr. Aoun stated that “communications are underway to achieve the principle of exclusive arms control on both the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts” and “will intensify once the current regional instability, caused by the escalating Israeli-Iranian conflict, subsides”.

29. On 18 April, Mr. Qassem stated that Hizbullah “will not allow anyone to disarm the resistance”. He further stated that the “Israeli withdrawal and halting the aggression are important steps toward engaging in a discussion on the defense strategy. The defense strategy is about how to build Lebanon’s strength, how to strengthen the army, and how to benefit from the resistance and its weapons. It is not about disarmament, but about discussing diplomatic, economic, and military levels in a comprehensive defense policy”.

30. On 25 April, the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, stated, “We will not hand over Hizbullah’s arms. The arms are our trump card, which we will not abandon without the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement and without initiating dialogue. What was required of us are two things that Lebanon has accomplished: deploying the army in the South and the withdrawal of the ‘party’ from the area”.

31. The Israel Defense Forces claimed numerous strikes on weapons caches, production sites and storage facilities allegedly belonging to Hizbullah, both south and north of the Litani River. On 9 April, the Israel Defense Forces stated that “Hizbullah has been trying to rebuild an underground weapons production site in the heart of the Choueifat neighbourhood in the southern suburbs [of Beirut]”. The Israel Defense Forces stated on 23 April that, since 27 November 2024, “more than 140 [Hizbullah] terrorists who posed a threat throughout Lebanon have been eliminated”. On 4 April and 7 May, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had killed Hamas militants in air strikes near Sidon. In addition, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had killed a militant from the group Jama’ah al-Islamiyya in Alayh district on 22 April.

32. Following the rocket launching incidents in March (see paras. 6–7 above), the Lebanese Armed Forces announced on 22 March that it had “found three primitive rocket launch platforms, in the area north of the Litani River, between the towns of Kfar Tibnit and Arnoun” in Nabatiyah and, on 28 March, that it “was able to identify the rocket launch site in the Qaqa’iyat al-Jisr area of Nabatiyah, north of the Litani River, and has begun an investigation”. On 16 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced the arrests of several Lebanese and Palestinian suspects. In response to “information about preparations for a new rocket attack”, the Lebanese Armed Forces on 20 April stated that it had seized missiles and launch pads and made several arrests during a raid in Sidon. On 2 May, the Higher Defence Council, chaired by President Aoun, warned “Hamas against using Lebanese territory to carry out any acts that would harm Lebanon’s national security”. The Lebanese Armed Forces subsequently announced the arrests of several Hamas-affiliated Palestinians suspected of involvement in the rocket launches on 22 and 28 March. Three suspects were handed over to the Lebanese Armed Forces by Hamas between 4 and 6 May, including at Ein El Hilweh camp in Sidon and El Buss camp in Tyre.

33. During a visit to Beirut by the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, on 21 May, Presidents Abbas and Aoun issued a joint statement that reaffirmed their mutual commitment to “the principle of the exclusivity of arms in the hands of the Lebanese State”. They announced the formation of a joint Lebanese-Palestinian committee. On 23 May, Mr. Salam issued directives to establish “a clear implementation mechanism according to a specific timetable”.

34. Palestine refugee camps experienced heightened insecurity. Clashes between residents of Beddawi camp near Tripoli and the adjacent Wadi al-Nahlah area on 18 March prompted the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Following persistent unrest in Beddawi camp, the Lebanese Armed Forces closed several official and unofficial camp entrances. Intense clashes between rival criminal groups from 18 to 20 May forced the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to temporarily suspend operations in Shatila camp in southern Beirut. Four UNRWA schools in Ein El Hilweh remain inaccessible owing to the continued presence of armed actors.

E. Arms embargo and border control

35. On 21 and 22 February, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it attacked routes allegedly used by Hizbullah to transfer weapons and equipment from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon. On 26 and 28 February, the Israel Defense Forces stated that

it had targeted Hizbullah operatives in north-eastern Lebanon allegedly involved in the purchase and transfer of equipment from the Syrian Arab Republic to Lebanon “to support the continued process of rebuilding Hizbullah’s capabilities”. In a strike on Nabatiyah on 20 April, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had killed a Hizbullah commander who “collaborated with Iranian operatives to facilitate the transfer of weapons and funds into Lebanon, including through the Beirut International Airport”. The Lebanese Armed Forces conducted at least 37 operations to counter the trafficking in weapons and ammunition, mostly in eastern Biqa’.

36. In a letter dated 21 April (S/2025/242), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations responded “to the letter dated 20 February from the representative of the Israeli regime to the United Nations (S/2025/107). The letter baselessly and unjustifiably references Iran, falsely alleging the transfer of weapons and funds to Hezbollah. The Islamic Republic of Iran, once more, categorically rejects this unfounded accusation”.

37. On 27 March in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Lebanese and Syrian interim defense officials stated they would “follow up on the strategic issue of border demarcation, establish specialized joint committees and activate coordination mechanisms to address security threats, particularly those arising along the border”. That step followed armed clashes between Lebanese clans and the Syrian interim authorities’ security forces near the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic on 16 and 17 March, in which at least 7 people were killed and 52 injured.

38. On 14 April, Prime Minister Salam made his first official visit to the Syrian Arab Republic to “open a new page in the history of relations between the two countries”. Mr. Salam stated that discussions with the interim President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmed al-Sharaa focused on “controlling borders and crossings, preventing smuggling, and ultimately demarcating the land and sea borders”.

F. Landmines and cluster bombs

39. On 19 March, a UNIFIL peacekeeper was severely injured in a landmine explosion during a foot patrol near Zibqin (Sector West). On 14 April, a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier was killed and four others injured when an explosive device detonated in a tunnel south-west of Zibqin during a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces inspection. On 20 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that three of its personnel were killed and several civilians injured by ammunition exploding while being transported by the Lebanese Armed Forces in Burayqah, Nabatiyah. The Lebanese Armed Forces announced more than 50 operations south of the Litani River and 42 operations north of the Litani River to detonate unexploded ordnance.

40. UNIFIL responded to 84 reports of suspected unexploded ordnance and 2 reports of a suspected improvised explosive device. UNIFIL cleared 1,651 m² north of Naqurah. In addition, 13 explosive ordnance risk clearance tasks were completed, including around United Nations positions, roadblock removal and road inspections. UNIFIL provided 6 explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions for 70 military and civilian personnel and 14 training sessions for demining teams.

III. Extension of State authority and institutional stability

41. Prime Minister Salam’s Government of “rescue and reform” won a vote of confidence in Parliament on 26 February with support from 95 of 128 parliamentarians. In its ministerial statement, the Government affirmed its commitment to “a state that has the power to decide war and peace”, “the adoption of a national security strategy

at the military, diplomatic and economic levels” and “the reconstruction of what was destroyed by the Israeli aggression”. In addition, the Government underlined “its commitment ... to implementing Security Council resolution 1701 in full, without fragmentation or selection” and working towards “the state’s duty to monopolize the carrying of weapons”.

42. President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam both stated that Lebanon would not be drawn into the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel. On 16 June, Mr. Salam affirmed “the necessity ... to prevent Lebanon from being dragged or implicated in any way in the ongoing regional war”. On 20 June, Mr. Aoun and the former President of Lebanon, Michel Sleiman, discussed “the need to keep Lebanon away from what is happening between Iran and Israel”.

43. During its first meeting, on 6 March, the Cabinet approved the 2025 State budget. On 13 March, the Cabinet approved leadership appointments to State security agencies, including Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal as the new Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the directors of the Internal Security Forces, State Security and General Security. On 29 May, the Cabinet approved supplemental financial subsidies for army personnel.

44. On 27 March, the Cabinet appointed Karim Souaid as the new governor of the Central Bank. On 28 March, the Cabinet approved appointments to fill long-standing vacancies in the Higher Judicial Council and, on 2 May, approved a draft law on the independence of the judiciary and referred it to Parliament.

45. With respect to the investigation into the explosion in the Port of Beirut on 4 August 2020, on 10 March, the State Prosecutor overturned a decision adopted in January 2023 prohibiting the judicial and security authorities from cooperating with the investigation conducted by Judge Tarek Bitar. That step facilitated Judge Bitar’s questioning of suspects and defendants in the case.

46. In May, the Government convened the thrice-postponed municipal and mukhtar elections for 1,065 municipalities across Lebanon. Lebanese State security forces undertook preventive measures to ensure the smooth conduct of the elections, and alternative polling locations for 39 conflict-affected municipalities near the Blue Line were established. Women’s representation in elected municipal councils, although still low, doubled to 10 per cent.

47. The Cabinet submitted to Parliament a draft law on the restructuring of the banking sector. On 24 April, Parliament adopted the amendments to the banking secrecy law, granting retroactive access to 10 years of banking records. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Beirut in March and June for discussions on the request made by Lebanon for a new IMF programme. In May, the Cabinet reconstituted the Council for Development and Reconstruction, which will be integral to future reconstruction efforts.

48. Lebanon continued to face conflict-related humanitarian needs. As at 31 May, at least 82,000 people, 51 per cent of whom are women, remain displaced. The continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, in combination with continued kinetic activity, the presence of unexploded ordnance and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, impedes returns. Humanitarian partners continued to support conflict-affected communities in meeting essential food, shelter, water, protection and healthcare needs amid security and funding constraints. Reconstruction and recovery needs were estimated at \$11 billion according to the report of the World Bank dated 7 March 2025 entitled “Lebanon rapid damage and needs assessment”.

49. At its 31 March conclusion, the extended Lebanon flash appeal, which had called for an additional \$371.4 million, was 26 per cent funded. By the same date, the 2025 appeal for the Lebanon Response Plan was 18 per cent funded, at \$482.8 million of the \$2.74 billion requested, with \$251.8 million received to date in 2025 and \$231.1 million carried over from 2024. UNRWA faces projected cash-flow gaps from July 2025 that imperil the continuity of essential services for 222,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon.

50. As at 31 May, 727,430 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Lebanon, including 716,050 of an estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon and 11,380 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. As at 15 June, at least 177,430 Syrians, including 119,873 refugees registered with the Office, had returned to the Syrian Arab Republic from Lebanon. As at 17 June, 141 deportation incidents following raids, arrests at checkpoints and failed onward movements by sea, involving at least 7,047 Syrians, were recorded. Approximately 40,000 Syrian new arrivals were reported in North Lebanon Governorate and 78,625 in Biqa' Governorate. On 16 June, the Cabinet approved a framework of principles for the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon.

IV. United Nations presence

A. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon force deployment and adaptation

51. As at 20 June, UNIFIL consisted of 10,372 military personnel from 47 contributing countries, with 827 women (7.97 per cent). In addition, UNIFIL had 777 civilian staff, including 237 international and 540 national personnel, with 252 women (32.43 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force operated with five vessels and 699 military personnel, including 66 women (9.44 per cent). There were 44 military observers, including 34 men and 10 women (23 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serving with the Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The highest-ranking military women hold the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, while the most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

52. UNIFIL conducted an average of 4,356 operational activities each month. Of those activities, 784 (18 per cent) involved mixed-gender teams. UNIFIL also undertook an average of 45 air patrols each month.

53. In line with the adaptation plan of UNIFIL, and as part of adjusting to a new context, UNIFIL operations focused on assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in deploying to the South Litani Sector, providing a safe and secure environment and preventing violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). To enable the full resumption of operational activities, including in support of the extension of State authority and to facilitate the return of displaced communities, UNIFIL removed more than 100 roadblocks, cleared unexploded ordnance, reopened and assessed secondary roads and re-established access the Blue Line. The Lebanese Armed Forces, in close coordination with UNIFIL, also removed roadblocks repeatedly placed by the Israel Defense Forces near Labbunah in April and Markaba in May. UNIFIL continued to engage with the parties regarding the use of new technology for monitoring and reporting and for the purposes of force protection.

54. UNIFIL experienced an increase in incidents of restrictions on freedom of movement since late April, with members of local communities stopping patrols and

erroneously asserting that UNIFIL personnel must be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Incidents were often filmed by the perpetrators and videos were circulated on social media. A particularly concerning incident occurred on 16 May in Jumayjimah (Sector West), during which UNIFIL peacekeepers returned fire after an isolated shooter fired approximately 20 shots towards the peacekeepers as they were moving away from an angry crowd. UNIFIL also experienced incidents involving the Israel Defense Forces, including the pointing of weapons and direct fire at a United Nations position in Shab'a (Sector East) on 13 May. One bullet hit the defensive barrier of a United Nations position. The mission continued to encounter roadblocks around the five Israel Defense Forces positions and so-called buffer zones north of the Blue Line, restricting access to five United Nations positions and the full length of the Blue Line (see annex I). UNIFIL issued an increasing number of statements, gave interviews and conducted in-person and virtual media visits to clarify its mandate and activities and counter misinformation and disinformation.

55. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force in support for maritime interdiction operations, hailed 2,476 vessels. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared each of the 406 vessels referred by UNIFIL. The mission accompanied the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy during 36 vessel inspections.

56. Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL assessed 22 subordinate military units and 3 vessels for logistics, training and operational preparedness on 17 June, with all shortfalls addressed. Utilizing the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System, UNIFIL continued to assess the adaptation of the mission's posture, footprint and operations to ensure mandate implementation. The mission also applied the indicators of the Action for Peacekeeping Plus monitoring framework to enhance its data-driven analysis and reporting.

B. Safety and security

57. The designated officials for North Litani River and South Litani River continued to coordinate to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel in Lebanon. From 1 March, dependants of international United Nations civilian personnel were permitted to return to the North Litani River designated area. Restrictions on non-programme critical civilian personnel in South Litani River ([S/2024/817](#), para. 71) were lifted on 25 March. Movement restrictions remained in place in the South Litani River area of operations, with the use of armoured vehicles, as well as 48 hours' notice, required for movement of civilian personnel in the South Litani Sector, except in Tyre and along the Tyre-Naqurah coastal road.

58. Kinetic activity, unexploded ordnance and other remnants of war continued to pose a threat to the safety and security of personnel. On 22 March, the Israel Defense Forces struck central Tyre; 14 national and 49 international civilian United Nations personnel resided within 1,000 m of the impact site. From 13 June, in the context of the hostilities between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in view of the risk of falling debris, UNIFIL personnel along the Blue Line sheltered on 55 occasions (see annex I). From 13 June, the mission reduced independent operational activities and activities near the Blue Line as a security precaution.

59. UNIFIL opened one technical investigation into violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) that involved direct impacts on UNIFIL personnel or assets. The mission concluded five technical investigations and shared its findings with the parties.

C. Conduct and discipline

60. UNIFIL recorded 12 allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct, including 1 allegation of sexual harassment. No allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation were reported in UNIFIL or the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. Training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 72 civilian and 2,546 military personnel (188 women and 2,430 men).

D. Accountability for attacks on peacekeepers

61. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. The next trial hearing in the case of the fatal attack against UNIFIL near Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 (see [S/2023/184](#)) is scheduled for 17 September 2025. There was no progress in criminal proceedings related to the 4 August 2018 incident in Majdal Zun (Sector West) (see [S/2018/1029](#)). Investigations into acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January 2022 continued (see [S/2022/214](#)). The investigation into the attack on a UNIFIL convoy outside Rafic Hariri International Airport, Beirut, on 14 February, which resulted in injuries to the former Deputy Force Commander and one other peacekeeper ([S/2025/153](#), para. 56), is ongoing. An investigation has been initiated into the incident on 10 June in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr (see annex I); one suspect has been detained and referred to the military prosecutor.

V. Liaison and progress towards sustainable solutions

62. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, offered her good offices with relevant authorities and actors in Lebanon, Israel and the region, to support the cessation of hostilities and to advocate for the parties to take concrete steps towards negotiated solutions and to advance long-stalled provisions of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). She continued to urge all parties, through public and closed-door channels, to leverage the political momentum provided by the cessation of hostilities agreement to forge new political pathways towards the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

63. UNIFIL continued its engagement with the parties to promote security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from areas north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL hosted the sixth meeting of the mechanism, on 11 March, following which UNIFIL supported the return to Lebanon of four individuals apprehended by the Israel Defense Forces in 2024. The Lebanese Armed Forces soldier apprehended by the Israel Defense Forces on 9 March (see para. 14 above) was repatriated on 13 March.

64. UNIFIL continued to utilize its liaison and coordination mechanisms to decrease tension along the Blue Line. There were 1,390 interactions with the Israel Defense Forces to deconflict movement with respect to the safety and security of the Lebanese Armed Forces, facilitating the deployment and operations of the Lebanese Armed Forces, including inspections of locations of interest, removal of roadblocks and facilitation of the return of displaced communities. UNIFIL issued 24 stop-firing requests to the Israel Defense Forces, including 5 on behalf of the Lebanese Armed Forces and 19 for the mission. In complement, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon leveraged diplomatic means in support of de-escalation measures.

65. In support of the protection of civilians, UNIFIL maintained liaison with both parties and facilitated 314 civilian and humanitarian movements. The Humanitarian Access Working Group, which oversees the humanitarian notification system, continued to coordinate access to hard-to-reach areas across Lebanon. In late February, the Israel Defense Forces informed the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that it would no longer actively deconflict humanitarian movements north of the Litani River. A limited number of humanitarian notifications continued to be channelled by the Office through UNIFIL for movements within three km of the Blue Line.

66. In March, UNIFIL initiated the repair and reconstruction of an estimated 40 Blue Line barrels damaged during the hostilities (see [S/2025/153](#), para. 68 and annex I). Access to one destroyed barrel was cleared by the demining teams of UNIFIL.

67. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv remains pending, notwithstanding the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for such an office.

68. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ([S/2007/641](#), annex).

VI. Observations

69. Civilians on both sides of the Blue Line have endured far too much to risk a relapse into conflict. Noteworthy progress has been made towards realizing the commitments set out in the cessation of hostilities agreement. While the intensity of kinetic activity has decreased significantly since the cessation of hostilities came into effect, the situation remains fragile. A safe and secure environment conducive to the full return and rebuilding of communities on both sides of the Blue Line has yet to materialize. Towards this end, I call upon the parties to ensure the protection of civilians, accelerate political efforts to create the space for renewed dialogue towards the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and, ultimately, a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. I call upon all actors concerned to refrain from unilateral or provocative action that could jeopardize the return to the full cessation of hostilities. The failure, actual or perceived, by one party to meet its obligations under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) is not a justification for the other party to renege on its obligations. I urge the parties to utilize the established liaison and coordination channels of UNIFIL, as well as the enhanced arrangements under the cessation of hostilities mechanism, to address disputes or threats and to prevent escalation. Regular meetings of the mechanism can enhance communication and shared problem-solving. I encourage such engagement at a strategic political level, in addition to military-to-military meetings concerning immediate operational-tactical issues. In addition, I welcome the efforts made by Lebanese leaders to spare the country from the hostilities between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel.

70. Welcoming the return by the Government of Israel of five Lebanese citizens who were being held in Israeli custody, I call for the release of the remaining Lebanese detainees.

71. Both parties have committed themselves to full respect for the Blue Line. However, the continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line and their continued use of force not only threatens stability along the Blue Line, but also undermines the efforts of the Lebanese authorities to extend the authority of the State. It risks fuelling a narrative that could further complicate the internal political

discussions required for Lebanon to meet its commitments to achieve a State monopoly on arms.

72. The presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity and resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty from Israel and call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory. I urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from all areas north of the Blue Line, including from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line. I reiterate, as provided for in resolution 1701 (2006), the offer of UNIFIL to support security arrangements that can strengthen the confidence of communities on both sides of the Blue Line.

73. The stated commitments by the Lebanese authorities to bring all weapons under State control and ensure that the State is able to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory, as well as the pledge to convene a dialogue towards formulation of a national security strategy, are encouraging. I note the progress made in strengthening the presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces between the Blue Line and the Litani River, including to dismantle unauthorized infrastructure and confiscate unauthorized arms and related materiel that were present in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The action taken by the Lebanese Armed Forces to ensure that the area south of the Litani River is free of unauthorized weapons, including in response to the rocket launches in March, shows that the Government of Lebanon has the resolve necessary to meet its obligations under resolution 1701 (2006). I note the agreement between Presidents Abbas and Aoun regarding the Lebanese State's monopoly on arms, including inside Palestine refugee camps. It is imperative that the Lebanese Armed Forces continue to take the measures necessary to ensure a State monopoly over the possession of weapons throughout all of Lebanese territory. Extending my appreciation for the generous support provided to date, I call upon donors to bolster their material and financial support to the Lebanese Armed Forces commensurate with their commitment to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

74. I welcome the continued implementation by UNIFIL of its adaptation plan, including a new operational *modus operandi*. A return to full patrolling and monitoring across the area of operations conducted in an agile and nimble manner has proved key to operational effectiveness. I repeat my call upon the parties to support the continuous development of the Force, including through the deployment and use of new technologies to enhance its mandate implementation capacities.

75. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL is essential for the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The increase in incidents affecting the freedom of movement of UNIFIL since April is of great concern. I welcome public statements from the Lebanese authorities expressing support for the mission and condemning attacks on peacekeepers. It is vital that national authorities continue to issue such statements to counter misinformation and disinformation regarding the mission's presence and to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers. Perpetrators of attacks against UNIFIL must be held to account. The mission should also continue to strengthen its strategic communications strategy to enhance understanding of its mandated functions.

76. Firing by the Israel Defense Forces at or near UNIFIL personnel and premises is also unacceptable. I reiterate my appeal to both parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, and ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, their freedom of movement and the inviolability of United Nations premises and property at all times.

77. I congratulate Prime Minister Salam on the formation of his Government and the holding of municipal elections to extend the authority of the State at the local

level. Ahead of next year's parliamentary elections, I call upon the Government and Parliament to prioritize reforms strengthening inclusive electoral processes to enable further gains in women's political representation and accessibility for persons with disabilities.

78. While steps taken by the Government and Parliament towards the implementation of economic, financial and judicial reforms are encouraging, expedited progress is required, including legislation on the restructuring of the banking sector, necessary to secure IMF assistance, restore donor and depositor confidence, and help to put Lebanon back on the path towards sustainable recovery and for communities to rebuild their lives. Greater progress is also vital to unlock urgently needed reconstruction funding. Meanwhile, additional resources for humanitarian and recovery response are crucial.

79. I am hopeful that developments in the Syrian Arab Republic will yield positive implications for Lebanon, including to create the conditions necessary to enable the sustainable, safe, dignified and voluntary return of Syrian refugees. I call upon the international community to work with the Syrian interim authorities towards creating conditions conducive to such returns. The consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement, remains essential. Palestine refugee camps are already experiencing considerable hardship and volatility and may come under increased pressure as disarmament plans are rolled out. It is therefore more critical than ever that UNRWA be able to continue its support to Palestine refugees in Lebanon.

80. I express my sincere gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and the Observer Group Lebanon. I thank the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, and the outgoing Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, for their dedication and leadership throughout a very challenging period. I also thank the troop-contributing countries, whose forces continue to be vital to supporting the parties in upholding their obligations under the cessation of hostilities agreement and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), and all members of the United Nations country team for their continued dedication to stability in Lebanon.

Annex I

Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2025

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded. It called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by UNIFIL for the purpose of swift investigation, including all locations of interest, all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in [S/2019/237](#)) and unauthorized firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.
2. In line with UNIFIL's adaptation plan, UNIFIL moved away from a "patrol sketch" (maps of planned patrol routes) oriented approach to a more "operation-led" modus operandi in March. Dedicated operations often spanned several days with different mission components working towards a joint end. "Patrol sketches" were at times used to facilitate the coordination of activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces but were not used to limit the freedom of movement of the Mission. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted a monthly average of 4,356 operational activities, including 45 air operations. The percentage of UNIFIL's operational activities conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces increased from 12 to 23 per cent, for an overall average of 16.8 per cent.
3. UNIFIL continued to update a list of locations of interest initiated after the return to the cessation of hostilities. As at 20 June, UNIFIL has identified 37 locations of interest and in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces inspected 16 of these.
4. While UNIFIL's freedom of movement was in general respected, UNIFIL experienced some incidents in which violence or weapons were used to intimidate UNIFIL peacekeepers, incidents resulting in damage to UNIFIL equipment or injuries to peacekeepers, and incidents resulting in UNIFIL cancelling their activity or using alternatives routes. Incidents of particular note occurred on 16 May in Jumayjmeh and on 10 June in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr. In addition to the incidents listed below, UNIFIL experienced minor incidents during which items such as stones or bottles were thrown at UNIFIL property or personnel without causing damage or injuries. There were also incidents during which patrols have been stopped, surrounded or pursued by individuals in civilian clothes. Incidents were often filmed by those hindering UNIFIL, with videos circulated on social media. Each of the incidents listed below has been raised by the Mission with the Lebanese Armed Forces.
5. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents involving the Israel Defense Forces, interfering with operations or putting peacekeepers or UN staff members at risk. Incidents of note took place near Rumaysh on 29 March, near Kfar Shuba on 13 May, near Yarun on 19 May and near Kfar Kila on 16 June. UNIFIL has protested each of the incidents to the Israel Defense Forces.
6. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents interfering with its operations that cannot be ascribed to any of the parties.




Figure 4. Denial of freedom of movement of UNIFIL 21 February – 20 June 2025.
Source: UNIFIL.

Denial of freedom of movement and aggressive behaviour by Lebanese actors

7. On 11 March, individuals in civilian clothes ripped off the antenna of a UNIFIL vehicle passing through Bayt Lif (Sector West). The Mayor of Bayt Lif was contacted, however, as at 20 June, the antenna has not been returned.

8. On 19 March an individual in civilian clothes drove up next to a UNIFIL patrol in Ayn Baal (Sector West) and damaged the left side mirrors of two UNIFIL vehicles with a club. The peacekeepers stopped to verify the damage and resumed the patrol movement shortly thereafter.

9. On 21 March, a group of 10 to 12 individuals in civilian clothes approached a UNIFIL patrol in Yarun (Sector West) and removed the UN flag from one vehicle while making unfriendly gestures. The UNIFIL patrol used an alternative route to continue. The Mayor of Yarun later informed UNIFIL that the incident was the act of unknown individuals.

10. On 21 March, two individuals in civilian clothes on a scooter approached a UNIFIL patrol near Burj al-Shamali (Sector West) and removed the flag from a vehicle. The patrol continued its movement.

11. On 24 March, four individuals in civilian clothes on two motorcycles removed the UN flag from a moving UNIFIL vehicle near Mays al Jabal (Sector West). The mayor of Mays al-Jabal referred to the incident as “childish behaviour” but was not able to identify the perpetrators.

12. On 24 March, a young boy, threw a rock at a UNIFIL logistic convoy southeast of Ghanduriyah (Sector East), breaking the windshield of one vehicle.

13. On 25 March, an individual in civilian clothes on a scooter blocked a Lebanese Armed Forces during a patrol in close coordination with UNIFIL, west of Frun (Sector West). The combined patrol used an alternative route to continue its movement.

14. On 27 March, an individual in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol near Abbasiva (Sector West) and displayed a pistol before firing one shot into the air. The patrol cancelled its activity.

15. On 12 April, two boys on a scooter threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol passing Jibal al-Butum (Sector West), breaking a vehicle windscreen. The patrol continued its movement.

16. On 25 April, a UNIFIL patrol was blocked by a vehicle southwest of Tayr Dibbah (Sector West), prompting the patrol to turn around and use a secondary road. Two individuals in civilian clothes on motorbikes blocked the patrol again and it turned around for a second time. The two motorcycles subsequently followed the patrol for approximately 10 minutes with the incident filmed and shared on social media. The mayor of Tayr Dibbah stated that members of the community got scared as UNIFIL entered a private road, and that he has called on residents to refrain from aggression against UNIFIL patrols.

17. On 29 April, eight young individuals on four scooters ripped the flag off a UNIFIL patrol vehicle northwest of Hariss (Sector West). The patrol continued its movement.

18. On 30 April, eight individuals in civilian clothes attempted to damage the rearview mirror and antennas on a UNIFIL vehicle in Siddiqin (Sector West) and further threatened to set it on fire. Peacekeepers used tear gas to disperse the crowd and then left the area. The peacekeepers returned to the area later the same day without further incident.

19. On 30 April, four individuals in civilian clothes climbed on top of UNIFIL patrol vehicles, in Khiyam (Sector East) and threw stones. A vehicle and a number of motorcycles followed the patrol as it was leaving. One UNIFIL vehicle sustained minor damage but the patrol continued its activity. The Lebanese Armed Forces later informed UNIFIL that the four individuals, involved in the incident, had been arrested.

20. On 30 April, ten individuals on scooters and in a vehicle pursued a UNIFIL patrol passing through Yatar (Sector West). A boulder on the road obstructed further movement while four scooters and a vehicle prevented the patrol from turning around. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter and the UNIFIL patrol continued. The mayor of Yatar informed UNIFIL that the individual who had spoken to the patrol was a member of the municipal police and (incorrectly) asserted that UNIFIL needed to be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

21. On 1 May, two individuals in civilian clothes stopped a motorcycle in front of a UNIFIL patrol, northeast of Tibnin (Sector West) with one of the individuals dismounting and stating that the area was private, and that the patrol could not continue. The patrol turned around and was followed by the motorcycle while using an alternative route.

22. On 2 May, eight individuals in civilian clothes on five motorcycles threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol near Suwannan (Sector East), damaging two of the vehicles. The same individuals also stole two jerrycans and one car hook. The UNIFIL patrol turned around and cancelled its activity. The Mayor of Suwannan later apologised and informed UNIFIL that the actions by the group did not reflect the sentiments of the community in regard to UNIFIL.

23. On 2 May, an individual in civilian clothes on a motorbike struck the side of a UNIFIL vehicle in Qabrikha (Sector East), causing minor damage. The patrol continued its activity.

24. On 9 May, a crowd of around 100 people surrounded and struck the vehicle of a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Batouliyah (Sector West) breaking a side mirror. The patrol continued its movement. Local authorities in Batouliyah later denied that the incident had taken place.

25. On 11 May, a UNIFIL patrol stopped northwest of Yatar (Sector West) as their vehicle was overheating. Where one individual stopped to assist the peacekeepers, a second man stated that he was a policeman and that the patrol was not allowed and used his vehicle to prevent further movements. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the patrol continued.

26. On 12 May, an individual in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Shab'a (Sector East) and stated that the road was closed. The UNIFIL patrol turned around and continued its movement using an alternative route. A video circulated on social media platforms, in which a man can be heard telling the patrol to "go back quickly". The Mayor of Shab'a later referred to the incident as "disgraceful" and not representative of the residents of Shab'a.

27. On 12 May, an individual in civilian clothes used a vehicle to block a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Ash Sh'aytiyah (Sector West) and stated that it was not welcome in the area without the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the UNIFIL patrol continued its movement. The Mayor of Ash Sh'aytiyah later informed UNIFIL that it would be good if the Mission was always accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

28. On 14 May, UNIFIL was stopped by a group of individuals in civilian clothes, while conducting a foot patrol in Shab'a. When the patrol tried to explain that it was carrying out an approved activity, the individuals started scuffling with the peacekeepers. UNIFIL adopted a defensive posture and contacted local leaders and the Lebanese Armed Forces. One UNIFIL vehicle was slightly damaged. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the patrol returned to its position. The mayor of Shab'a informed UNIFIL that he had spoken to the Lebanese Armed Forces, who had identified and spoken to the perpetrators to avoid further incidents.

29. On 16 May, a UNIFIL patrol was stopped in Jumayjmeh, near Khirbet Selm (Sector East), by an angry crowd of approximately 20 individuals. Peacekeepers were threatened with metal bars and axes and told they had no right to patrol the area as it was private property and that UNIFIL should be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The crowd grew to around 50 people and the Lebanese Armed Forces, who had promptly arrived, struggled to calm them down. Peacekeepers resorted to non-lethal force, including tear gas and warning shots fired into the air, to enable a safe withdrawal. As they were leaving, an isolated shooter fired approximately 20 shots, with impacts approximately one metre behind an armored vehicle. The patrol returned fire. There were no injuries, although two UNIFIL vehicles sustained damage, with several tires punctured and a radio stolen. The latter was later recovered by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The incident was recorded and widely circulated on social media platforms. A "statement" was also issued by "residents of Jumayjmeh", claiming that UNIFIL had entered private property without being accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces, and that "several injuries were reported as a result of the tear gas".

30. On 19 May, five individuals in civilian clothes threw iron bars at a UNIFIL patrol east of Dayr Qanoun an-Nahr (Sector West), causing minor damage to the UNIFIL vehicles.

31. On 20 May, an individual in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL engineering reconnaissance mission in Aynata (Sector West), presenting himself as a police officer. He stated that UNIFIL could not continue its movement and was not allowed to take pictures. The Lebanese Armed Forces promptly arrived, and the peacekeepers continued their activity. The mayor of Aynata said that the local residents had seen

the peacekeepers taking pictures and acting suspiciously, which was not tolerated in the village.

32. On 20 May, approximately 25 agitated individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol, east of Shaqra (Sector East), prompting the patrol to turn around and return to its position.

33. On 25 May, two individuals in civilian clothes on a moped threw stones at a UNIFIL patrol passing Yarun, while recording the patrol and making unfriendly gestures. There was minor damage to the UNIFIL vehicle.

34. On 26 May, an individual in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL vehicle south of Aytit (Sector West), broke the side mirror and pulled off the UN flag while demanding the patrol to turn around. The patrol continued its movement.

35. On 28 May, ten individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol near Frun (Sector East) with two vehicles. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived some 40 minutes later, whereafter the UNIFIL patrol continued. The Mayor of Frun later told UNIFIL that the patrol had entered private property and that he remained at UNIFIL's disposal to address similar situations if they would occur.

36. On 28 May, 12 individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol undertaken in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, west of Yatar (Sector West) by placing two tractors across the road. The patrol used an alternative route with three vehicles following the patrol as they left the area. The incident was filmed and circulated on social media. The mayor of Yatar later informed UNIFIL that the individuals were part of the municipal police.

37. On 28 May, two individuals in civilian clothes moved alongside a UNIFIL patrol southwest of At Tiri (Sector West), one individual gesturing to turn around, while the second filmed. The UNIFIL patrol took an alternative route to continue its movement. The two motorcycles followed for a short distance.

38. On 29 May, a young individual on a scooter approached a UNIFIL patrol in Ayn Baal and broke the left mirrors of two UNIFIL patrol vehicles. The UNIFIL patrol continued its planned activity.

39. On 30 May, an elderly individual threw a glass bottle at a UNIFIL patrol vehicle northwest of Bint Jubayl (Sector West), causing minor damage. Later the same day, at the same location, an elderly individual threw rocks at the patrol, again causing minor damage to the vehicle.

40. On 30 May, an individual in civilian clothes driving a vehicle stopped a UNIFIL patrol, west of Srifa (Sector West). Twenty additional individuals subsequently arrived at the location. Upon UNIFIL's request, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived and accompanied the patrol out of the area.

41. On 3 June, two individuals in civilian clothes on a scooter stopped a UNIFIL patrol, southwest of Siddiqin and stated that it could not continue without the Lebanese Armed Forces. Ten minutes later, 20 other individuals arrived. When UNIFIL returned, having waited for the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces, they were stopped again, and it was decided to use an alternative road. Media mischaracterized the incident as "a major clash". The former mayor Siddiqin attributed the incident to "unsupervised youths".

42. On 3 June, 20 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol in Srifa. The Lebanese Armed Forces was informed and when they arrived the patrol continued.

43. On 5 June, four agitated individuals in civilian clothes in two vehicles blocked a UNIFIL patrol near in Sribbin (Sector West). Subsequently, 12 other individuals in civilian clothes joined the group. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived at the location, whereafter the patrol continued its movement.

44. On 7 June, an agitated group of about 20 individuals in civilian clothes blocked a UNIFIL patrol near Srifa, climbing onto the vehicles and putting Hizbullah flags on them. The scene was filmed and shared on social media. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter and the UNIFIL patrol continued.

45. On 10 June, 20 individuals in civilian clothes carrying iron bars stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Dayr Qanun al-Nahr (Sector West). The patrol moved to a nearby location and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. A second UNIFIL patrol, which was responding to the first patrol's call for assistance, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, was then stopped in the same area by 10 individuals in civilian clothes. The group subsequently increased to about 100 people throwing stones and attempting to place Hizbullah flags on the vehicles. The peacekeepers used tear gas to disperse the crowd and returned to their UN position. The Lebanese Armed Forces personnel were also involved in a physical altercation with some of the individuals while the peacekeepers were leaving. The former mayor later condemned the incident but stressed that UNIFIL patrols should be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces to prevent future incidents. UNIFIL has been informed by the Lebanese authorities that an investigation has been initiated into the incident with one suspect detained and referred to the military prosecutor while efforts to identify additional suspects continue.

46. On 10 June, six individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Tayr Falsay (Sector West) and asked it not to proceed without the Lebanese Armed Forces. When the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived the UNIFIL patrol continued its movement. The former mayor of Tayr Falsay later contacted UNIFIL to express his dismay at UNIFIL patrols repeatedly entering the village without the Lebanese Armed Forces.

47. On 10 June, an individual in civilian clothes on a scooter, holding what appeared to be a hand grenade, stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Burj al-Shamali. The patrol used an alternative route to continue and informed the Lebanese Armed Forces.

48. On 11 June, four individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol near Srifa, demanding it be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived shortly thereafter, and the patrol continued. The mayor of Srifa later informed UNIFIL that the incidents in the municipality on 3, 7 and 11 June were all the result of "childish acts" by youth. The mayor also said that he had reached out to all community members to call on them to refrain from stopping UNIFIL patrols.

49. On 11 June, approximately 40 individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol northwest of Bayt Lif and threw stones at the patrol, damaging the patrol vehicles. The patrol cancelled its activity. The mayor of Bayt Lif condemned the incident but said that the UNIFIL patrol had passed by the village shortly after an Israeli drone strike had hit the village, which had the residents feeling very anxious and nervous.

50. On 12 June, six individuals in civilian clothes stopped a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Toura (Sector West) and stated that the patrol could not continue without the Lebanese Armed Forces. The patrol moved to a nearby location and, once the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, continued its movement. The mayor of Toura informed UNIFIL that locals had seen the patrol moving in a narrow street, stopped them and asked them to proceed to the main road. The mayor advised that patrols

should be conducted on main roads and that the municipal police should be informed in advance of UNIFIL's movements.

Denial of freedom of movement and aggressive behaviour involving the Israel Defense Forces

51. UNIFIL continued to encounter other roadblocks particularly around the five Israel Defense Forces positions and two so-called buffer zones north of the Blue Line, complicating access to UN position 1-31, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b (Sector West), observation point HIN near Marwahin (Sector West), UN position 8-33, northeast of Hula (Sector East), UN position 9-63, south of Udaysah (Sector East), and UN position 9-64 south of Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL has protested these access restrictions. The Israel Defense Forces has stated that it takes "significant measures to allow UNIFIL to operate freely and without and disturbance" while maintaining its operations and that "the Israel Defense Forces does not implement restrictions on the movement of any UNIFIL vehicles to observation post-HIN."

52. At the end of May, UNIFIL encountered new roadblocks in the vicinity of Israel Defense Forces' positions north of the Blue Line, in particular in Sector East. Following a number of incidents, as detailed below, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL on 3 June that it would not interfere with UNIFIL removing 13 of the roadblocks.

53. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents involving the Israel Defense Forces, interfering with operations or putting peacekeepers or UN staff members at risk. UNIFIL has protested each of the incidents with the Israel Defense Forces.

54. On 23 February, the Israel Defense Forces opened fire on a vehicle driven by an off-duty UNHCR national staff member near Hula (Sector East). The staff member and his wife sought refuge in a nearby ditch. UNIFIL coordinated with the parties to facilitate their rescue.

55. On 13 March, the Israel Defense Forces placed a polygon steel target in front of the observation slot of the southwest guard tower at a UN position southwest of Alma al-Sha'b, obstructing UNIFIL's view.

56. On 29 March, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed a laser at a UNIFIL patrol south of Alma al Sh'ab (Sector West). The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they do not acknowledge that the incident occurred.

57. Also, on 29 March, an Israel Defense Forces soldier south of the Blue Line fired shots in the direction of a UNIFIL patrol near Rumaysh (Sector West), using an automatic weapon. The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that these were warning shots, as part of an escalation of force procedure, towards an unidentified individual in the area and that Israel Defense Forces were aware of the presence of UNIFIL personnel and fired the warning shots with the utmost caution.

58. On 30 March, a laser was pointed at a UNIFIL patrol near Udaysah (Sector East) from an Israel Defense Forces tank. The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that the actions were not intended to cause harm or intimidate UNIFIL, and that it had emphasised the importance to its personnel to not aim lasers or fire warning shots towards UNIFIL.

59. On 1 April, an Israel Defense Forces soldier fired five shots in the air and three shots in the direction of a UNIFIL patrol near Udaysah (Sector East). The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that the area where the incident took place has a history of infiltration attempts, and that "the action taken by Israel Defense Forces was not intended to cause harm or intimidate UNIFIL forces".

60. On 2 April, a stationary Israel Defense Forces tank aimed its turret at a UNIFIL patrol northeast of Hula (Sector East).
61. Overnight on 1 to 2 April, an Israel Defense Forces tank blocked a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Naqurah (Sector West). After about an hour, the tank was moved, and the patrol continued. The Israel Defense Forces have informed UNIFIL that they had blocked the road while marking a mine field.
62. On 10 April, a group of 11 Israel Defense Forces soldiers clearing vegetation, stopped a UNIFIL patrol south of Alma al-Sha'b. The patrol managed to proceed shortly thereafter. The Israel Defense Forces has informed UNIFIL that they had "engaged in a respectful conversation and allowed them [the UNIFIL patrol] to proceed on their way, without interruption".
63. On 28 April, an Israel Defense Forces tank located at one of its positions north of the Blue Line pointed the turret at a UNIFIL patrol southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
64. On 6 May UNIFIL issued a "stop-firing" request after five trajectories were detected and UNIFIL observed several points of impact near a UN position southeast of Marun al-Ra's (Sector West).
65. On 7 May, an Israel Defense Forces tank located south of the Blue Line, south of Alma al-Sha'b used its laser rangefinders on UNIFIL vehicles and turned their turrets toward the patrol. The UNIFIL patrol withdrew to a safe location and continued to monitor the situation. While withdrawing, the patrol was followed by a drone.
66. On 13 May, Israel Defense Forces personnel at the positions north of the Blue Line near Marun al-Ra's pointed a laser at a UNIFIL patrol vehicle's camera system.
67. On 13 May, the Israel Defense Forces fired two shots towards a UN position southeast of Kfar Shuba (Sector East), with one point of impact on a defensive barrier of the shelter. Peacekeepers took shelter and issued a "stop-firing" request. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that the action "was not intended to cause harm or intimidate UNIFIL forces" and that the Israel Defense Forces Command had "drawn lessons from the incident".
68. On 17 May, Israel Defense Forces personnel north of the Blue Line pointed lasers at UNIFIL personnel southeast of Marun al-Ra's.
69. On 19 May Israel Defense Forces personnel located north of the Blue Line pointed lasers at UNIFIL personnel, southeast of Marun al-Ra's. The laser from a tank appeared to scan the UNIFIL vehicles and camera system.
70. On 29 May, the Israel Defense Forces fired approximately 30 small arms rounds about 50 metres in front of a combined UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces patrol, southwest of Yarun. Following up on the incident, the Israel Defense Forces stated that the UNIFIL forces "positioned themselves in the direction from which the Israel Defense Forces were securing themselves".
71. On 30 May, the Israel Defense Forces aimed the turret of a tank, toward UNIFIL peacekeepers who were removing a roadblock near Markaba (Sector East). Simultaneously, at least ten Israel Defense Forces soldiers took up firing positions in the peacekeepers' direction. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that removing the roadblock required "approval".
72. On 31 May, an Israel Defense Forces soldier pointed his weapon toward a UN position, southwest of Alma al-Sha'b.
73. On 4 June, one UNIFIL Maritime Task Force vessel was illuminated by what seemed to be an Israel Defense Forces drone radar on at least four occasions. Such behavior could be interpreted as threatening and could have triggered a reaction in self-defense by the vessel.

74. On 7 June, after Israel Defense Forces soldiers installed a roadblock in the vicinity of observation point MAR, southeast of Markaba, Israel Defense Forces troops inside the Israel Defense Forces position pointed a laser at UNIFIL troops.

75. On 8 June, as a UNIFIL patrol attempted to remove an Israel Defense Forces roadblock southwest of Markaba (Sector East), an Israel Defense Forces tank drew up less than 20 meters away and pointed its turret towards the peacekeepers. UNIFIL cancelled its activity.

76. On 16 June, UNIFIL reported warning shots fired near a UNIFIL patrol, southwest of Kfar Kila (Sector East). UNIFIL observed two 120 mm shells originating from an Israel Defense Forces Merkava tank, located south of the Blue Line, impacting approximately 600 meters from their location. No injuries or damage were reported. The LAF were informed.

77. On 19 June, a UNIFIL patrol in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces west of Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West), where it was interrupted by an Israel Defense Forces drone equipped with a loudspeaker, warning the patrol to leave the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces decided to relocate to a safe area and canceled the activity.

Incidents not attributed to any party

78. UNIFIL also experienced a number of incidents interfering with its operations that cannot be ascribed to any of the parties.

79. On 19 March, a UNIFIL soldier was severely injured in a landmine explosion during a foot patrol near Zibqin (Sector West). The injured peacekeeper was subsequently medically evacuated from Lebanon.

80. On 15 May, UNIFIL peacekeepers discovered minor damage to a UN position, southwest of Shab'a, likely caused by the shock wave from indirect artillery fire originating south of the Blue Line.

81. UNIFIL peacekeepers experienced temporary electronic interference while operating near Alma al-Sha'b on 24 May, At Tiri on 5 May and 18 June, Yarun on 13 and 14 May, as well as Ayn Ibil and Marun al Ra's on 16 May. UNIFIL also experienced manipulation of a maritime vessel's automatic identification system device while at sea on 13, 14 and 15 June.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) states that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
2. In identical letters dated 29 May addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2025/XX), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that, “Hezbollah persists in its efforts to transfer money through Lebanon’s border crossings, including via Beirut International Airport, and to smuggle arms across the Syria-Lebanon border, in direct violation of the arms embargo [...]”. The Permanent Representative further conveyed that [these actions] “underscore the strategic objective of Iran and Hezbollah to rearm and re-establish Hezbollah’s military presence across Lebanon, spanning areas north and south of the Litani River”. The Permanent Representative appealed: “The Security Council must also adopt measures to deter Iran from continuing its transfer of weapons and financial support to Hezbollah [...] it is imperative that Member States take action to prevent the flow of funds to Hezbollah through their territories.”
3. Following allegations reported in the media about Hizbullah weapons smuggling at the port of Beirut, President Aoun and Minister of Public Works and Transport Fayez Rasamny on 11 April conducted an inspection of the port. Two days earlier, Minister Rasamny, in a press conference at the port, stated: “Security at the port is under close surveillance and we reject any media discourse that casts doubt on this matter.”
4. As detailed in paragraph 55 of this report, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,476 vessels.
5. Following a series of airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs on 5 June (see para. 11), the Israel Defense Forces stated: “Hezbollah’s air force unit continued its terrorist activities and developed its capabilities. The unit is working to produce thousands of drones, under the guidance and funding of Iranian terrorist groups, as part of Iranian efforts aimed at striking the State of Israel. Over the past years, Iran has been funding and directing terrorist plots in the project, in partnership with Hezbollah. Hezbollah operatives travel to Iran to provide guidance on production, with the goal of developing Hezbollah’s own production.”
6. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 10 of its resolution [2591 \(2021\)](#). It urged further and increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including daily logistical needs and maintenance, counter-terrorism, border protection, and naval capacity.

2. In identical letters dated 9 January 2024 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General ([S/2024/36](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations stated that, "The Government of Lebanon also requests support from the United Nations to help the Lebanese State extend its authority over the entirety of Lebanese territory by strengthening its armed forces. In particular, support should be provided for deployment of those forces south of the Litani River, and they should be provided with equipment in cooperation with [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)], so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)." Subsequently, on 29 February 2024, Lebanon's then-caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati stated that to implement resolution 1701, the Army would need allied countries to help with everything from "fuel to equipment to means of transportation to the barracks and even to weapons – everything the Army needs."

3. In a presidential statement adopted on 16 January 2025 ([S/PRST/2025/1](#)), the United Nations Security Council called for further international assistance to strengthen State institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces.

4. The Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Toward the Implementation of UNSCR 1701, which was circulated to the United Nations Security Council by the United Kingdom in its capacity as President of the Security Council ([S/2024/870](#)), noted the intention of the United States and France to work with the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon and the wider international community to support enhanced Lebanese Armed Forces deployment to southern Lebanon and to strengthen the capabilities of the Army.

5. In his inaugural address on 9 January 2025, President Joseph Aoun underscored the need to invest in the Lebanese Armed Forces, including through investment from the Lebanese State itself, in order to secure the country's borders and contribute to stabilization in the south. During the reporting period, regional and global leaders have continued to champion a surge in support aimed at enhancing the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out its critical tasks. The Lebanese authorities have made several calls for increased international support to be channeled to the Army.

6. Support to the Lebanese Army has been a central theme of President Aoun's official visits in the region. In his visit to Riyadh on 3 March, a joint statement released by President Aoun and the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud emphasized the need

to support and empower the Lebanese Armed Forces towards asserting the authority of the State across Lebanon. Following his visit to Doha, on 16 April President Aoun and his Qatari counterpart Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani released a joint communiqué which stated, “Both sides emphasized the national role of the Lebanese Army, the importance of supporting it, and the need to implement Resolution 1701 in all its provisions.” The imperative to support the Lebanese Armed Forces was also cited during a 19 May press conference between President Aoun and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi during the former’s official visit to Cairo. Jordan’s support to the Lebanese Armed Forces was acknowledged according to a readout from His Majesty’s office during a meeting on 10 June between President Aoun and King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein.

7. Several commitments were announced by Member States in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the reporting period. On 18 June, a signing ceremony was held to mark Germany’s commitment to provide €17.85 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The grant will be used to procure essential equipment, uniforms and material for the Army. On 16 April, during the above-mentioned trip by President Aoun to Doha, the Emir of the State of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, announced a \$60 million grant to supplement the salaries of Lebanese Army personnel, as well as a commitment to provide military vehicles. In the reporting period, the Government of the Netherlands pledged an additional amount of €7.5 million for support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, to fund infrastructure, equipment, border control efforts, and mine action.

8. Several Member States provided equipment or other forms of in-kind support to bolster the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United States delivered additional assets and tactical support, including to advance explosive ordnance disposal, as well as infrastructural support. France and Italy provided equipment, logistics assistance, training-based capacity development, and livelihood and sustainment support, with Türkiye also providing equipment. Assistance from the United Kingdom and France was used to enhance training centres and related infrastructure. The United Kingdom also continued its support to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area of border management. Canadian support was directed towards the provision of uniforms and procurement of equipment, while both Canada and Türkiye, alongside other donors, bolstered capacity building and training initiatives. France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and the United States channeled assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide direct support to local communities in southern Lebanon.

9. With a view to bolstering the coordination of international support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was signed on 14 May between the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), the United Nations Development Programme in Lebanon, and Lebanon’s Ministry of National Defense. The memorandum of understanding formalizes the “LAF Livelihood Ecosystem” project managed by the United Nations Development Programme to address the sustenance needs of Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and their families, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. With the support of France, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces signed a separate memorandum of understanding, on 10 June for the provision of non-lethal material support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

10. As part of international resource mobilization efforts to support enhanced Lebanese Armed Forces deployment in southern Lebanon, the Military Technical Committee convened for a two-day meeting in Beirut and Naqurah on 20 and 21 March, respectively, and in Berlin on 10 and 11 June to take stock of existing support streams and identify remaining gaps. Both UNSCOL and UNIFIL participated

as observers, with the latter hosting the Committee at its base in Naqurah on 21 March. A rise in candidacies for membership in the Military Technical Committee points to growing multilateral interest in supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, with the membership of Cyprus confirmed by the Committee during its Berlin meeting in June. Since the inception of the Military Technical Committee in March 2024, \$384 million has been mobilized.

11. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces continued during the reporting period. Donor funding totaling approximately \$25 million, including pledges, from Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Spain, was channeled through the above-mentioned LAF Livelihood Ecosystem [see annex III, para. 9] in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Separately, under a broader United Nations country team strategy of support to the security sector, seven United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are supporting the implementation of 18 projects in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. The United Nations also provided direct assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces to promote and mainstream inclusive gender policies.

12. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, together with UNIFIL and international partners, continues to engage with potential donors to secure future support to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
